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ABSTRACT 
Web services provide a platform neutral and programming language independent 
technology that supports interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a 
network. Clients and other systems interact with Web services using a 
standardised XML messaging system, such as the Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP), typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialisation in 
conjunction with other related Web standards. Nevertheless, the idea of 
applications from different parties communicating together raises a security threat. 
The challenge of Web services security is to understand and consider the risks of 
securing a Web-based service depending on the existing security techniques and 
simultaneously follow evolving standards in order to fill the gap in Web services 
security. However, the performance of the security mechanisms is fraught with 
concerns due to additional security contents in SOAP messages, the higher 
number of message exchanges to establish trust, as well as the extra CPU time to 
process these additions. As the interaction between service providers and 
requesters occurs via XML-based SOAP messages, securing Web services tends 
to make these messages longer than they would be otherwise and consequently 
requires interpretation by XML parsers on both sides, which reduces the 
performance of Web services. The work described in this thesis can be broadly 
divided into three parts, the first of which is studying and comparing the 
performance of various security profiles applied on a Web service tested with 
different initial message sizes.  
The second part proposes a multi-criteria decision making framework to aid Web 
services developers and architects in selecting the best suited security profile that 
satisfies the different requirements of a given application during the development 
process in a systematic, manageable, and effective way. The proposed framework, 
based on the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach, incorporates not only 
the security requirements, but also the performance considerations as well as the 
configuration constraints of these security profiles. The framework is then 
validated and evaluated using a scenario-driven approach to demonstrate 
situations where the decision making framework is used to make informed 
  ii 
decisions to rank various security profiles in order to select the most suitable one 
for each scenario. 
Finally, the last part of this thesis develops a novel steganography method to be 
used for SOAP messages within Web services environments. This method is 
based on changing the order of XML elements according to a secret message. This 
method has a high imperceptibility; it leaves almost no trail because it uses the 
communication protocol as a cover medium, and keeps the structure and size of 
the SOAP message intact. The method is empirically validated using a feasible 
scenario so as to indicate its utility and value.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
The Internet has changed the business world in a revolutionary way to a virtual 
world where the customer is served around the clock and around the world. In 
order to increase the productivity, decrease the cost and satisfy the customer, most 
of the organisations have shifted their business policies from a traditional way into 
applying Internet-based technologies (Yang, 2002; Rao et al., 2004). In this 
context, distributed computing has been the magical key enabling the business 
over the Internet (Nagappan, Skoczylas & Sriganesh, 2003). 
In early stages, two basic standards, HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and 
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), were developed in order to enable the 
sharing of documents across the distributed network which led to the great success 
of the Web. Later, the Web became the preferable platform for many applications 
especially e-commerce, which illustrated the need of transferring the Web from 
the human-centric paradigm to the application-centric paradigm (Cerami, 2002; 
Hondo, Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002; Nandigam, Gudivada & Kalavala, 2005). 
Many technologies have been developed to enable the movement from the human 
end-user interaction to the application-application interaction. Each of them has 
succeeded in its mission to a certain degree, but most of these systems consisted 
of ad hoc solutions (Cerami, 2002). According to Nandigam, Gudivada & 
Kalavala (2005), many solutions, such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC), 
Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), Component Object 
Model/ Distributed Component Object Model (COM/DCOM), Java Remote 
Method Invocation (RMI) and Message based application integration, had the idea 
of component-based software. However, they were determined by difficulties that 
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appeared because of the non-transparency and dependency on programming 
languages, operating systems, data representations and network protocols. 
The idea of Web services came about to overcome the previously mentioned 
problems, while offering the promise of automated Web with some 
standardisation in order to lower the barrier of application integration (Cerami, 
2002). 
A Web service is an application that is available on the Internet, or intranet, uses a 
standardised eXtensible Markup Language (XML) messaging system, and 
independent of any programming language or operating system (Cerami, 2002; 
Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). This technology is based on the 
standard Internet protocols, such as HTTP, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), as well as XML-based protocols, such as 
the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Web Services Description Language 
(WSDL),  Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) and Web 
Services Security (WS-Security) (Yang, 2002; Rao et al., 2004; Hondo, 
Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002). Web services provide a standardised way for 
applications to expose their functionality and communicate with other applications 
over a network, regardless of its implementation, programming language or 
platform (Singh et al., 2004). 
The idea of applications from different parties communicating together raises a 
security threat, however. The security of exchanged messages is thus an important 
issue to be taken into consideration in Web services. The recipient of the message 
should be able to confirm its integrity and assure that it has not been modified. 
Additionally, the message should be delivered to the recipient confidentially 
where only the authorised users could read it, know the identity of the sender and 
determine the operation requested in the message (Mi et al., 2005). The challenge 
of Web services security is to understand and consider the risks of securing a 
Web-based service depending on the existing security techniques and 
simultaneously follow evolving standards in order to bridge the gap in Web 
services security. Any security model should illustrate the data flow through an 
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application and network topology without exposing it to undue risk (Hondo, 
Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002). 
1.2 Research Motivations 
As the interaction between service providers and requesters occurs via XML-
based SOAP messages, securing Web services tends to make these messages 
longer than they would be otherwise and consequently require interpretation by 
XML parsers on both sides, which reduces the performance of Web services 
(Menasce, 2002). The cost, in terms of performance, of securing Web services can 
be significant. The trade-off between performance and security depends primarily 
on the security approach that is used to secure the Web service (Novakouski et al., 
2010). There are occasions when a simple transport-level security protocol, such 
as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) standard, is sufficient to meet the security 
requirements. However, for many types of applications, SSL alone is insufficient 
and more rigorous message-based mechanisms should be implemented (Sosnoski, 
2009). 
Moreover, as different standards and techniques for securing Web services have 
been developed by several organisations and various members of industry, some 
of these standards and techniques complement and extend each other, while others 
conflict or compete in the mix. Thus, selecting an appropriate security profile 
represents a complex dilemma for Web services architects and developers. This is 
due to the following three reasons: (1) There is no one supreme Web service 
security profile for all cases; i.e. different Web services security profiles achieve 
different requirements; (2) Applying different security profiles normally results in 
different quality measurements of a certain Web service; and (3) Different 
organisations usually have different requirements and even the same organisation 
may establish different requirements across different software applications. 
Furthermore, choosing the best-suited Web service profile to be deployed for a 
certain application in a particular organisation is a complex undertaking decision-
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making task.  This decision is usually uninformed as in many cases the decision is 
based on the sole experience of the developer. In some other cases, developers 
tend to use a profile that is (a) configurable based on the organisation’s‎
infrastructure; (b) developers are familiar with; or (c) supported by existing 
providers, without taking into consideration other security profiles. This is in fact 
represents the problem space.  
Accordingly, the selection of a candidate profile, in an ideal world, should depend 
on evaluating the available security profiles against all the requirements of the 
given Web services application. Ideally, Web services developers specify a set of 
requirements according to the service provider’s security preferences and 
technological constraints, taking into consideration the level of performance 
expected by the service consumer. The requirements can be divided into several 
dimensions according to different independent criteria and sub-criteria to create a 
multi-dimensional model. Each criterion and sub-criterion is given a weight 
according to its level of importance in the application. Each candidate solution is 
also weighted against each sub-criterion according to what extent this particular 
solution matches the requirement represented by this sub-criterion. 
Generally, service providers set these weights on the basis of judgment. When 
there are a small number of selection criteria, direct judgments are possible; yet 
when the number of requirements is large, the direct judgement may favour the 
key elements only (Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008). In such a multi-criteria decision 
making model, it is important to have quantifiable values that are rational and 
consistent. 
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1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The previous section (‎1.2) has highlighted that there is a considerable number of 
different security profiles and mechanisms that can be employed for Web 
services. Selecting a security profile for a given Web service often requires 
understanding the trade-offs between security and performance. Accordingly, the 
main aim of this research is thus: 
To develop a prototypical framework that aids Web services 
architects to select the best suited security approach that 
satisfies the security and performance requirements of a given 
Web services application. 
In fulfilling this aim, the following objectives are considered important to be 
achieved: 
Objective 1: Design a performance testing model to understand the cost of 
applying security profiles on the performance of Web services. 
Objective 2: Develop a decision making framework based on the results gathered 
from the testing model, as well as the security requirements and 
system limitations. 
Objective 3: Evaluate the developed framework through the use of real scenarios 
so as to indicate the‎framework’s utility and value. 
Objective 4: Explore and evaluate the feasibility of using steganography as an 
alternative approach to secure Web services. 
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1.4 Research Approach 
The paradigm followed in this research is the Design-Science Research (DSR). 
This research aims, by utilising DSR, at producing an artefact in the form of a 
framework to help architects and developers to choose the best-suited security 
approaches for Web services applications. The aim of this research is highly 
consistent with the general aim of DSR.  
In the context of this research, designing and developing a framework for 
selecting the most fitting security profile for a certain Web services application is 
the tackled wicked problem. In the context of design-science research, the term 
“wicked‎ problems”‎ can‎ be‎ described‎ as‎ unstructured‎ decision-making activities 
and‎ settings.‎ This‎ is‎ because‎ these‎ types‎ of‎ decisions‎ are‎ normally‎ “poorly‎
formulated, confusing, and permeated with conflicting values of many decision 
makers or other stakeholders” (Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2008).  
Design artefacts are classified by March & Smith (1995), and anchored by Hevner 
et al. (2004), into constructs of vocabulary and symbols, models representing 
reality with appropriate levels of abstraction, methods in the form of algorithms 
and practices, and instantiations which are implemented systems and/or their 
prototypes developed as proof-of-concepts (Al-Debei & Fitzgerald, 2010). The 
developed framework in this thesis represents a model artefact which includes 
constructs. While its application and use in the course of the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process and the steganographical embedding/extracting algorithms represents the 
method artefacts. Developing the AHP and Steganography applications as 
software as well as the usage of real scenarios to validate them denote the 
instantiations. 
The scheme to construct design artefacts is still very broad. Two main and general 
processes are identified by March & Smith (1995) as build and evaluate. Whilst 
building design artefacts demonstrate feasibility, they are evaluated against 
criteria of value to a community of intended users to ensure utility, quality, and 
efficacy (Hevner et al., 2004). Importantly, Design Science Research stresses the 
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importance of iterations in producing the design artefacts and assumes that reality 
and knowledge emerge throughout the iterations effort (Markus, Majchrzak & 
Gasser, 2002; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009). 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on Web services security and its related 
specifications. The trade-off between security and performance is highlighted and 
several approaches to analyse the performance of Web services security and 
selecting the best security approach are explored. The discussion identifies the 
research gaps that this thesis is addressing. 
Chapter 3 details the research methodology employed in this thesis. A theoretical 
grounding of Design Science Research (DSR) is provided in this chapter. 
Thereafter, The DSR paradigm is justified as a suitable approach for this research. 
The research conducted in this thesis is then explained in line with the DSR 
research cycle. 
Chapter 4 describes a set of performance tests conducted to evaluate the 
performance of various security profiles applied on a Web service, and tested with 
different initial message sizes. The results are used to compare the performance of 
SSL-based profiles against the message-level security ones. We also analyse the 
penalty of using SAML-based, STS-based, symmetric vs. asymmetric and 
reliability profiles on the performance of Web services. 
Chapter 5 introduces a novel Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) decision-
making framework for Web service security profiles. This framework represents 
the solution space which aims to make the decision in this context more informed, 
systematic, manageable, and effective by providing developers with an approach 
through which they can prioritise the security requirements, rank the available 
alternatives accordingly, and then select the profile that best fulfils their defined 
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requirements. Three real-life scenarios are then tested using this framework and 
the results are compared to those presented in documentations of best practices to 
verify its efficiency. 
Chapter 6 discusses a number of steganographic studies in text, XML as well as 
SOAP messages, and then proposes a novel steganography method to be used for 
SOAP messages within Web services environments. The method is based on 
rearranging the order of specific XML elements according to a secret message. 
This method is then empirically validated using a feasible example so as to 
illustrate its utility and value. 
Chapter 7 summarises the research findings and outlines the research 
contributions to the knowledge. Finally, the limitations of this research are 
discussed and directions for future research are explored. 
 
 
  
‎Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
 
Bachar Alrouh 9 
Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the Web services technology and its security 
standards and specifications. It also reviews previous research in the fields of 
performance analysis and selecting the most suitable approach to secure Web 
services. Accordingly, the chapter is organised as follows: the Web services 
technology is presented in section ‎2.2. The Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
is described in section ‎2.3. Section ‎2.4 explores the different Web service 
standards. The benefits of Web services and the challenges that face their 
development are mentioned in sections ‎2.5 and ‎2.6, respectively. Section ‎2.7 
defines the security requirements of Web services and Section ‎2.8 describes the 
basic cryptographic concepts. Various XML and Web services security standards 
are explored in section ‎2.9, while the Web Services Interoperability Technology 
(WSIT) is introduced in section ‎2.10. Related studies in the subjects of 
performance analysis and decision making are reviewed in sections ‎2.11 and ‎2.12. 
Finally, section ‎2.13 summarises the chapter and highlights the research gap. 
2.2 Web Services 
It is generally accepted that Web services are applications that are available on the 
Internet or the intranet, use a standardised XML messaging system, and are 
independent of any programming language or operating system (Cerami, 2002; 
Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). This technology is based on the 
standard Internet protocols (e.g., HTTP, FTP, and SMTP) as well as XML-based 
protocols (such as SOAP, WSDL, UDDI and WSS) (Yang, 2002; Rao et al., 2004; 
Hondo, Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002). The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
defines‎ a‎Web‎ service‎ as‎ “a software system designed to support interoperable 
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machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a 
machine-processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the 
Web service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, 
typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialisation in conjunction with 
other Web-related standards.”‎(Booth et al., 2004). 
Web‎ services’‎ applications‎ can‎ be implemented with different programming 
models. These models fall into three main categories (Goncalves, 2010), which 
shall now be presented: 
2.2.1  XML-RPC Web Services 
XML-RPC is a remote procedure call protocol. This protocol uses XML for 
marking up the Web services requests and responses (Lerner, 2001; Zimmerman, 
2007).  In an XML-RPC model, the service requester passes a request which 
contains the method name and parameters wrapped in XML that defines their data 
types. The response comes back with similar data (Zimmerman, 2007). RPC-
based Web services are easy to implement when using scripting languages, which 
have very loose data types (Muller, 2010). However, the main criticism of XML-
RPC is not being loosely-coupled, because it is usually implemented by mapping 
services directly to language-specific functions or method calls (Muller, 2010). 
Moreover, this mechanism does not handle advanced data structures (Lerner, 
2001). Therefore, many vendors felt this approach to be a cul-de-sac and stopped 
their support for RPC-style Web services. 
2.2.2  REST-based Web Services 
REST (REpresentational State Transfer) Web services are collections of Web 
resources, which are identified by their Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs). 
Every document and process is modelled as a Web resource with a unique URI 
(Goncalves, 2010). These Web resources are manipulated by actions that can be 
specified in an HTTP header. Messages can be exchanged in any format, such as 
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XML, HTML, without the need for the WSDL or SOAP protocols. A Web 
browser can serve as a client in many cases. A Web service interacts with 
resources, rather than working with messages and operations. HTTP is the main 
protocol in REST, where only four methods are available: GET, PUT, POST, and 
DELETE (Goncalves, 2010; Netbeans, 2011). REST can typically be used for 
simpler applications, where HTTP is the appropriate protocol, and when the 
HTTP infrastructure alone can satisfy the security requirements of these 
applications (Netbeans, 2011). 
2.2.3  SOAP-Based Web Services 
The business logic of SOAP-based Web service is exposed on the net via a WSDL 
document. Messages are exchanged between the Web service and its clients using 
SOAP messages. SOAP-based Web services are suitable for complex 
applications, where complicated operations are required, or for applications 
requiring advanced security (Goncalves, 2010).  
For the purpose of this thesis, and because the main focus is the security of Web 
services, all the discussion will be based on SOAP-based Web services. 
2.3 Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
The word services in Web services refers to the Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) (O’Neill‎ et‎ al.,‎ 2003). SOA is a recent development in distributed 
computing, in which an application can call a functionality from another 
application over a network (O’Neill‎et‎al.,‎2003). This architectural style supports 
software reusability by creating reusable services in comparison with the 
traditional Object-Oriented Architecture (OOA), which supports reusability by 
reusing classes or objects (Booch, 1986). The major difficulty with OOA is that 
objects are often too fine-grained for efficient reusability. Therefore, a 
Component-Oriented Architecture (COA) has emerged to use software 
components as reusable entities, which consist of a set of related classes, 
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resources and configuration information (Singh et al., 2004). Although COA is a 
powerful way to design software systems, it does not address the additional issues 
emerging from current-day enterprise environments, which have become rather 
complicated because of using different software and hardware platforms, Internet-
based distributed communication and enterprise application integration (Brown, 
Johnston & Kelly, 2002; Singh et al., 2004). The Service-Oriented Architecture 
addresses these issues by using services as reusable entities (He, 2003). 
According to Cerami (2002), He (2003) and Carminati, Ferrari & Hung (2005), 
there are three major roles in the Service-Oriented Architecture: 
 A service provider that implements the service and makes it available for a 
particular business purpose. 
 A service requester that utilises an existing Web service to meet business 
requirements. 
 A service registry which is a centralised place where developers can 
provide new Web services or use the existing ones. 
An important aim of Service-Oriented Architecture is to achieve loose 
coupling among interacting software agents (He, 2003). To enable this, the 
following mechanisms should be available (Singh et al., 2004): 
 A mechanism for clients to access services and registries. 
 A mechanism for services to be registered with registries and for 
clients to search these registries for their required services. The Web 
services’ architecture enables services that are located over the 
network with transparent locations to be dynamically discovered by 
clients. 
 A mechanism for well-defined Web‎services’‎interfaces to be exposed 
in a way that enables clients to access those interfaces. 
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In a Web service model, functionality is published on a network where two 
important capabilities are provided: the first is the ability to find the functionality 
(discovery), and the second is the ability to connect to the functionality (binding). 
These capabilities are represented by three roles: Web services provider, Web 
services requester and Web services broker (O’Neill‎ et‎ al.,‎ 2003;‎ Carminati,‎
Ferrari & Hung, 2005). The publish-find-bind model is illustrated in Figure ‎2-1. 
 
Figure  2-1: The Publish-Find-Bind Model (O’Neill‎et‎al.,‎2003) 
2.4  Web Service Standards 
Singh et al. (2004) have stated that for any technology to be successful, the 
technology standards must be widely accepted. To enable such a wide acceptance, 
Web services standards and systems that implement those standards should have 
the following criteria: 
 “A Web service should be able to service requests from any client 
regardless of the platform on which the client is implemented”. 
 “A client should be able to find and use any Web service regardless of the 
service’s‎implementation‎details‎or‎the‎platform‎on‎which‎it‎runs”. 
Standards enable Web services to achieve wide acceptance and interoperability by 
establishing a base of commonality.  
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The main Web services standards cover the following areas: 
 Common markup language for communication. 
 Common message format for exchanging information. 
 Common service specification formats. 
 Common means for service lookup. 
Figure ‎2-2 illustrates a stack of the main standards on which Web services are 
generally based on: 
 
Figure  2-2: The Web Services Technology Stack (Albreshne, Fuhrer & 
Pasquier, 2009) 
2.4.1  Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) is a simple and flexible text based 
markup language. This standard is accepted throughout the computer industry as it 
facilitates the communication between service providers and requesters using a 
common language. XML is also independent of any platform or technology. 
Messages in XML can be exchanged over the Internet using standard Internet 
protocols such as HTTP (Guruge, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a). 
‎Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
 
Bachar Alrouh 15 
Tags enclosed in angled brackets are used to mark XML data; the tags contain the 
meaning of the data they mark. The XML tag usage is different from HTML, 
which is oriented to displaying data. Thus, unlike HTML, display is not intrinsic 
in XML (Cerami, 2002). 
XML is a product of the W3C. Therefore, changes to it will be supported by all 
leading parties. This means that when XML evolves, Web services can also 
evolve without having concerns about compatibility (Singh et al., 2004). 
2.4.2  Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
As XML fills the need for a common language, the Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP) solves the need for a common messaging format (Mitra & 
Lafon, 2007). SOAP enables different objects to communicate by exchanging 
messages. SOAP is an XML-based protocol that uses data encoding format and 
HTTP/SMTP to transfer messages. SOAP does not require any specific 
technology at its endpoints because of its independency of programming 
languages and platforms. Moreover, SOAP is also supported by leading industrial 
parties (Singh et al., 2004). 
 
Figure  2-3: SOAP Message Structure (Singh et al., 2004) 
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SOAP defines an envelope, which contains a SOAP body, where the message is 
included, and an optional header. The SOAP envelope, body plus header, is an 
XML document (Mitra & Lafon, 2007). Figure ‎2-3 illustrates a SOAP envelope: 
2.4.3  Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 
The role of the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is to define a 
standard way for specifying the details of a Web service (Christensen et al., 2001). 
Details of Web service interfaces, bindings and other deployment details are 
specified using a general-purpose XML schema. That enables clients without prior 
knowledge of the service to use that Web service (Adams & Boeyen, 2002; Singh 
et al., 2004). 
 
Figure  2-4: WSDL Service Description (Singh et al., 2004) 
WSDL grammar describes Web services as a collection of communication 
endpoints, as shown in Figure ‎2-4. The exchanged data are specified as part of 
messages. Every action allowed at an endpoint is an operation. In addition, port 
types are grouped together collections of operations that are possible on an 
endpoint. The port types, operations as well as messages are all abstract 
definitions, which do not hold deployment-dependent details in order to enable 
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their reuse. A binding is specified by a protocol and data format specifications for 
a particular port type. A port is defined when a network address is associated with 
a reusable binding. A collection of ports, in turn, defines a service. Furthermore, 
WSDL specifies a common binding mechanism to bring together all protocols and 
data formats with an abstract message, operation, or endpoint (Singh et al., 2004). 
2.4.4  Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration 
(UDDI) 
The Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) specification 
defines a standard way for registering, deregistering, and looking up Web services 
(Clement et al., 2004). UDDI is a standards-based specification for Web service 
registration, description, and discovery.  
 
Figure  2-5: Role of Registry in a Web Service (Singh et al., 2004) 
The main purpose of UDDI registry is to enable service providers to register their 
services with‎a‎“broker”‎and requesters to find services advertised by this broker. 
The role that UDDI plays between the service requester and the service provider 
ends when a requester finds the service; a service provider registers its services 
with the broker (i.e. UDDI registry). A service requester then searches for the 
required service in the UDDI registry. When the required service is found, the 
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service requester binds directly with the service provider to use that service (Singh 
et al., 2004), as illustrated in Figure ‎2-5. 
Using the UDDI specification, an XML schema is defined for applications 
wanting to use the registry. A service provider registering its Web service with a 
UDDI registry must provide service, business, binding and technical information 
about the service (Adams & Boeyen, 2002; Singh et al., 2004). This information 
is stored in a common format that contains three parts: 
1. White pages that describe general business information such as name, 
description, phone numbers, etc. 
2. Yellow pages that describe the business using terms of standard 
classifications (taxonomies), which follow standard industrial 
categorisations in order to enable locating services by industry, category, 
or geographical location information. 
3. Green pages that list the service, binding, and service-specific technical 
information. 
Web services standards have been widely accepted throughout enterprises and the 
popularity of Web services is increasing because of the benefits they provide. 
2.5 Benefits of Web Services 
According to Singh et al. (2004) and Albreshne, Fuhrer & Pasquier (2009), these 
are the benefits enterprises gain from adopting Web services: 
2.5.1  Interoperability 
The key feature of the Web services model is that it allows various distributed 
services to be implemented using different programming languages and executed 
on a variety of software platforms and architectures. This is a vital benefit in large 
enterprises, where different solutions and systems that often require different 
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platforms are developed over the time; Web services thus enable interoperability 
in these heterogeneous environments and various systems can use the services to 
easily interoperate with each other. 
2.5.2  Expanding Business Services Through the Web 
In the business world, Web services can be used to build upon the benefits of the 
World Wide Web for its operations. For example, product catalogues can be made 
available to retailers through a Web service to achieve better supply chain 
management.  
2.5.3  Enabling Integration With Existing Systems 
Most enterprises have a huge amount of data stored in existing enterprise 
information systems and databases, and the cost of replacing these systems may 
not be a reasonable option. Web services provide developers with standard ways 
to access middle-tier and back-end services without forcing developers to learn 
new programming models or styles. 
2.5.4  Freedom of Choice 
Web service standards have expanded the marketplace for tools, products, and 
technologies. This gives organisations an extensive diversity of choices, and they 
can select configurations that best cover their application requirements. 
Developers can improve their productivity because they can choose from a ready 
market of pre-built application components rather than having to develop their 
own solutions. Moreover, these tools enable developers to move quickly and 
easily from one configuration to another as needed. Web services also guarantee 
the standardisation of tools, so that developers can choose to adopt tools from 
either server vendors or a third party, depending on the requirements. 
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2.5.5  Supporting More Client Types 
Web services enable more client types to use applications and services. They aim 
at supporting interoperability, and therefore, extending the reach of existing 
applications or services to various client types. This does not depend on the 
platform on which the client is based. For example, a client can be based on a Java 
or Microsoft platform or even a wireless platform. 
2.5.6  Increasing Programming Productivity 
Productivity in an information-driven economy demands the ability of developing 
and deploying applications in a reasonable time frame. It means that applications 
should go rapidly from the prototyping stage to the production phase and 
simultaneously continue to evolve even after they are placed into production. 
Productivity is improved when application development teams have standard 
ways to access the services required by multi-tier applications and standard means 
to support a different types of clients, and that what Web services provide by 
creating a common programming standard. Before the appearance of Web 
services, distributed computing environments have had many different 
technologies, which are not always compatible. Developers have tried to tie 
several different systems together, such as custom and standard database 
management systems and transaction processors, with traditional Web 
technologies, but have had to deal with a large number of different programming 
models. Since Web services introduce a common standard across the Web, 
vendors, in order to stay in the competition, are more likely to develop better tools 
and technologies to attract developer, and so the  whole industry benefits. 
Thanks to its advantages, Web services technology has rapidly extended through 
enterprises. However, there are many challenges that face Web services 
technology. To benefit from this new technology, these challenges should be well 
addressed. 
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2.6 Challenges of Web Services Development 
The Web services specifications are evolving quickly and sometimes in 
unexpected directions. These specifications vary in their degrees of maturity and 
therefore these technologies may change as they are extended to provide improved 
Web services support (Singh et al., 2004). Moreover, they are supported and 
maintained by various standards organisations, and as a result they may 
complement, overlap or compete with each other (Lakshminarayanan, 2010); thus, 
it is important to take these factors into consideration when developing Web 
services. 
2.6.1  Security 
Unsurprisingly, security is as important for Web services as it is for other 
enterprise applications. As a matter of fact, security becomes an even more 
important aspect‎ as‎ applications‎ on‎ the‎Web‎ expose‎ their‎ enterprise’s‎ processes 
and business data to distributed, and not necessarily trusted, clients (Hondo, 
Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002; Holgersson & Soderstrom, 2005; Mahmoud, 2005). 
2.6.2  Advancing Technologies 
Although the basic Web services' standards and protocols (including WSDL and 
SOAP) have matured during the last decade, there is a growing number of 
supporting protocols , referred to as WS-* protocols , that have yet to reach the 
level or wide adoption SOAP and WSDL have achieved (Kontogiannis, 2008). 
In addition, Interoperability is a persistent challenge, which Web services have 
already succeeded to realise, but achieving interoperability requires developing 
further standards to guarantee an interoperability degree that matches the vision of 
Web services (Lakshminarayanan, 2010).  
Another challenge that faces Web services is the organising of multiple services 
for processing business logic (Singh et al., 2004). Often, a single business process 
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is implemented as a sequence of stages in a workflow, where a separate service 
may be used to implement a particular stage in that workflow. Therefore, 
achieving the goal of a specific business logic process requires a high level of 
coordination between the services that compose this process (Singh et al., 2004). 
2.6.3  Reliability 
Reliability is the quality aspect that is concerned with how well a service is 
maintained and can be measured by the number of failures that occur during a 
specified period of time. In Web services’‎ environments, achieving reliability is 
an obvious challenge due to the unreliable nature of the underlying protocols. For 
instance, the default HTTP best-effort delivery neither guarantees the delivery of 
all the sent packets nor delivering them in the same sending order (Singh et al., 
2004; Wang et al., 2004). 
2.6.4  Availability and Response Time 
Availability is the probability that a Web service is present and ready to be used 
when required (Singh et al., 2004). One of the challenges that faces the developers 
of Web services is to maximise the availability of these services and minimise the 
amount of time a client has to wait before receiving a response from an invoked 
service. 
2.6.5  Scalability 
The scalability challenge concerns handling a large number of simultaneous client 
interactions. An efficient implementation of a Web services’‎ system‎ requires‎ a‎
good management of the system’s resources and services, including database 
connections and XML parsing. Validating XML documents through XML parsing 
is an intensive process, when compared to its equivalent binary format. This can 
have a significant effect on the performance of Web services as it increases the 
payload size (Singh et al., 2004). 
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In this thesis, the focus will be on the security challenge. The crucial issue in Web 
services is how to ensure their security since they are based on exchanging 
messages through the Internet where there are always security risks regarding 
stealing, loosing or modifying these messages (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002). 
Geer (2003) has stated that Web services pose a difficulty to network 
administrators because Web services open up networks by enabling users from 
outside their networks to access databases, applications and internal users. 
Furthermore, Web services can perform large number of transactions in a short 
time which are difficult to be secured using traditional security techniques, such as 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNn) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL). 
2.7 Security Requirements 
There are some major security requirements that must be addressed to ensure the 
safety of exchanging Web services information through a network. These 
requirements are: 
2.7.1  Confidentiality 
In any networked system, the communicating parties need to exchange data while 
guaranteeing that only the expected receiver can read this data. This means that 
the exchanged data must be protected against eavesdroppers (Nakamur, Hada & 
Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). The term confidentiality in the field of information 
security refers to the requirement for exchanged data between two communicating 
parties not to be available to a third party that may try to pry into the 
communication (O’Neill‎ et‎ al.,‎ 2003). In order to achieve confidentiality, one 
approach is to use a private connection between the communicating parties, such 
as a dedicated line or a virtual private network (VPN). However, the critical 
information of a Web service, such as WSDL and SOAP messages, are usually 
exchanged through untrusted networks, the Internet most likely, where the private 
connection is not achievable and another approach is used to meet the requirement 
of confidentiality, that is encryption (Rao et al., 2004). 
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2.7.2  Integrity 
The term integrity refers to the requirement of ensuring that transmitted 
information‎ hasn’t‎ been‎ changed‎ or‎ modified‎ during‎ transmission‎ (Nakamur, 
Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). It does not mean preventing information 
from being tampered with since it is impossible in untrusted networks, especially 
the Internet. The next best thing is to detect this tampering if it occurs. The 
knowledge about the fact that tampering has occurred fulfils the integrity 
requirement. Integrity can be achieved using digital signature (O’Neill‎ et‎ al.,‎
2003). 
2.7.3  Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation literally means that the message originator cannot deny sending 
this message. Any doubt about the message sender throws confidentiality and 
integrity into question and the results could be either bad or disastrous. Digital 
signature and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technologies are used to deliver 
non-repudiation (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). 
2.7.4  Authentication 
Authentication refers to establishing identity (Geer, 2003) which ensures that 
access to data and applications is limited to those who have the appropriate proof 
of identity (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002). As with standard Web traffic, the 
service provider should authenticate service requesters before sending Web 
services information (Yang, 2002). PKI technology could be also used for 
authentication. However, it is not the only available method for authentication. 
Biometrics, passwords and hardware devices, such as dongles and smart cards, are 
also used for authentication. They all are based on the idea of having a token in 
the possession of the entity that is authenticated and this token is either software-
based or hardware-based. In the case of Web services the communication could be 
between software and another which adds a new twist on authentication. The 
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scenario is a human user may authenticate directly to their systems using a 
human-machine authentication technique where they will not be running Web 
services directly. However, when a Web service starts, information about the 
authentication status must be carries in the Web service communication. This 
scenario is enabled by the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (O’Neill‎
et al., 2003). 
2.7.5  Authorisation 
Authorisation means determining the privileges of the user and deciding whether 
the entity is allowed to access particular resources and services or not (Yang, 
2002; Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). Just because a user is 
authenticated does not mean that they are always authorised. Authorisation 
software allows an administrator to manage a policy for access control to services 
by giving different privileges to different users and groups. Single Sign-On (SSO) 
technologies, such as SAML, are used in Web services for both authentication and 
authorisation (O’Neill‎et‎al.,‎2003). 
2.7.6  Availability 
Availability could be an ambiguous security requirement but it is very essential. 
As well as Web services, security services themselves require availability. 
Otherwise they are meaningless because it is costly for any business if critical 
information is not available when needed (O’Neill‎et‎al.,‎2003). 
2.7.7  Privacy 
While confidentiality is the requirement that data that is in transit is not available 
to eavesdroppers, the privacy requirement concerns the privacy rights of the 
subject of the data. A strong encryption could protect the data while it is in transit. 
However, this data could not be well encrypted while storing it and if there are 
any back doors in the Web application or a direct connect to the database this data 
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may be stolen. Privacy thus requires assuring that data is always protected 
(O’Neill‎et‎al.,‎2003). 
2.8 Basic Cryptographic Concepts 
In the world of Information Systems, cryptography is often seen as a synonymous 
with security (O’Neill‎et‎al.,‎2003) because security implies some core concepts , 
which are keys, cryptography, signature and certifications (Siddiqui, 2003b). 
2.8.1  Cryptography 
There are two encryption methods, asymmetric cryptography and symmetric 
cryptography. The first method uses a pair of keys (public key and private key). 
This pair is generated by a suitable cryptographic algorithm. The public key, as 
the name implies, is open for public use, while the private key should be kept 
confidential. When someone wants to send a confidential message to a specific 
party, the sender asks for the public key of the receiver and uses this key to 
encrypt the original message. The receiver uses the private key to decrypt the 
message. No one else will be able to decrypt the message since only the receiver 
has the private key. The other encryption method (symmetric cryptography) uses 
the same key for encryption and decryption which makes this method less 
expensive than the first one. Therefore, the asymmetric method is used only to 
exchange the shared secret. When both of the parties know the shared secret, they 
start using the symmetric encryption (O’Neill‎ et‎ al.,‎ 2003;‎ Siddiqui,‎ 2003b;‎
Tatsubori, Imamura & Nakamura, 2004). 
2.8.2  Message Digests 
The message digest method introduces an added field (value) to the original 
message that occurs from applying a digest calculation on the message data. The 
sender sends the digest value with the message, while the receiver reapplies the 
same digest calculation and compares the resulted value with the digest value. If 
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the message has been altered, these values will not match. The drawback of this 
method is that the change will not be detectable at the receiver side if both the 
message and its digest are altered during the transmission (Siddiqui, 2003b). 
2.8.3  Digital Signature 
In this method, the digest algorithm is used to generate the digest value of the 
message, and then the private key is produced to generate a digital signature over 
the digest value. The message receiver repeats the digest calculation and then uses 
the public key to verify the signature. This method assures‎that‎the‎message‎hasn’t‎
been altered after applying the digest calculation (message integrity) and the 
message is surely coming from the owner of the public key (user authentication) 
(Yang, 2002; Siddiqui, 2003b). 
2.8.4  Certification 
The certificate consists mainly of two fields of information, the identification of 
the certificate owner and the public key of the certificate owner. The certificate 
issuing authority also signs the certificate using its own private key, which 
enables any interested party to check the integrity of the certificate by verifying 
the signature (Yang, 2002). 
2.9 XML and Web Services Security Standards 
With the aim of fulfilling the security requirements and providing a framework to 
secure XML-based applications, standards organisations, such as the W3C and the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), 
have presented various security specifications that coordinate with each other to 
form modules of XML firewalls (Siddiqui, 2003a). Figure ‎2-6 illustrates the most 
common XML and Web services standards and their dependencies.  
‎Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
 
Bachar Alrouh 28 
 
Figure  2-6: XML and WSS standards and their dependencies (Naedele, 2003) 
The security specifications can be divided into three main categories (Nordbotten, 
2009). These categories and their underlying specifications are: 
2.9.1  XML Security 
XML Digital Signature (XML DSig) 
The XML Signature specification is a joint effort of the W3C and The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) aiming to provide data integrity, message 
authentication and signer authentication features wrapped in an XML format 
(Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003; W3C, 2002b). 
The XML signature specification describes XML syntax to associate between 
cryptographic signature and XML documents. It includes procedures for 
establishing and verifying XML signatures (Naedele, 2003). Digital signature of 
one party could be read by another because the machines work with the same 
encrypted digest for the same section of XML document (Siddiqui, 2003a). 
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XML Encryption (XML Enc) 
W3C’s‎XML‎Encryption‎specification‎uses‎encryption‎ techniques‎ to‎address‎ the‎
requirement of data confidentiality (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003; 
W3C, 2002a). 
The XML encryption specification defines the process for encrypting and 
representing encrypted data in XML documents. All or just part of the XML could 
be encrypted in the message. Therefore, only information that is confidential is 
encrypted while the unconfident information could be sent unencrypted (Geer, 
2003). 
XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) 
XKMS (W3C, 2001) defines a Web service interface that combines the 
interoperability of XML with the security of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in 
order to manage the security of PKI-based application. XKMS consists of two 
sub-protocols; XML Key Information Service Specification (X-KISS) and XML 
Key Registration Service Specification (X-KRSS) (Nordbotten, 2009). X-KISS is 
used for locating and retrieving public keys from a key server to perform the 
encryption or signature verification, while X-KRSS defines an interface that can 
register, revoke and recover escrowed keys from a key server (Naedele, 2003). 
2.9.2  Security Markup Languages 
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
Presented by OASIS, XACML enables developers to express their authorisation 
and access policies in XML (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003). 
XACML specifications enable access control policies to be expressed in XML. It 
expresses sophisticated access control model and fine-grained access policies in 
XML documents, or any other e-resources. Using this specification, the access 
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control policies control how XML documents appear to the end user (Nagappan, 
Skoczylas & Sriganesh, 2003; Naedele, 2003). 
Extensible Rights Markup Language (XrML) 
XrML is an easy-use general-use specification focuses on expressing rights and 
conditions related to digital services and resources (e.g., expiration times). Thus, 
XrML deals with digital rights management, but it is not suitable for complex 
access policy or rule sets, which are addressed by XACML. Both XACML and 
XrML‎don’t‎ deal‎with‎ authentication‎ and‎protection‎ directly;‎ instead‎ they‎ leave‎
these matters to the underlying encryption and digital signature protocols 
(Naedele, 2003). 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
OASIS provides a possibility for partner applications to share user authentication 
and authorisation information, by achieving the single sign-on feature without 
using cookies as in the normal way (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003). 
SAML is an XML-based framework for exchange security information. Such 
exchanges occur usually between interacting applications that do not always share 
the same authentication and authorisation techniques. However, SAML assumes 
trust between participants because SAML does not provide this trust by itself. It 
refers to XML Enc and XML DSig to establish this trust (Hondo, Nagaratnam & 
Nadalin, 2002; Geer, 2003; Naedele, 2003). 
2.9.3  Web Services Security 
Web Services Security (WS-Security) 
OASIS defines this specification depending on The XML Signature and XML 
Encryption specifications in order to include integrity, confidentiality and single 
message authentication features within a SOAP message (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 
2003a). WS-Security (Nadalin et al., 2006) specification provides a way for Web 
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services developers to implement several different security models throughout 
attaching security data to the headers of SOAP messages (SOAP extensions) 
(Geer, 2003).  
Web Services Policy (WS-Policy) 
The WS-Policy (Bajaj et al., 2006) specification defines a framework for 
expressing policies that refer to interoperability capabilities and requirements in a 
Web services-based system (Vedamuthu et al., 2007).  
Web Services Security Policy (WS- SecurityPolicy) 
The WS-SecurityPolicy (Nadalin et al., 2007c) specification defines a standard set 
of assertions that represent security requirements and preferences for Web service 
endpoints in order to describe the preferable way of securing the communications 
path (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010). 
Web Services Trust (WS-Trust) 
WS-Trust (Nadalin et al., 2007b) supplements the functionality of WS-Security 
and Web Services‎ Policy‎ by‎ deﬁning‎ security‎ tokens‎management‎mechanisms‎
(such as issuing, renewing, cancelling, and validating security tokens). In a Web 
services security model, the service consumer may use WS-Trust, after 
discovering what security token is required, to obtain the required token from a 
Security Token Service (STS) (Vedamuthu et al., 2007). 
Web Services Secure Conversation (WS-SecureConversation) 
WS-SecureConversation (Nadalin et al., 2007a) extends WS-Security and WS-
Trust to provide mechanisms for establishing and identifying a security context in 
order to support exchanging multiple messages. The communicating parties share 
the security context for the duration of the communication session. This can 
potentially improve the overall performance of subsequent message exchanges, 
because more efficient keys or new key material can be exchanged.  
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2.10 Web Services Interoperability Technologies 
(WSIT) 
In order to improve Web services Quality of Service (QoS) and to enable 
interoperability between Java and .Net Web services, The Web Services 
Interoperability Technologies (WSIT) (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010; Sun 
Microsystems Inc., 2007) has been developed as a joint effort between Sun 
Microsystems, Inc. (later merged with Oracle USA, Inc. to become Oracle 
America, Inc.) and Microsoft Corporation as part of the Metro Web services 
stack. 
Enterprise features are‎supported‎in‎Metro’s‎WSIT through the implementation of 
several open Web services standards and specifications, such as message 
optimisation, reliable messaging, and security. Figure ‎2-7 shows the underlying 
services that were implemented for each technology. 
 
Figure  2-7: WSIT Web Services Features (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007) 
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2.10.1  WSIT Reliable Messaging Technology 
Reliability is the QoS aspect of a Web service representing how well it maintains 
its service quality. Reliability is often measured by the number of failures that 
occur in a given time period. Reliability in Web services systems may be more 
difficult to maintain because of the unreliable nature of the underlying transport 
specifications, such as HTTP (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010).  
 
Figure  2-8: Application Message Exchange without Reliable Messaging  
(Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007) 
Without reliability, the receiving endpoints would not know if messages are lost, 
duplicated, or reordered as these messages transfer over the HTTP connection 
without delivery assurances (Figure ‎2-8).  
 
Figure  2-9: Application Message Exchange with Reliable Messaging Enabled 
(Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007) 
The Web Services Reliable Messaging technology (WS-ReliableMessaging) 
defines a protocol that implements a QoS contract between an application and its 
underlying messaging processor service. This contract consists of four actions: 
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submit, deliver, respond and notify, and covers the following delivery assurances: 
at most once, at least once, exactly once and in order (Bertino et al., 2010). 
Securing SOAP messages alone does not prevent them from being lost in transit, 
or delivered out of order (Bertino et al., 2010). Reliability enables systems to 
overcome the failure of losing messages in transit or delivering them out of order. 
If a message is lost, the sender endpoint resends the message until its receipt is 
acknowledged by the receiving endpoint, as illustrated in Figure ‎2-9. If these 
messages are received out of order, the receiving endpoint can rearrange the 
messages into the correct order. 
2.10.2  WSIT Security Technology 
WSIT implements several Web services security specifications to provide 
interoperability and secure communication between Web services endpoints, as 
well as any intermediary nodes, as presented in Figure ‎2.10. Security, as provided 
by WSIT, is an addition to the existing transport-level security, which may still be 
used when point-to-point security is all that is needed. Besides the main XML and 
Web services specifications, security is implemented in WSIT by adopting the 
following specifications: 
 Web Services Security (WS-Security). 
 Web Services Policy (WS-Policy). 
 Web Services Trust (WS-Trust). 
 Web Services Secure Conversation (WS-SecureConversation). 
 Web Services Security Policy (WS-SecurityPolicy) 
 
Figure  2.10: WSIT Security Specifications 
‎Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
 
Bachar Alrouh 35 
2.10.3  WSIT Security Profiles 
A security profile is a description of a secure communication exchange between a 
service provider and its client. Achieving different levels of security requires a 
combination of different security techniques (i.e. security tokens, encryption, 
signature, and even securing the entire wire using SSL). As a result, SOAP-
messages can be safely delivered over the unsecured wire and can be processed, 
entirely or partially, by middleware services if required (Hatala, Eap & Shah, 
2004).  
WSIT provides a number of security profiles that can be applied to secure a Web 
service. Each profile represents a set of pre-defined security specifications and 
configurations. These security profiles are (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010): 
 Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA): This profile depends 
on a symmetric key cryptography that is used for integrity and 
confidentiality. It relies on a single, shared secret key, generated at runtime 
and‎encrypted‎using‎ the‎ service’s‎certificate.‎The‎client‎does‎not‎possess‎
any certificates on its own, but instead sends its username/password for 
authentication. 
 Username with digest passwords (UDP): This profile is similar to UA, 
except that digest passwords are used in the username token and therefore 
is not required to be encrypted. 
 Mutual Certificates Security (MCS): This is an asymmetric cryptography 
profile that adds security via authentication and message protection that 
ensures integrity and confidentiality. 
 Symmetric Binding with Kerberos Tokens (Kerb): This profile 
authenticates the client using Kerberos Tokens. The integrity and 
confidentiality protection are established using symmetric keys, generated 
with the Kerberos Protocol.  
‎Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
 
Bachar Alrouh 36 
 Transport Security using SSL: This profile uses Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) to protect the application during transport. Transport-layer security 
is provided by transport mechanisms used to transmit information over the 
wire between clients and providers, thus transport-layer security relies on 
HTTP Secure transport (HTTPS) using SSL. Transport security is a point-
to-point security mechanism that can be used for authentication, message 
integrity, and confidentiality. 
 Message Authentication over SSL (MA): This profile attaches an 
authentication token with the message and uses SSL for confidentiality 
protection. 
 SAML Authorisation over SSL (SA): This profile attaches an authorisation 
token with the message and uses SSL for confidentiality protection. In this 
profile, the SAML token is expected to carry some authorisation 
information about end users. The sender of the token is actually vouching 
for the credentials in the SAML token. 
 SAML Sender Vouches with Certificates (SV): This profile protects 
messages with mutual certificates for integrity and confidentiality. The 
sender vouches a SAML token for authorisation. 
 SAML Holder of Key (HOK): Under this profile, the truest between a 
service and a client is not established directly, but requires the client to 
send a SAML assertion, issued by a specific SAML authority. The service 
has a trust relationship with the authority that issues the SAML token. The 
request is signed with the client's private key and encrypted with the server 
certificate. The response is signed using the server's private key and 
encrypted using the key provided within the SAML assertion. 
 Endorsing Certificate (End-Cert): This profile uses a symmetric key for 
integrity and confidentiality protection, and an endorsing client certificate 
to supplement the claims provided by the token associated with the 
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message signature. For this profile, all the requests need to be authorised 
by a special identity, e.g. a purchase manager should endorse a purchase 
request to a vendor.  
 STS Issued Token: This profile enables the use of a single Security Token 
Service (STS) to establish a chain of trust between servers and clients; 
especially where service providers and requesters are in different managed 
environments and confidentiality is a major issue. Instead of services 
trusting clients directly, services trust tokens issued by a trusted STS. The 
client then has to securely authenticate to this STS. 
 STS Issued Token with Service Certificate (STS-SC): This profile is similar 
to the previous one, except that confidentiality protection is enabled using 
a service certificate. 
 STS Issued Token Endorsing Token (STS-End): This is also an STS-based 
profile, that requires the client to authenticate using a SAML token that is 
issued by a designated STS, but the message signature has to be signed by 
an endorsing token. 
2.11 The Performance of Web Services Security 
The performance of the security mechanisms is fraught with concerns due to 
additional security contents in SOAP messages, the higher number of message 
exchanges to establish trust as well as extra processing time to process these 
additions. As the interaction between service providers and requesters occurs via 
XML-based SOAP messages, securing Web services tends to make these 
messages longer than they would be otherwise and consequently requiring 
interpretation by XML parsers on both sides, which reduces the performance of 
Web services (Menasce, 2002). 
Performance is an open problem in Web services, and has been analysed in 
different manners. A study by Gray (2004) compared the performance of Web 
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services with other middleware, such as CORBA and Java RMI. This study has 
shown that the performance of Web services is a major drawback. Another study 
(Jeckle, Melzer & Himsolt, 2004) also compared the same technologies and 
illustrated that the HTTP overhead causes higher response time for SOAP 
packages, which grows exponentially as the payload size increases. 
The majority of the related studies have compared the performance of different 
toolkits. In (Machado & Ferraz, 2005), several SOAP toolkits have been evaluated 
with an objective of identifying and measuring SOAP inefficiency. Head et al. 
proposed a standard benchmark suite for quantifying and comparing the 
performance of the different SOAP implementations, such as gSOAP, AxisJava, 
XSUL and bSOAP (Head et al., 2005), and various XML parsers (Head et al., 
2006).  
Moreover, there have been several studies to benchmark the various aspects of 
performance by studying the effect of the implementation framework on the 
performance of Web services. For example, both studies by Sun Microsystems 
Inc. (2004) and Microsoft Corporation (2004) compared the performance of Web 
service technologies in two common middleware platforms: Java 2 Platform 
Enterprise Edition (J2EE) and .NET, that offer similar facilities for creating and 
using Web services. Similarly, Microsoft Corporation (2008) conducted a 
comparison of the performance of Web services applications deployed on two 
application servers (.NET 3.5/Windows Server 2008 vs. IBM WebSphere 6.1 
ND/Red Hat Linux). Each of the previous studies claimed that its framework has 
the‎upper‎hand‎in‎terms‎of‎Web‎services’‎performance; yet all the previous studies 
discussed the performance of plain-text services, without considering the security 
aspects of these services. 
Early discussions of the security and performance trade-off (Vaughan-Nichols, 
2002; Dodds, 2002) highlighted that SOAP-Web services suffer a performance hit 
when applying security measures. Because SOAP messages in their initial XML 
plain text are insecure, applying encryption and decryption on each message in the 
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service-side and client-side will increase the overhead of these messages and 
increase processing time in both ends. 
In security related studies, Shirasuna et al. (2004) evaluated three security 
approaches, namely SSL, WS-Signature and WS-SecureConversation, for grid 
services. Their evaluation has shown that transport level security is faster than 
message level security, and should be used if there is no additional requirement to 
use message level security. Their results indicated that WS-SecureConversation 
should be used when several messages are exchanged between the service and the 
clients, where XML-Signature is slightly faster than WS-SecureConversation for 
one-time invocations. Nevertheless, WS-SecureConversation has a scalability 
concern if the Web service is invoked by a huge number of clients simultaneously. 
In a study of vertical scalability (i.e. adding capacity, such as processors and 
memory, to an existing system) of Tomcat Application Server, Guitart et al. (2005) 
examined the cost of security in Web services. However, its scope was restricted 
to the security of the communication channel, using SSL. Message layer security 
approaches were not considered in their tests. 
Moralis et al. (2007) compared the performance of Web services with Kerberos 
Token Profile against X.509 Token Profile, while Liu, Pallickara & Fox (2005) 
conducted several tests for different operations (Signing vs. Verifying and 
Encryption vs. Decryption with several algorithms). Two studies by Tang et al. 
(2006) and Chen et al. (2007) compared the cost of WSS Signing and WSS 
Encryption. They indicated that using either the Username or X.509 tokens does 
not make a significant difference to the performance of Web services. 
Sosnoski (2009) studied how using the WS-Security and WS-SecureConversation 
standards affect the performance of Java Web services implemented using the 
Apache Axis2 Web services stack. The aim was to provide a guideline on when 
and how to use WS-Security. He also suggested the usage of WS-
SecureConversation for long-running exchanges of messages between clients and 
a server, especially when relatively small messages are exchanged between the 
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service and its clients. Further work led by Sosnoski (2010) expanded that test to 
provide a performance comparison between the Apache Axis2 and Sun’s Metro 
Web services stacks. This experiment suggested that Metro is twice to three times 
faster than Axis2 when security configurations (i.e. signature, encryption and 
username tokens) are applied, even though they perform similarly without 
security. 
Aiming at providing a general guideline for selecting appropriate security 
mechanisms, the work by Novakouski et al. (2010) compared different WS-
Security mechanisms (i.e. Password Only, Sign Only, Encrypt Only. Sign Then 
Encrypt, Encrypt Then Sign, and WS-SecureConversation) in details. It examined 
the impact of applying these mechanisms on the performance of SOAP-based 
Web services, measured in terms of: Round Trip Time (RTT), message size and 
resource usage. The study established that to minimise the huge penalty of 
applying security on the performance of Web services, a good understanding of 
the requirements and expectations is required, as there is no supreme standard that 
can provide security and performance in all applications and systems.  
The previously discussed studies, however, considered the performance of the 
security standards that can be applied on Web services, such as the usage of 
encryption and digital signature, and the type security tokens. Alternatively, our 
study focuses on the overall performance of the security profiles, which simplify 
the security usage. Each profile predefines a set of security features to be 
implemented when securing a Web service. This approach shields the developers 
of Web services from the complexity of making a technical decision and allows 
them to focus on addressing the requirements of the security system. 
2.12 Selecting Security Profiles 
Architects and developers responsible for Web service security have a 
considerable number of options available to them. These options are further 
complicated by the fact that different projects and organisations have different 
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security requirements. Applying different sets of standards and techniques could 
result in different quality measurements of a certain Web service (Shirasuna et al., 
2004; Liu, Pallickara & Fox, 2005; Tang et al., 2006; Singhal, Winograd & 
Scarfone, 2007; Moralis et al., 2007;). To design, develop, and deploy secure Web 
services, architects and developers should be able to select an appropriate security 
profile amongst the available technologies by considering the new threats 
associated with exposing functionality on potentially unsecured networks 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2005), and simultaneously providing a level of quality 
that is acceptable by the service consumer (Casola et al., 2009).  
Currently, there are several XML-based security profiles and mechanisms that 
may be used to satisfy the security requirements of a particular application. In an 
ideal situation, the task a Web service developer is to select the one profile that 
satisfies all the requirements. On many other occasions, there may be several 
solutions that satisfy most of the requirements, but not all of them. This can be 
considered as a decision problem, where an informed decision should be made by 
prioritising the requirements, and ranking the available options accordingly, to 
select the profile that matches the most important requirements.  
The selection of a candidate solution depends on evaluating the available security 
profiles against several characteristics derived from the requirements of the given 
application. A Web services application developer specifies a set of requirements 
according to the service provider’s security preferences and technological 
constraints, taking into consideration the quality of service expected from the 
service consumer. The requirements can be divided into several dimensions 
according to different independent criteria and sub-criteria to create a multi-
dimensional model. Each criterion and sub-criterion is given a weight according 
to its level of importance in the application. Each candidate solution is also 
weighted against each sub-criterion according to what extent this particular 
solution matches the requirement represented by this sub-criterion. 
Generally, service providers set these weights on the basis of judgment. When 
there is a small number of selection criteria, then direct judgments may be a 
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possibility. Nevertheless, when the number is large, the judging process may lead 
to improper selection due to the bias towards key elements only (Godse, Sonar & 
Mulik, 2008). In such a multi-criteria decision making model, it is important to 
have quantifiable values that are rational and consistent. 
In research trends of Web services, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is 
widely used as a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method to select the 
best Web service from a pool of services that have the same functionality 
provided by different service providers (Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008). Wu & 
Chang (2007) presented a conceptual model using AHP to help service consumers 
to find the service provider who provides the most optimal quality; yet their 
approach was not concerned with security. 
The framework of Zuo, Wang & Wu (2008) approached the problem of selecting 
an optimal service among many Web services, which all meet the functional 
requirements, by establishing an index system for Web services products selection 
based on four aspects: user, product, environment and supply. They conducted a 
questionnaire survey to collect the views of 30 experts divided into two groups: 
business operation experts and academics. 
Godse, Sonar & Mulik (2008) suggested the use of AHP as a quantitative 
approach to alternate the common ad-hoc practices in choosing Web services. 
Their model consists of three main criteria: security, quality and business 
agreement. Casola et al. (2009) also proposed a framework for quality and 
security evaluation. Their model depends on response time, integrity and 
confidentiality as measuring aspects to find a provider that guarantees these 
requirements. Thirumaran et al. (2011) proposed an AHP framework to choose the 
best custom search service based on performance, cost, security and usability 
requirements. 
While all the previous models focused mainly on the point of view of the service 
consumer (selecting the optimal service among many available services that all 
meet the functional requirements), our research emphasises the service 
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developer’s viewpoint. The aim here is to provide a decision making tool to help 
Web services developers to select the best suited security approach to secure Web 
services that satisfies the security, configuration and performance requirements of 
a given application during the development process. 
2.13 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter provided background information in the area of Web services 
security and standards. The several approaches to analyse the performance of Web 
services security were discussed, which in turn led to highlight the high cost of 
applying security on the overall performance of Web services.  
The literature review reports that the trade-off between security and performance 
depends largely on the selected security approach, where different security 
specifications affect the performance of Web services differently, as discussed by 
various studies (Shirasuna et al., 2004; Liu, Pallickara & Fox, 2005; Tang et al., 
2006; Moralis et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2007; Sosnoski, 2009; Novakouski et al., 
2010).  
On the other hand, achieving a certain security level requires sometimes a 
combination of different security techniques (Hatala, Eap & Shah, 2004). There is 
no security standard that can achieve all the security requirements of all the 
applications while maintaining the best performance (Novakouski et al., 2010). As 
a result, a Web services developer would ideally apply a combination of security 
specifications in order to achieve the required level and coverage of security. This 
can be a very daunting task because of the complexity and variety of Web services 
security standards. Therefore, Several Web services development environments, 
such as .net and JAVA’s METRO Web services stacks, provide developers with 
predefined sets of security specifications, or simply security profiles. The 
parameters of these profiles, for instance security token, encryption algorithm and 
sign before/after encryption, can be adjusted by the developers according to their 
security preferences. 
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In order to select the most suitable security profile for a given application, it is 
important to evaluate the security coverage of each profile against its 
performance. The previously mentioned related studies focused on the 
performance of individual security specifications and components. Instead, the 
approach of this research is to explore the overall performance of these profiles by 
developing a performance testing model to understand the cost of applying 
security profiles on the performance of Web services (Objective 1). The argument 
here is that understanding the overall performance of the security profiles will 
help in the initial selection process. Then, the performance of the individual 
security components (such as what proportion of that performance is due to the 
delay in encrypting the SOAP message and what proportion is because of 
acquiring credentials) can be considered to fine-tune the selected profile in order 
to achieve the finest solution. 
The issue of selecting the best-fitted security profile can also be addressed by 
consulting rigorous documentations of best practices and case studies provided by 
reputable studies. However, due to the huge variation of the nature of modern 
systems that relay on Web services, different systems may have different 
requirements, configurations and limitations. Therefore, it is difficult to provide 
an ultimate solution that fits in all the scenarios. In addition, there are cases where 
more than one recommended solution can be implemented to satisfy the security 
requirements of a certain system, while there are other cases where there is no 
solution that satisfies all system requirements. Such cases require rating the 
various alternatives according to their coverage of the different requirements, and 
subsequently, selecting the security profile with the highest rate. This emphasises 
the need of a systematic framework to rate the alternatives according to different 
criteria (i.e. requirements) in order to aid Web services developers in selecting the 
most appropriate profile amongst a set of alternatives. 
Several studies provided Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) frameworks 
for Web services discovery and composition (Wu & Chang, 2007; Zuo, Wang & 
Wu, 2008; Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008; Casola et al., 2009; Thirumaran et al.; 
‎Chapter 2:  Web Services Security 
 
Bachar Alrouh 45 
2011). Their approaches considered the service consumer point of view (the aim is 
to select the most suitable Web service from a pool of services that provide the 
same functionality). Alternatively, we approach the issue from the Web services 
developer view-point by addressing how to provide a Web service with the best-
possible security that considers the performance expectations and the service 
provider’s‎limitations (Objective 2). 
The MCDM frameworks introduced in previously discussed related work were 
illustrated via the use of example scenarios. However, they did not provide an 
empirical validation of their efficiency as they did not provide a benchmark to 
validate against. In this thesis, we try to validate and evaluate the developed 
framework using a scenario-driven approach. To demonstrate the‎ framework’s‎
utility and value, the tested scenarios are chosen from well-known documentations 
of best practices, and the results of the framework are compared to the 
recommendations of these documents (Objective 3). 
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Chapter 3:  Research Design and Approach  
3.1 Overview 
This chapter aims at describing the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology 
which will be undertaken as a general research methodology for this thesis. A 
detailed discussion from its different perspectives is presented in order to explain 
and justify the adoption of this methodology.  
3.2 Philosophical Grounding 
A paradigm can be defined as a set of basic beliefs which guide the actions and 
the activities of the researchers throughout the research process (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Mingers, 2001). Research in the field of information systems and 
computing can be categorised into three main paradigms (Chua, 1986; Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009). These 
paradigms are: 
 The Positive Research: Collected data is used to support hypotheses and 
assumptions that made prior to investigation.  
 The Interpretive Research: Collected data is used to extract knowledge 
without making assumptions. 
 The Design Science Research approach: Constructing artefacts and 
evaluating them is used to explain and enhance aspects of the system. 
In the research world, there are four philosophical theories to view the research 
paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Mingers, 2001; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009): 
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 The theory of existence (Ontology) which describes the nature of reality 
by asking questions like what is real and what is not? What is fundamental 
and what is derivative? 
 The theory of knowledge (Epistemology) that explores the nature of valid 
or true knowledge.  
 The theory of reasoning and inference (Methodology) which studies the 
relations between theory and practice in order to identify the best approach 
that helps in generating the desired knowledge in a valid and reliable way. 
 The theory of value and value judgement (Axiology or Ethics): What is of 
value or considered right? 
Table ‎3-1 summarises the theoretical perspectives of these four research 
paradigms. 
Our research aims at producing an artefact in the form of a framework to help 
architects and developers to choose the best-suited security profiles for Web 
services applications. The aim of this research is highly consistent with the 
general aim of DSR. This is because the research in information systems and 
computing is considered a DSR research, if the main aim is to change a current 
situation related to organisational or social systems into a more desirable one 
through the development of novel artefacts (Hevner et al., 2004). Hence, we argue 
that DSR is highly fitting in the context of this research. 
Indeed, design-science research is primarily a problem solving paradigm (Hevner 
et al., 2004) that seeks to create artefacts addressing the so-called wicked 
problems (Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2008; March & Storey, 2008). In principle, 
design-science research attempts to successfully design, develop, and evaluate 
technology-oriented design artefacts characterised as novel, innovative, and 
purposeful. When portrayed as purposeful, this implies that these artefacts would 
potentially provide organisations and humans with recognisable utility since they 
should address unsolved problems (Hevner et al., 2004), or provide better 
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solutions and thus enhance existing practices (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008). 
Hence, these artefacts aim to provide additional improvements to real-world 
phenomena (March & Storey, 2008; Iivari, 2007; Purao, 2002). Therefore, while 
humans could change their life styles through the introduction of these novel 
artefacts, organisations might change the ways in which they do business so as to 
exploit the opportunities that emerged due to these artefacts.  
 
 Research Perspective 
Basic Belief Positivist Interpretive Design 
Ontology 
A single reality. 
Knowable, 
probabilistic 
Multiple 
realities, socially 
constructed 
Multiple, 
contextually 
situated 
alternative 
world-states. 
Socio-
technologically 
enabled 
Epistemology 
Objective; 
dispassionate. 
Detached 
observer of truth 
Subjective; 
values and 
knowledge 
emerge from the 
researcher-
participant 
interaction 
Knowledge 
through making: 
objectively 
constrained 
construction 
within a context. 
Iterative 
circumscription 
reveals meaning 
Methodology 
Observation; 
quantitative, 
statistical 
Participation; 
qualitative. 
Hermeneutical, 
dialectical 
Developmental: 
Measure 
artefactual 
impacts on the 
composite 
system 
Axiology 
Truth: universal 
and beautiful; 
prediction 
Understanding: 
situated and 
description 
Control; 
creation; 
progress; 
understanding 
Table  3-1: Philosophical Assumptions of Research Approaches  
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009) 
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3.3 Overview of Design Science Research 
Design Science research (DSR) is a set of analytical techniques and perspectives 
for performing research in the area of information systems and computing. Design 
Science Research involves the analysis of the use and performance of designed 
artefacts to understand, explain and most probably enhance the behaviour of 
aspects of information systems (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009). 
Design means to invent, plan and develop something for particular purpose. To 
bring design activity into focus at an intellectual level, we should distinguish 
between‎ “natural‎ science”‎ and‎ “science‎ of‎ artificial”.‎The‎ natural‎ science‎ is‎ the‎
knowledge about objects or phenomena that describes and explains how they 
behave and interact with each other. On the other hand, the knowledge about 
artificial objects and phenomena designed to meet certain desired goals is known 
as the science of artificial. 
Research, according to Kuhn (1996), is defined as an activity that contributes to 
the understanding of a phenomenon. A phenomenon is a set of behaviours of 
some entities that is found interesting by the researcher. In the case of information 
systems, the phenomenon, or part of it, may be created, instead of naturally 
occurring. Understanding means the knowledge that allows prediction of the 
behaviour of some aspects of the phenomenon. Research methods or techniques 
are the set of activities a research community considers appropriate to the 
production of understanding. 
Owen (1997) introduced a general model for generating and accumulating 
knowledge (Figure ‎3-1) that is helpful to understand the Design Science Research 
process:‎ “Knowledge‎ is‎ generated‎ and‎ accumulated‎ through‎ action.‎ Doing‎
something and‎ judging‎ the‎ results‎ is‎ the‎ general‎ model” (Owen, 1997). The 
process is illustrated as a cycle where knowledge is used to create works, and 
works are appraised to create knowledge. 
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Figure  3-1: A General Model for Generating and Accumulating Knowledge 
(Owen, 1997) 
3.4 The Outputs of Design Science Research 
Based on the work of March & Smith (1995) and Hevner et al. (2004), Vaishnavi 
& Kuechler (2009) have proposed five general outputs explicate the types and 
levels of knowledge that can be derived from Design Science Research, 
highlighted in Table ‎3-2. 
Output Description 
Constructs The conceptual vocabulary of a domain 
Models A set of propositions or statements expressing relationships 
between constructs. 
Methods A set of steps used to perform a task (how-to knowledge). 
Instantiations The operationalisation of constructs, models and methods. 
Better theories Artefact construction as analogous to experimental natural 
science 
Table  3-2: The Outputs of Design Science Research  
(Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2005) 
Knowledge Works 
Channel 
Channel 
Paradigm 
Knowledge Building Process 
Knowledge Using Process 
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Purao, (2002) has pointed out a different perception on the output of Design 
Science Research where the multiple outputs are classified by level of abstraction, 
as shown in (Figure ‎3-2). 
 
Figure  3-2: Outputs of Design Science Research (Purao, 2002) 
3.5 Design Science Research Methodology 
Drawing heavily from the work of Owen (1997), Vaishnavi & Kuechler (2009) 
have developed a general methodology of Design Science Research, (Figure ‎3-3). 
In this model, each of the stages can be revisited at any point in the process. 
Therefore, Design Science Research in considered as an interactive approach, 
which is especially suitable for software development, because requirements are 
constantly changing, and findings from one stage may require a revisit to a 
previous stage to alter the design of the system and improve it. 
 
Emerging Theory about 
embedded phenomena 
Knowledge as Operational 
Principles 
Artefact as Situated 
Implementation 
Constructors 
Better Theories 
Models 
Models 
Methods 
Constructors 
Better Theories 
Abstraction 
Abstraction 
Abstraction 
Instantiations 
Methods 
Constructs 
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Figure  3-3: The General Methodology of DSR (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009) 
The previous figure illustrates the five stages of the Design Science Research 
cycle,‎where‎“knowing‎is‎making”,‎and‎each‎stage‎can‎be‎revisited‎at‎any‎point‎in‎
the process. The following section will discuss these stages (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2009): 
Awareness of Problem: This may come from multiple sources: new 
developments in industry or in a reference discipline. Reading in an allied 
discipline may also provide the opportunity for application of new findings to the 
researcher’s‎field.‎The‎output‎of‎this‎phase‎is‎a‎proposal, formal or informal, for a 
new research effort.  
Suggestion: This stage comes immediately after the proposal. The output of this 
phase is a tentative design that is intimately connected with the proposal.  
Development: The provisional Design is implemented in this stage and the final 
result is an artefact.  
Knowledge 
Flows 
Process 
Steps 
Outputs 
Awareness of 
Problem 
Suggestion 
Development 
Evaluation 
Conclusion 
Proposal 
Tentative Design 
Artefact 
Results 
Operation and 
Goal 
Knowledge 
Circumscription 
Performance Measures 
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Evaluation: Once constructed, the artefact is evaluated according to criteria that 
are always implicit and frequently made explicit in the proposal (Awareness of 
Problem phase).  
Conclusion: This phase is the final effort of a specific research. Normally, if the 
result is satisfying, even if there are still deviations in the behaviour of the artefact 
from the hypothetical predictions, the results may be considered good enough. 
The results of the effort are consolidated and written up at this phase, and the 
knowledge gained in the effort is frequently categorised as firm facts that have 
been learned and can be constantly applied, or behaviour that can be repeatedly 
invoked. Otherwise, the knowledge gained in the effort is categorised as loose 
ends or uncharacteristic behaviour that requires explanation and may well serve as 
the subject of further research.  
3.6 Developing a Framework for Selecting 
Security Approaches Based on DSR 
Following the DSR paradigm, we aim to develop a framework for selecting a Web 
services security approach that is most appropriate for a certain application. To 
this end, three possible approaches are investigated throughout the DSR cycle, 
namely AHP, performance analysis and steganography. 
By referring to (Saaty, 2008), we recognise four facets need to be defined to 
develop the first approach: (a) goal; (b) alternatives; (c) criteria; and (d) sub 
criteria. An AHP hierarchy indicates a relationship between elements of one level 
with those of the level immediately below. This relationship percolates down to 
the lowest levels of the hierarchy. In the hierarchic structure, at the root of the 
hierarchy is the goal or objective of the problem being studied and analysed. The 
leaf nodes are the alternatives to be compared. In between these two levels are 
various criteria and sub-criteria. It is important to note that when comparing 
elements at each level, a decision-maker needs just to compare with respect to the 
contribution of the lower-level elements to the upper-level ones.  
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In the context of this research, defining the goal of the AHP framework was quite 
straightforward as it is directly mapped to the current research problem; i.e. 
choosing the best-suited security profile to be deployed for a particular application 
including its Web services. Having the goal established, we moved a step further 
to define the decision alternatives. For this purpose, we selected the security 
profiles that are deemed representatives. 
However, the issue of defining the decision criteria and sub-criteria was more 
complex. Three iterations incorporating design, deployment, and evaluation 
courses of action were needed before the final artefact (i.e. AHP Framework) has 
been emerged which includes a comprehensive criteria and sub-criteria in this 
context. In addition, a fourth iteration has been used to introduce an alternative 
approach to secure Web services based on steganography. In the following sub-
sections, we discuss these four iterations in detail. 
3.6.1  DSR Iteration One: Library Research 
In this iteration, we followed a library research in which a comprehensive 
literature review was undertaken. The main purpose of this library research was to 
understand the security elements or criteria that are relevant in the domain of Web 
services. In fact, this iteration was not very challenging given the fact that there is 
almost a consensus in the relevant literature regarding Web service security 
measures (Nakamur, Hada &‎Neyama,‎2002;‎Yang,‎2002;‎Geer,‎2003;‎O’Neill‎et‎
al., 2003; Siddiqui, 2003; Naedele, 2003; Rao et al., 2004; Tatsubori, Imamura & 
Nakamura, 2004; Nadalin et al., 2006/2007). The identified security criteria based 
on which Web service security profiles need to be compared are: (1) 
Authentication, (2) Integrity, (3) Confidentiality, (4) Non-repudiation, (5) 
Authorisation, and (6) End-to-End Security. 
After establishing these criteria, we deployed and utilised them to compare 
different Web service security profiles. Retrospectively, we found out that 
although these criteria facilitate reducing the number of favoured security profiles 
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for a certain application; yet there is a number of security profiles that can be 
employed, such as: UA, UDP, MCS, SSL, SA, SV and STS. Consider this example, 
a certain Web application is highly critical and requires fulfilment of all of the 
previously discussed security criteria. To choose the best-suited security profile, 
the developer need to compare the security profiles based on the defined security 
criteria. These criteria alone will lead the developer to find out that more than one 
security profile can be selected, although there are slight differences in the level of 
security they can achieve.  
Moreover, despite the fact that these security profiles can achieve the defined 
security requirements to a certain degree, they may have substantial differences in 
terms of performance. Hence, we recognised that these criteria alone are not 
sufficient for developers so as to take informed decisions and that performance 
requirements need to be taken into consideration. Table ‎3-3 summarises this 
iteration. This evaluation led us to start the iteration two of our DSR research. 
Problem: Selecting security approaches for Web services. 
Suggestion: 
To identify and define: 
1. The security criteria and sub-criteria. 
2. The available security profiles. 
Outputs: 
Model: Initial selection framework (based on a decision making 
approach). 
Construct: security criteria (e.g. authentication, authorisation) and 
security profiles (e.g. UA, MCS). 
Method: Initial AHP framework (security criteria). 
Evaluation: The performance evaluation of the security profiles is required. 
Table  3-3: DSR Iteration One (Library Research) 
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3.6.2  DSR Iteration Two: Laboratory Experiments 
To test the effect of individual security profiles on Web services performance, we 
designed and implemented a performance testing experiments, where a simple 
Java API for XML Web Services (JAX-WS) application was used. This Web 
application consists of a Web service and a client, and it represents the peer-to-
peer mode test. The performance analysis framework resulted from this iteration 
represents the first approach to consider when selecting a security profile since it 
provides performance guidelines of the security profiles. 
Problem: Selecting security approaches for Web services. 
Suggestion: Analyse the performance of the identified security profiles. 
Outputs: 
Model: Improved selection framework (based on performance 
analysis and decision making approaches). 
Construct: performance criteria (e.g. Round Trip Time, message 
size). 
Instantiation: Performance tests. (‎Chapter 4: ). 
Method: AHP framework (security and performance criteria). 
Evaluation: The configuration limitations and preferences of the system should 
be considered. 
Table  3-4: DSR Iteration Two (Laboratory Experiments) 
Having reached this point of the research, we recognised that security profiles 
need to be selected not only based on their fulfilment of security requirements, but 
also based on their performance measures. In other words, the AHP hierarchy at 
this point included two major criteria (security and performance) along with their 
sub-criteria. By utilising the current AHP hierarchy we started analysing different 
scenarios and cases related to Web applications. This step has highlighted an 
important criterion which has been overlooked, namely configuration 
requirements. In fact, while conducting these cases, it became apparent that 
different security profiles normally call for different infrastructures to be in place. 
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Examples of these infrastructure and configuration requirements include 
certificates and security service tokens. Table ‎3-4 illustrates the second iteration. 
Having recognised the importance of configuration requirements to the decision 
of which security profile is most appropriate to be deployed in a certain situation; 
we started DSR iteration 3 to further enhance the AHP framework.  
3.6.3  DSR Iteration Three: Configuration Requirements  
As highlighted in the previous subsection, each security profile requires 
configuring some options on the Web service host. These configuration 
requirements reflect the technological constrains and system preference of the 
Web service provider. The Web service client may need to be configured 
depending upon the security profile selected by the server side. For Web service 
security profiles, the service configuration requirements are: (1) Certificates 
stores, (2) Security Token Service, (3) Users’ database, and (4) Flexibility.  
After these three iterations of the conducted design-science research, we have 
reached a point where, from our perspective, the developed AHP framework in its 
current form can be implemented and tested using real scenarios to verify its 
utility and value. The results of the evaluation stage indicate that the AHP 
framework can be used to facilitate the selection of a security profile based on the 
three selected criteria: security, performance and configuration. Table ‎3-5 
explains the third DSR iteration. 
On the other hand, the performance results, from iteration two, highlighted the 
effect of applying security and reliability profiles on the size of the secured SOAP 
messages and related that to the drop of performance of Web services. Therefore, 
in iteration four, we look at another alternative to secure Web services using 
steganography rather than encryption in order to minimise the impact of the 
message size. 
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Problem: Selecting security approaches for Web services. 
Suggestion: Analyse the configuration requirements of the identified security 
profiles. 
Outputs: 
Model: Improved selection framework (based on 
(1) 
performance 
analysis and 
(2) 
improved decision making approaches). 
Construct: configuration criteria (e.g.‎ security‎ tokens,‎ users’‎
database). 
Method: Final AHP framework (security, performance and 
configuration criteria). (‎Chapter 5: ) 
Instantiation: AHP tool. (Appendix C) 
Evaluation: 
- The AHP framework is evaluated using scenarios from 
documentations of best practices. The results are satisfactory. 
- Alternative approaches may be considered to reduce the size of 
security assertions. 
Table  3-5: DSR Iteration Three (Configuration Requirements) 
3.6.4  DSR Iteration Four: Alternative Solution Based on 
Steganography  
The literature review, as well as the performance analysis conducted as part of this 
research, demonstrates that applying security and reliability profiles to SOAP 
messages decreases the performance of Web services dramatically. This is due to 
the extra security assertions added to these messages and the higher number of 
message exchanges needed to establish trust and reliability. Therefore, we have 
considered alternative options, using steganography, to establish trust between 
Web services and their clients. During this iteration, we developed a method to 
embed a hidden message in the sender endpoint and extract this message in the 
receiver endpoint. This method is based on shuffling the XML tags of a SOAP 
message in a particular order, where each permutation of these tags has a specific 
meaning (e.g. an alphabet letter or a control status). 
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Problem: Selecting security approaches for Web services. 
Suggestion: 
Explore and evaluate the feasibility of using steganography as an 
alternative approach to secure Web services. 
Outputs: 
Model: Final selection framework (based on 
(1)
performance 
analysis, 
(2)
decision making and 
(3)
steganography approaches). 
Method: Embedding and Extracting Algorithms. (‎Chapter 6: ) 
Evaluation: 
The steganography method is validated using an example to 
illustrate its utility and value. The results are satisfactory. 
The overall selection framework is accepted. 
Table  3-6: DSR Iteration Four (Alternative Solution Based on 
Steganography) 
After the fourth iteration (Table ‎3-6), the final selection framework is considered 
to be satisfactory. This framework provides three approaches to tackle the 
problem of selecting a suitable security approach for a given Web services 
application. The first is to use the results of the performance analysis 
instantiations that have been developed during iteration 2. Those instantiations 
map the performance aspects to the tested security profiles and can be used when 
there is no need to consider the system limitations and constraints. The second 
approach is to use the AHP multi-criteria decision making framework to make an 
informed decision based on the security, performance and configuration criteria. 
This approach enables developers to rate the tested security profiles according to 
those criteria. Finally, the third approach is to apply our developed steganography 
method. This method is an alternative to traditional encryption-based security 
approaches and can be used to minimise the size and the number of exchanged 
messages. 
3.7 Summary 
This research is about constructing an artefact (A multi-criteria decision making 
framework) and evaluating it as an effort to enhance and automate the process of 
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selecting the most appropriate Web services profile in a given application. 
Accordingly, we are dealing with an artificial science (information systems and 
computing) rather than a natural science.  Therefore, Design Science Research is 
the obvious choice as a general methodology for this research. This research aims, 
by applying the DSR, at producing an artefact in the form of a framework aiming 
to help Web services developers to select the best-suited security profiles for 
software applications. The aim of this research is highly fitting with the general 
aim of DSR. The research in information systems and computing is considered a 
DSR research, if the main aim is to change a current situation related to 
organisational or social systems into a more desirable one through the 
development of novel artefacts (Hevner et al., 2004). Hence, the DSR is highly 
consistent in the context of this research. 
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Chapter 4:  A Performance Evaluation of 
Security Profiles for Web services   
4.1 Overview 
This chapter describes a series of performance tests that focuses on understanding 
the impact of applying various security profiles on the performance of Web 
services. The collected results represent a starting point for understanding trade-
offs between performance and security, and form a basis for making architectural 
and engineering decisions, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Chapter 4 is organised as follows: The test design is described in section ‎4.2. The 
test results are presented and analysed in section ‎4.3. Finally, section ‎4.5 
summarises the key findings. 
4.2 Test Design 
Recently, Web services security has witnessed a significant impetus as several 
specifications have been developed and implemented to meet the security 
challenges of Web services. However, the performance of the security 
mechanisms is fraught with concerns due to additional security contents in SOAP 
messages, the higher number of message exchanges needed to establish trust as 
well as extra CPU time to process these additions. See Appendix A for a 
comparison between four SOAP messages (Simple, Secured with UA, Secured 
with MCS, and Reliable Message) with an initial data of one character. 
This test focuses mainly on the overall performance of WSIT security and 
reliability profiles. Therefore, the following discussion does not essentially cover 
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the performance of underlying WSS specifications implemented within the 
security profiles. 
4.2.1  Test Subjects 
This section describes the METRO/WSIT project (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007) 
and its security profiles that were selected to be benchmarked by the experiments. 
In‎ order‎ to‎ improve‎ Web‎ services’‎ Quality‎ of‎ Service‎ (QoS)‎ and‎ to‎ enable‎
interoperability between Java and .Net Web services, the Web Services 
Interoperability Technologies (WSIT) (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007) has been 
developed as joint effort between Sun and Microsoft. WSIT is an implementation 
of a number of open Web services specifications to support enterprise features, 
such as message optimisation, reliable messaging, and security.  
Web services have relied on transport-based security such as SSL to provide 
point-to-point security. WSIT implements WS-Security so as to provide 
interoperable message content integrity and confidentiality, even when messages 
pass through intermediary nodes before reaching their destination endpoint. WS-
Security, as provided by WSIT, is an addition to the existing transport-level 
security, which may still be used. 
WSIT provides a number of security profiles that can be applied to secure Web 
services. Each profile represents a set of pre-defined security specifications and 
configurations. Using security profiles reduces the development time and allows 
Web services developers to focus their effort on identifying the security 
requirements of their systems rather than going into the complexity of 
understanding the several security standards and finding the right combination 
that fulfils the security needs of the developed systems. However, while applying 
WSIT security profiles to enhance the security of Web services, this may also 
result in increasing the size and number of the exchanged SOAP messages, which 
may in turn lead to an increase in the time of processing these messages and 
transmitting them over the network. 
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Currently, there are many security profiles that can be implemented to secure Web 
services, see section ‎2.10.3 . We have deliberately selected seven of them for this 
experiment. The selection was based on identifying the generic profiles, which 
cover the general configuration types and represent the different security methods, 
as illustrated in Figure ‎4-1. The selected profiles are: 
 Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA). 
 Username with digest passwords (UDP). 
 Mutual Certificates Security (MCS). 
 Transport Security using SSL (SSL). 
 SAML Authorisation over SSL (SA). 
 SAML Sender Vouches with Certificates (SV). 
 STS Issued Token (STS). 
 
Figure  4-1: METRO Security Profiles 
Username 
Authentication Security 
Mutual Certificates 
Security 
SAML 
Third Party STS 
Message 
Layer Security 
Transport 
Layer Security 
Test Case/ Security Profile Security Method 
No Security 
UA 
UDP 
STS 
MCS 
SV 
SA 
SSL 
Layer 
‎Chapter 4: A Performance Evaluation of Security Profiles for Web services  
 
Bachar Alrouh 64 
We also test the impact of applying Reliable Message Delivery and Deliver 
Messages in Exact Order, as‎provided‎by‎Metro’s‎WSIT,‎on‎the‎performance‎of‎
Web services. 
4.2.2  Test Scenario and Cases 
Echo Web service (Simple structure/ Dynamic payload): This JAX-WS echo 
application consists of a Web service and a client, which represents the peer-to-
peer mode test; the client sends different size auto-generated messages (from 1 
Byte to 1MByte) and the Web service echoes (send back) the same message 
received. The test was run with and without applying security profiles, using 
different initial message sizes: 1byte to 1 Mbyte. This Web service was used to 
test the performance of security profiles because using a simple payload reduces 
the side effects of unrelated processing of the business logic. In addition, as 
security profiles employ encryption algorithms, which are used to decipher the 
exchanged data, the encryption/decryption process depends on the size of the 
message. Therefore, a dynamic size payload was selected for this experiment. 
Book details Web service (Complex structure/ static payload): The client 
sends a sequence of messages; each contains a one-element array of book details 
objects (Figure ‎4-2). The Web service replies by sending a simple string response 
for each message it receives. The complex structure/ static payload was used for 
the performance of reliable messaging methods because reliability guarantees the 
delivery of the message, as a whole, regardless of the actual payload. If a message 
is lost, the sender resends the message until its receipt is acknowledged by the 
receiver. If these messages are received out of order, the receiver can rearrange 
the messages into the correct one. 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <S:Body> 
  <ns2:bookOrder xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/"> 
   <book>  
     <isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn> 
     <author>Author_1</author> 
     <name>Book_1</name> 
     <pages>111</pages> 
     <publisher>Publisher_1</publisher> 
   </book>     
  </ns2:bookOrder> 
 </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Figure  4-2: Complex Payload SOAP-Message 
4.2.3  Test Environment and Settings 
In this chapter, the focus is on the increment of processing time when applying 
security profiles instead of the network latency. As a result, the data were 
collected from a local machine; the Web service and the client were deployed on a 
Dell machine (Pentium D CPU 2.80 GHz / 3GB of RAM) Running Microsoft XP.  
NetBeans IDE 6.5 was used to develop the Web service and the client. The Web 
service was developed as a Web application and deployed on a GlassFish 2.2 
application server. A Java SE application was used to represent the client. The 
initial data sent from the client to the service were randomly generated before 
sending the message to avoid any caching.‎Metro’s‎WSIT‎Web service stack 1.4 
was used to apply security profiles to the tested Web service. 
4.2.4  Evaluation Metric 
The time spent in requesting and responding on the client side was measured as 
round trip time (RTT) using Java’s System.nanoTime(). For the reliable 
messaging experiment, we also measured the average response time, maximum 
response time and the maximum throughput using the Web services monitor in the 
Glassfish Admin Console. Every test was repeated 1000 times and the average, 
maximum and standard deviation RTT were calculated for each case. The test is 
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then repeated on 10 different occasions, and used the average results after 
eliminating the highest and lowest scores to reduce the noise results. The results 
were then compared using the Round Trip Time Increment Percentage (Tang et 
al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007) (RTTIP) in order to evaluate the performance 
overhead for a specific security profile deployment: 
%100
0
0 


RTT
RTTRTT
RTTIP i     (1) 
Where:  
 RTT0 is the round trip time without applying any security profile 
deployment. 
 RTTi is the round trip time of the Web service with a specific security 
profile i deployment.   
4.3 Results and Analysis 
The average value of the RTT for each initial message size and each profile is 
used to study the normal behaviour of the Web service (Table ‎4-1). We also 
calculated the standard deviation RTT (Table ‎4-2) and maximum RTT (Table ‎4-3) 
as suggested by (Casola et al., 2009) to indicate how often the Web service 
secured using a certain profile shifts from its normal behaviour, and the worse 
scenario, respectively. 
Security 
Profile 
Initial Message Size (Byte) 
1 10 100 1 K 10 K 100 K 1 M 
No 
Security 24 25 25 25 27 42 228 
UA 80 81 82 84 101 263 2055 
UDP 80 80 80 81 98 259 2051 
MCS 119 119 119 121 137 295 2109 
SSL 42 42 42 43 45 71 348 
SA 52 52 53 52 55 80 357 
SV 122 122 124 124 140 303 2110 
STS 266 285 288 294 316 481 2229 
Table  4-1: Average Round Trip Time (milliseconds) 
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Security 
Profile 
Initial Message Size (Byte) 
1 10 100 1 K 10 K 100 K 1 M 
No 
Security 6 8 8 9 12 31 54 
UA 25 28 28 28 33 59 18 
UDP 26 26 27 27 31 57 15 
MCS 29 29 29 29 33 56 16 
SSL 22 22 22 23 24 42 20 
SA 23 24 23 23 25 41 24 
SV 23 24 27 24 29 57 15 
STS 664 957 1048 1246 1272 1201 498 
Table  4-2: Standard Deviation Round Trip Time (milliseconds) 
Security 
Profile 
Initial Message Size (Byte) 
1 10 100 1 K 10 K 100 K 1 M 
No Security 207 213 211 211 211 211 390 
UA 237 237 236 239 253 400 2509 
UDP 235 235 235 237 251 393 2398 
MCS 295 274 275 277 291 435 2489 
SSL 205 205 205 206 205 218 381 
SA 215 214 215 215 214 226 460 
SV 282 282 282 282 298 516 2464 
STS 19218 23250 22973 30351 30366 26838 33229 
Table  4-3: Maximum Round Trip Time (milliseconds) 
The data collected from these experiments can be analysed in many different 
ways. Figure ‎4-3 illustrates the RTT Increment percentage for the average values 
of the tested security profiles. This figure shows three types of performance 
behaviour in response to the increase in the message size. The first group includes 
SSL and SA, which are transport layer security profiles. These profiles are clear 
winners as they have the smallest incremental percentage values amongst the rest, 
and their RTTIP decreases when the data size increases. However, they provide 
point-to-point security only and cannot guarantee end-to-end security. The second 
group includes UA, UDP, MCS and SV. These message layer security profiles 
can provide end-to-end security, but they show a significant increase in their RTT 
as the data size increases. The third group is for the STS-based profiles, which 
have the worst performance amongst all the other profiles. However, their 
performance is stable for all data sizes, and becomes very similar to the rest of the 
message layer security profiles for large data sizes (1 MByte+). 
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Figure  4-3: RTT Increment Percentage for the Average Values 
Based on the previous observations, the results can be discussed using the 
following criteria: security layer (transport vs. message), encryption type 
(symmetric vs. asymmetric), the usage of SAML tokens and finally authentication 
type (direct vs. STS). 
4.3.1  Transport Security vs. Message Security 
Figure ‎4-4 illustrates the huge difference in performance between message level 
security, represented by UA, and transport level security using SSL. While the 
increment percentage of RTT using message level security increases when the 
data size increases, we can notice its decrease when using transport layer security. 
This is because SSL is lightweight, as it depends on securing the communication 
channel and does not involve any XML parsing. Therefore, transport layer 
security should be used if there is no special requirement to use message level 
security, such as having a chain of Web services, where end-to-end security is 
required. 
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Figure  4-4: Transport Security vs. Message Security 
4.3.2  Username Tokens vs. Mutual Certificates 
As shown in Figure ‎4-5, when the initial data size is in the range of 1 byte to 1 
Kbyte, the round trip time is increased by around 220-230% when applying 
username authentication profiles. The UDP performs slightly better than UA 
because the username token in UDP, unlike UA, is not encrypted due to the use of 
digest passwords. On the other hand, using MCS for the same data sizes increases 
the round trip time by 370-390%.  The difference can be related to the fact that 
UA and UDP use symmetric key cryptography while MCS uses asymmetric 
cryptography, where symmetric is always faster than asymmetric encryption (Sun 
Microsystems Inc., 2007).  
When large messages are exchanged between the client and the service (i.e. 
1Mbyte) we notice however that the difference between the performance of UA, 
UDP and MCS decreases dramatically because most of the processing time is 
spent on applying the actual encryption rather than manipulating the keys. 
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Figure  4-5: Username vs. Mutual Certificates 
4.3.3  SAML: Over SSL vs. Mutual Certificates 
Figure ‎4-6 confirms that the performance of SAML-based security profiles (SA 
and SV) depends mainly on the underlying security method that is used to protect 
the data (SSL and MCS respectively). 
 
Figure  4-6: SAML-Based Profiles Compared to Their Underlying Security 
Profile 
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In both of the security profiles, SA and SV, the sender vouches a SAML token for 
authorisation. However, SA protects the exchanged message using SSL in the 
transport layer, while SV depends on mutual certificates, which is a message level 
security mechanism. Comparing the performances of (SSL vs. SA) and (MCS vs. 
SV) indicates that there is a negligible increase in RTTIP when SAML is applied, 
especially when very large messages are exchanged. 
4.3.4  STS vs. Non-STS 
In Figure ‎4-7, we compare the performances of STS-based and non-STS (direct 
client-service authentication) security profiles. The non-STS based profile used 
for the comparison is UA. Since the security of the client is dependent upon the 
security profile selected for the STS itself, not the service, the STS itself is 
secured using a separate UA profile.   
 
Figure  4-7: STS vs. Non-STS 
Results show that using third party STS tokens affect the performance of the Web 
service significantly. When the initial message size is between 1 byte – 1 Kbyte, 
the RTTIP of STS is about 4 times its value when applying non-STS security 
profile, UA. Therefore, STS security profiles should only be used when the 
service and the client are in two different domains, where direct authentication can 
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be an issue.  However, when the initial data size reaches 1 M byte, the 
performance difference decreases noticeably. 
4.3.5  Average, Standard deviation and maximum 
This section explores the effect of changing the data size on the performance 
behaviour of the security profiles.  
In order to demonstrate the normal behaviour, the average values of RTT were 
used, as shown in Figure ‎4-8. All the testes profiles show a very small increase in 
the RTT when the data size increases gradually from 1 byte to 10 Kbyte. 
However, the increase becomes significant when the data size is increased to 100 
Kbyte and then 1 Mbyte. The message layer security-based profiles (UA, UDP, 
MCS and STS) respond with a very sharp increase in the RTT when the data size 
reaches 1 MByte. Nonetheless, the differences between the RTT values of these 
message layer security profiles values start to disappear and they all when very 
large messages (1 MByte+) are used. 
 
Figure  4-8: Average Round Trip Time –RTT (milliseconds) 
The standard deviation values (STDEV) of the round trip time (Figure ‎4-9) 
illustrate the variation there is from its normal behaviour, represented by the 
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average. A small STDEV value indicates that the data points tend to be very close 
to the average, whereas a large value for the STDEV indicates that the data are 
spread out over a large range of values. 
 
Figure  4-9: STDEV Round Trip Time –RTT (milliseconds) 
In small data sizes (1 byte to 1 Kbyte), all the studied profiles, apart from the STS, 
have a steady STDEV when the data size increases. STS depends on a third party 
to provide tokens, which means that there are two active communication channels, 
where the latency could occur in either. This mean that STS based profiles tend to 
have a variant performance where the round trip time could vary quite often from 
its normal (average) value. All the other profiles show an increase in the STDEV 
when the data size increased to 100Kbyte, which then decreases to a smaller value 
when the data size reaches 1 Mbyte. 
Figure ‎4-10 shows the change in maximum round trip time when the data size 
increases.‎The‎maximum‎value‎can‎be‎used‎to‎describe‎the‎“worst‎case‎scenario”‎
or the worst performance you can get from a particular Web services. Due to the 
bigger number of communication channels in the STS profile, this profile has the 
highest value of maximum RTT. Its maximum values vary slightly in response to 
changing the data size.  
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Figure  4-10: Max Round Trip Time –RTT (milliseconds) 
On the other hand, all the other profiles have a very similar maximum values in 
small data size messages (1 byte to 10Kbyte). Significant differences start to 
appear when the data size reaches 100 Kbyte. The maximum values at the 1 
Mbyte data size indicate that the worst case scenarios for transport layer security 
profiles are still better than those of message layer security profiles. In addition, 
The STS profile performs significantly worse than the rest, which is different from 
its behaviour in normal scenarios (average values), where the differences between 
the performance of all message-level security profiles start to disappear when the 
message size increases to 1 Mbyte. 
4.4 Reliable Messaging 
As illustrated in Table ‎4-4, adding reliable messaging to our Web service resulted 
in increasing the average response time by around 30 % when applying reliable 
messaging alone, and more than twice its value when we applied the Exact Order 
Delivery (which drops the throughput to less than half its value).  
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Simple (No reliability) 16 32 62.5 107.42 
Reliable Messaging (RM) 21 312 47.62 135.11 
RM + Order 35 18329 28.57 155.94 
Table  4-4: Reliable Messaging Results 
The maximum response time recorded in this experiment for Web services with 
reliable messaging implemented was more than 10 times the maximum value of 
Web services without reliability assurance. When applying the exact order 
delivery assurance, the maximum value increased by more than 570%. This is 
because when a message is lost, the sender endpoint resends the message until its 
receipt is acknowledged by the receiving endpoint. If these messages are received 
out of order, the receiving endpoint can rearrange the messages into the correct 
order. These processes have a huge impact on the performance of Web services, 
as demonstrated in the previous table. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have compared the performance of several security profiles for 
Web services. The performance evaluation has shown that profiles that use 
transport level security are always faster than the message-level security ones. In 
addition, Message level security protocols have a scalability problem if large 
messages are exchanged, unlike SSL-based profiles. Within message level 
security profiles, username authentication based profiles perform better than 
mutual certificates security. However, the difference is insignificant when using 
very large size messages. Using digest passwords instead of encrypting the whole 
username token can slightly improve the performance. Moreover, the performance 
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penalty of using SAML is very small and depends primarily on the underlying 
security profile. In addition, the performance of STS security profiles is massively 
less than non-STS profiles and should only be used when the service and its 
clients are on different domains. Finally, reliable messaging is very important in 
critical systems because it enables them to overcome the failure of losing 
messages in transit or delivering them out of order. However, reliability comes at 
the expense of the performance of Web services, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
Several studies, such as (Shirasuna et al., 2004; Moralis et al., 2007; Novakouski 
et al, 2010) reached similar conclusions regarding the high performance of SSL 
when compared to message-layer security mechanisms and the little impact of 
changing the security token on the performance of Web services. On the other 
hand, the main difference between our approach and the previous work is that we 
focused on the performance of security profiles rather than its underlying 
standards and protocols. We argue that our approach simplifies the security usage 
and increases the usability when making a decision on which security profile to 
select for a given application. This is because it shields the developer from the 
complexity and variety of the different security standards, and allows them to 
focus on the overall performance of the easier-to-understand profiles. Moreover, 
we studied the impact of changing the message size on the performance of Web 
services and analysed not only the average values, but we also considered the 
maximum and standard deviation values in order to reach a better understanding 
of the overall performance. 
This chapter represents the second iteration of the DSR cycle (see section ‎3.6.2 ); 
the results gathered from these experiments provide the basis for the AHP model 
that is developed in the next chapter. The discussion provided in this chapter may 
also be used as a performance guideline to be consulted when selecting a security 
profile for a Web services application.  
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Chapter 5:  Selecting Web Services Security 
Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making Approach  
5.1 Overview 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are several XML-based security 
profiles and mechanisms that may be used to satisfy the security requirements of a 
particular application. The task a Web service developer in an ideal situation is to 
select the one profile that satisfies all the requirements. On many other occasions, 
there may be several solutions that satisfy most of the requirements, but not all. 
This can be considered as a decision problem, where an informed decision should 
be made by prioritizing the requirements and ranking the available options 
accordingly to select the profile that matches the most important requirements. 
The selection of a candidate solution depends on evaluating the available security 
profiles against several characteristics derived from the requirements of the given 
application. A Web services application developer specifies a set of requirements 
according to the service provider’s security preferences and technological 
constraints, taking into consideration the quality of service expected from the 
service consumer. The requirements can be divided into several dimensions 
according to different independent criteria and sub-criteria to create a multi-
dimensional model. Each criterion and sub-criterion is given a weight according 
to its level of importance in the application. Each candidate solution is also 
weighted against each sub-criterion according to what extent this particular 
solution matches the requirement represented by this sub-criterion. 
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Generally, service providers set these weights on the basis of judgment. When 
there are a small number of selection criteria, then direct judgments may be a 
possibility. Nevertheless, when the number is large, the judging process may lead 
to improper selection due to the bias towards key elements only (Godse, Sonar & 
Mulik, 2008). In such a multi-criteria decision making model, it is important to 
have quantifiable values that are rational and consistent. 
In this chapter, an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1982) approach is 
used to solve the problem of assigning weights to selection features and enable a 
quantitative basis for selecting a security profile for a Web service. AHP is a well-
established method to make these types of decisions. It is a quantitative approach 
based on relative judgments, with the assurance of consistent output. AHP is able 
to handle tangible as well as intangible attributes while monitoring the 
consistency in judgment (Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008; Roper-Lowe & Sharp, 
1990) . 
This chapter also provides a scenario-driven approach to demonstrate situations 
where the decision making framework is used to make informed choices to rank 
various service security patterns and select the best possible one to meet the 
requirements of these scenarios.  
Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows: Section ‎5.2 discusses the 
decision making concept, while section ‎5.3 provides an overview of the common 
methods used in Decision making. Section ‎5.4 explains the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) and the steps of its implementation. The AHP framework for 
selecting security profiles for Web services is introduced in section ‎5.5. The 
framework is then validated using three different scenarios in Section ‎5.6. Finally, 
concluding remarks are presented in section ‎5.7. 
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5.2 The Necessity of a Formal Decision Making 
Framework 
The modern enterprise sees itself operating in an ever-complex environment, with 
technological advances and information overload forcing such enterprises to look 
and deal with different tasks. The decision making process is one of the most 
important tasks in any organisation, due to its high-risk implication and future 
consequences (Saaty, 1982). 
In such situations, the multiplicity and complexity of the criteria lead to a complex 
decision making process. In the real life environment communication links 
between the members of the decision-making group with a common 
understanding of the syntax and semantics of the underlying issues are an 
essential requirement for making an informed decision. 
As a consequence of the complexity, stochasticity and the involvement of many 
decision makers, a disciplined framework for decision making has become a 
requirement. Thus, many formal decision techniques were developed in the past to 
tackle these problems. However, these tools were too mathematical or theoretical 
or only capable of solving problems simpler than the modern ones (Bhushan & 
Rai, 2004). 
On the other hand, advances in the field of the mathematics, operations research, 
cybernetics, artificial intelligence have been applied and used to develop decision 
making techniques (Bhushan & Rai, 2004). The underlying principle of these 
methods is optimisation. This results in a vast expansion of quantitative decision 
making aid using optimisation techniques. 
Decision making is a process of choosing one alternative among a set of 
alternatives, based on some criteria. This can be achieved by assessing these 
criteria against each alternative as well as the evaluation of the alternatives based 
on each criterion. The conclusion of all these evaluations is then used to achieve 
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the relative ranking of the alternatives. In addition, with a group of experts’‎
opinions to be incorporated in the decision making the complication will increase. 
Therefore, a structured approach is needed to avoid the ambiguity of the analysis 
and boost the progress. A generic disciplined process should provide a structure to 
deal with complex problems, a justification for the decisions, consistency, 
objectivity and finally the decisions can be repeated and reviewed and are easy to 
understand. 
5.3 Decision Making Methods 
There are several tools for solving a decision problem. The selection of an 
appropriate tool is not an easy task and depends on the concrete decision problem, 
as well as on the objectives of the decision makers. The chosen approach should 
employ credible evaluation methods (Baker et al., 2001). 
Over decades, several approaches were developed as a try to standardise the 
process of making decisions. Choosing an appropriate decision making method is 
dependent on the decision problem type, the attributes of the decision making 
method‎and‎ the‎decision‎makers’‎objectives.‎The‎use‎of‎optimization‎ techniques‎
can also lead to a more deployment of decision making methods (Bhushan & Rai, 
2004). The chosen method should thus be justified and evaluated (Baker et al., 
2001). In general, the ease of use and the applicability remain an issue for some 
approaches due to the heavy dependence on Math (too theoretical) or incapability 
to solve complicated decision problems. For instance, Ranking Approach (RA) 
(Buss, 1983), non-linear programming model (Badria & Davisb, 2001; Santhanam 
& Kyparisis, 1996), 0-1goal programming model and Analytical Network Process 
(ANP) (Lee & Kim, 2000) reliant on complicated mathematical models are 
difficult to understand and therefor to use. 
Numerous multivariate methods also reported to be used ignore decision‎makers’‎
preferences in the process of decision making (e.g. the Simple Multi-Attribute 
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Rating technique (SMAR) (Salmeron & Herrero, 2005; Dutta & Burgess, 2003)  
and Decision Making Units (DMU) (Salmeron & Herrero, 2005)). DMU involves 
assessing the performance of different units that might be different in their nature 
such as a computer or a school. The performance is measured considering the 
amount‎ of‎ inputs‎ involves‎ and‎ outputs‎ generated.‎ The‎ units’‎ performance‎
measures are then compared in a sense that one unit is more efficient that another 
if it gives more outputs for same inputs quantity or same amount of outputs for 
smaller set of inputs. This comparison can be represented mathematically by ratio 
of a sum of outputs over a sum of inputs. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
(Salmeron & Herrero, 2005) extends DMU by assigning different weights to 
outputs and inputs. The weights are different values assigned to make a unit more 
important than others. DMU and DEA are preferred when there is no need to 
consider‎preferences‎of‎decision‎makers‎as‎ the‎main‎ intention‎ to‎compare‎units’‎
performances.  
Pros and Cons Analysis (Baker et al., 2001) could be used for simple decisions 
with few alternatives and criteria. Kepner-Tregoe (K-T) Decision Analysis 
(Kepner & Tregoe, 1981) is suitable for fairly complex problems. Multi-Attribute 
Utility Theory (MAUT) (Edwards & Barron, 1994; Goodwin & Wright, 1999) is a 
quantitative comparison method used to combine dissimilar measures of costs, 
risks, and benefits, along with individual preferences, into high-level, aggregated 
preferences. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1982; Saaty & 
Vargas, 1984; Saaty & Kearns, 1985; Saaty, 1987; Saaty, 1990a; Saaty, 1990b; 
Saaty & Vargas, 1991; Saaty & Vargas, 2000; Saaty, 2001; Saaty, 2008) is a 
quantitative comparison method used to select a preferred alternative by using 
pair-wise comparisons of the alternatives based on their relative performance 
against the criteria. The basis of this technique is that humans are more capable of 
making relative judgments than absolute judgments (Saaty, 2008). 
A research conducted by (Kamal, 2008) compared several prioritising approaches 
and identified AHP as the most-effective one, as shown in Table ‎5-1.  
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Characteristics Differentiating the Prioritisation 
Techniques 
Prioritisation Techniques 
AHP SMAR DEA RA ANP 
Incorporation of preference structure  – – – – 
Synthesised analysis of diverse judgements  – – – – 
An intuitive technique – – –  – 
Optimising resource allocation for interaction of factors  –  –  
Limited attributes to carry out real world decisions –     
Captures individual knowledge and experience   – – – 
Gives easy understanding of problem situation  – – –  
Time-consuming process – – – – – 
Non-linear representation – – –  – 
Managing large amount of qualitative/quantitative data  – – – – 
Applicability weakened by complex mathematical models – – –   
Easy understanding of the prioritisation process   –  – 
Quick insight into structure of information   – – – 
Requires less skill and training      
Measure the performance efficiency of decision makers –   – – 
Structures through symbolic and numeric representation   – – – 
Supports different viewpoints through rich pictures  – – – – 
Techniques not appropriate for all situations      
Too much focus on quantifiable calculations –     
Providing a step-wise guideline for prioritising the factors  – – –  
Accessible data format  –  – – 
Graphical representation  – – – – 
Resolves complex problems of choice and prioritisation  –  –  
Table  5-1: Comparisons of Decision Making Approaches (Kamal, 2008) 
5.4 The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The AHP was developed as an organised approach, utilising the experience, 
intuition and heuristics, to give decision-making the structure of a well-defined 
methodology derived from sound mathematical principles. 
The wide spread AHP acceptance by the decision makers is due to its simplicity 
and‎ease‎of‎use.‎AHP‎helps‎structure‎the‎decision‎maker’s‎thoughts‎and‎organise 
the problem in an easy to follow and analyse manner. A wide range of 
applications has utilised the AHP, including alternative selection (Zeng et al., 
2007), resource allocation (Ramanathan, 1995), forecasting (Saaty, 1987; Ülengin, 
1994; Jensen, 1982; Jensen & Spencer, 1986), business process re-engineering 
(Ashayeri, Keij & Bröker, 1998; Wei, Chien & Wang, 2005), quality function 
deployment (Karsak, Sozer & Alptekin, 2003), balanced scorecard (Ravi, Shankar 
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& Tiwari, 2005), benchmarking (Lu et al., 1994), public policy decisions (Saaty, 
2001), healthcare (Dolan, 1989), multimedia communication  (Ghinea, Magoulas 
& Siamitros, 2005) and many more. Essentially, the AHP has been used to 
structure the complexity, measurement and synthesis of rankings. These features 
make it suitable for all these applications and it has been acknowledged as a 
theoretically sound and market-tested‎and‎accepted‎methodology.‎AHP’s‎success‎
is given by its almost universal adoption as a new paradigm for decision-making 
coupled with simplicity of implementation and understanding. Furthermore, its 
results agree with perceptions and expectations. 
The main concepts of the AHP are:  
 The AHP is analytic. It assists in analysing the decision problem logically 
and in establishing numbers based on the decision‎maker’s‎ intuition‎ and‎
feelings which can be validated, questioned and reviewed by others. 
 The AHP utilises a hierarchy structure. This property comes naturally with 
the human tendency to decompose and reduce the complex problems into 
sub problems to be tackled one by one. 
 The AHP defines a step-by-step process for decision making.  
These steps will now be described (Saaty & Vargas, 2000):  
5.4.1  Hierarchy 
The problem is decomposed into a hierarchy of goal, criteria, sub-criteria and 
alternatives. 
Hierarchy indicates a relationship between elements of one level with those of the 
level immediately below. This relationship percolates down to the lowest levels of 
the hierarchy and in this manner every element is connected to every other one, at 
least in an indirect manner. 
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In the hierarchic structure, at the root of the hierarchy is the goal or objective of 
the problem being studied and analysed. The leaf nodes are the alternatives to be 
compared. In between these two levels are various criteria and sub-criteria. It is 
important to note that when comparing elements at each level a decision-maker 
has just to compare with respect to the contribution of the lower-level elements to 
the upper-level one. 
5.4.2  Pair-Wise Comparisons 
Data are collected from experts or decision-makers corresponding to the 
hierarchic structure, in the pair-wise comparison of alternatives on a qualitative 
scale as described below. The comparisons are made for each criterion and 
converted into quantitative numbers, as illustrated in Table ‎5-2. 
Option  
Numerical 
value(s) 
Equal 1 
Marginally strong 3 
Strong 5 
Very strong 7 
Extremely strong 9 
Intermediate values to reflect fuzzy inputs  2, 4, 6, 8 
Reflecting dominance of second alternative compared with 
the first 
Reciprocals 
Table  5-2: The Nine-Point Scale For Pair-Wise Comparisons 
The pair-wise comparisons of various criteria generated at step 2 are organised 
into a square matrix. The diagonal elements of the matrix are 1. The criterion in 
the ith row is better than criterion in the jth column if the value of element (i, j) is 
more than 1; otherwise the criterion in the jth column is better than that in the ith 
row. The (j, i) element of the matrix is the reciprocal of the (i, j) element.  
A= [
     
   
       
]      (2) 
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5.4.3  Eigen Vector 
The principal Eigen value and the corresponding normalised right Eigen vector of 
the comparison matrix give the relative importance of the various criteria being 
compared. The elements of the normalised eigenvector are termed weights with 
respect to the criteria or sub-criteria and ratings with respect to the alternatives.  
5.4.4  Consistency Ratio 
The consistency of the matrix of order n is evaluated. Comparisons made by this 
method are subjective and the AHP tolerates inconsistency through the amount of 
redundancy in the approach. If this consistency index fails to reach a required 
level, then answers to comparisons may be re-examined. The consistency index, 
CI, is calculated as: 
CI‎=‎(λmax‎- n) / (n - 1)     (3) 
Where‎λmax‎is‎the‎maximum‎eigenvalue‎of‎the‎judgment‎matrix.‎This‎CI‎can‎be‎
compared with that of a random matrix, RI (Table ‎5-3). The ratio derived, CI/RI, 
is termed the Consistency Ratio (CR). Saaty suggests the value of CR should be 
less than 10%.  
CR = CI / RI       (4) 
Order of the matrix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random Consistency Index – RI 0 0 0.58 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 
Table  5-3: Random Consistency Indices (Saaty, 1990a) 
5.4.5  Ratings 
The rating of each alternative is multiplied by the weights of the sub-criteria and 
aggregated to get local ratings with respect to each criterion. The local ratings are 
‎Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making Approach  
 
Bachar Alrouh 86 
then multiplied by the weights of the criteria and   aggregated to get global 
ratings. 
5.4.6  Integrating Group Judgments 
If the judging process involves multiple experts, then a single consolidated 
judgment is calculated using a geometric mean to integrate the group judgment. 
5.5 The AHP Framework 
This section proposes an AHP framework for selecting security profiles for Web 
services. 
5.5.1  Hierarchy 
The main goal of this study is to provide a framework that aids Web service 
developers when they select the best-suited security profile for a certain 
application. Therefore, we classified the requirements according to three criteria, 
namely security, configuration and performance. 
The security category is subcategorised according to the different security 
requirements for Web services. The configuration criterion refers to the resources 
management‎ requirements‎ for‎ the‎ security‎ profiles‎ (certificates,‎ users’‎ database‎
and security service token), as well as the configuration flexibility. The 
performance criterion is defined by the average round trip time, standard deviation 
round trip time and maximum round trip time. In this hierarchy model (Figure ‎5-
1), the alternatives are represented by the different profiles that can be used to 
secure Web services. 
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Figure  5-1: An AHP Framework for Web Service Security Profiles 
5.5.2  AHP Alternatives : Security Profiles  
For the purpose of demonstrating the most common security profiles for Web 
services, the Metro Web services stack (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010) is used in 
this chapter. Metro is an advanced Web services stack that provides 
interoperability between Java and .Net Web services. The most used feature of 
Metro is security, which involves streaming encryption/signatures, secure 
conversation, and trust. To simplify security usage, Metro provides several 
security profiles that cover the most-used cases. Choosing a profile can be done 
according to the type of security (transport or message level), type of client 
credentials (user name/password, X.509 certificate, SAML assertion, Kerberos 
ticket, or issued token from a third-party) and the role the client credential plays in 
securing the messages (Carr & Guo, 2009). 
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In ‎Chapter 2: , several METRO/WSIT security profiles were described and 
evaluated. Our selection process considered choosing the most common and 
generic security profiles that represent various security methods, tokens and 
implementation layers. These profiles are used as alternatives in the proposed 
AHP model: 
 Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA). 
 Username with digest passwords (UDP). 
 Mutual Certificates Security (MCS). 
 Transport Security using SSL (SSL). 
 SAML Authorisation over SSL (SA). 
 SAML Sender Vouches with Certificates (SV). 
 STS Issued Token (STS). 
5.5.3  AHP Criterion 1: Security  
There are some major security requirements that must be addressed to ensure the 
safety of exchanging Web services information through a network (Nakamur, 
Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). These requirements are: 
 Authentication: It refers to establishing identity which assures that access 
to data and applications is limited to those who have appropriate proof of 
identity. Authentication mechanisms are based on the idea of having a 
token in the possession of the entity that is authenticated and this token is 
either software or hardware based. When a Web service starts, information 
about the authentication status must be carried in the Web service 
communication. As in standard Web traffic, service provider should 
authenticate service requesters before sending Web services information. 
This mechanism is known as peer-to-peer authentication. Another 
important mechanism is known as message origin authentication. The idea 
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here is that received messages are authenticated based on their origin. This 
is useful if messages are communicated through a chain of Web services. 
 Integrity: It refers to the requirement of ensuring that transmitted 
information has not been changed or modified during transmission. 
Knowledge about tampering occurrence fulfils integrity requirements. 
Integrity can be achieved using digital signature, for example. 
 Confidentiality: It refers to the requirement for exchanged data between 
two communicating parties not to be available to a third party that may try 
to pry into the communication. In order to achieve confidentiality, one 
approach is to use a private connection between the communicating 
parties, such as a dedicated line or a VPN. However, the critical 
information of Web services is usually exchanged through untrusted 
networks, the Internet most likely, where the private connection is not 
achievable and another approach is used to meet the requirement of 
confidentiality, which is encryption. 
 Non-repudiation: It means that the message originator cannot deny 
sending this message. Any doubt about the message sender throws 
confidentiality and integrity into question and results could be disastrous. 
The Web Services Security (WSS) standard assures non-repudiation 
through its use of the XML Signature standard”‎ (Singhal, Winograd & 
Scarfone, 2007). 
 Authorisation: It refers to granting privileges for users and deciding 
whether an entity is allowed to access particular resources and services or 
not. Just because a user is authenticated does not mean that they are 
always authorised. Authorisation software allows administrators to 
manage a policy for access control to services by giving different 
privileges to different users and groups. Single sign-on technologies, such 
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as SAML, are used in Web services for both authentication and 
authorisation. 
 End-to-End Security: It means that communicated data is signed and 
encrypted between partners communicating the data throughout the chain. 
5.5.4  AHP Criterion 2: Configuration 
Each security profile requires configuring some options on the Web service host. 
These configurations requirements reflect the technological constraints and 
system preference of the Web service provider. The Web service client may need 
to be configured as well depending upon the security profile selected by the server 
side. 
For the security profiles mentioned earlier, the regular service configuration 
requirements (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010) are: 
 Certificates stores: there are two types of certificates stores. Keystore is 
used in the service and client sides to specify the certificates and private 
keys for the service and client, respectively. Truststore is used in the server 
side to specify aliases that contain the certificates and trust root of the 
clients, and vice versa.  
 Security Token Service: this service implements a protocol that defines 
message formats and message exchange patterns for issuing, renewing, 
cancelling, and validating security tokens. The STS we used in our test 
was deployed in the active mode, as it implements the WS-Trust protocol, 
as opposed to the WS-Federation passive protocol. The security 
configuration for the client-side of this application is dependent upon the 
security mechanism selected for the Security Token Service, and not on 
the security mechanism selected for the application.  
 Users’ database: to be used by security profiles that require username, and 
preferably passwords, for authentications. 
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 Flexibility: The configuration requirements vary in terms of flexibility 
between the different security profiles. Transport level security profiles are 
usually easier to configure than the message level ones. Furthermore, some 
profiles require configuring additional options, such as SAML callback 
handler‎on‎ the‎client‎ side.‎We‎use‎ the‎ term‎“configuration‎ flexibility”‎ in‎
this chapter to refer to how flexible it is to implement a certain security 
profile. 
5.5.5  AHP Criterion 3: Performance  
In order to study the performance of the security profiles, in the previous chapter, 
we used a simple JAX-WS echo application, which consists of a Web service and 
a client in a dedicated switched network; the client sends different sized messages 
(from 1 Byte to 1MByte) and the Web service echoes (sends back) the same 
message received. Every security mechanism has been tested under the default 
settings of its profile to secure the request and response SOAP messages, where 
all the tested profiles provide peer authentication (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010). 
We measured the time spent in requesting and responding on the client side as 
round trip time (RTT), which starts from the moment the client starts initializing a 
request to the server until receiving the final response from the server. This 
includes for example the time needed to authenticate and obtain an assertion from 
an Identity Provider in SAML-based profiles, or an issued token from a Security 
Token Service (STS) in STS-based profiles. However, some security profiles, 
such as MCS, SSL and SV, require an out-of-band exchange for the digital 
certificates. The method and frequency of exchanging the certificates are not part 
of the default settings of these profiles; hence the time needed to exchange them 
can vary. In order to test the performance of such profiles, we assumed that the 
digital certificates already exist on the server as well as the client, and flagged the 
Certificates Stores sub-criterion in the AHP model to reflect the dependency on 
these certificates as a configuration issue. 
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Accordingly, the considered performance parameters are: (1) average RTT, (2) 
maximum RTT, and (3) standard deviation RTT. 
5.5.6  Data Collection 
In order to evaluate the performance of the different security profiles, a 
performance test was conducted on various security profiles applied individually 
on a simple Web service and tested every time with different initial message sizes. 
In ‎Chapter 4: the results were used as basis for the comparison between the 
security profiles in terms of performance. 
When selecting a security profile to secure a Web service, it is important to 
consider the initial data size exchanged between the service provider and client. In 
the previous chapter, we demonstrated that some security profiles perform 
differently when changing the size of the exchanged data. Therefore, it is 
important for the service developer to estimate or measure the expected size of the 
exchanged data when selecting a security profile. 
In this framework, we used the performance measurements of data sizes that range 
from 1 byte and 1 Megabyte. A developer would choose an appropriate selection 
window for the application, and then, the results are aggregated accordingly. The 
Factor Analysis dimension reduction method (FA) (Kim & Mueller, 1993) was 
used to reduce the number of measurements into a single value that describes the 
performance measurements of the selected window for each security profile. Since 
the number of dimensions (i.e. data size categories) is relatively small, medians 
and geometric means can be biased (Li, Hastie & Church, 2007).  
The representatives resulted were then normalised to cover the scale from 1 to 9 to 
be used in the pair-wise comparison step. The security profile with the largest FA 
value for a selected window of data sizes should have a normalised value of 1 
(lowest) as this profile has the longest round trip time. Similarly, the security 
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profile with the smallest FA value should have the value of 9 (highest) to indicate 
that this profile has the best performance, or the shortest round trip time.  
In this chapter, the AHP framework used a data size window that covered the 
whole range (1 byte to 1 Megabyte). Table ‎5-4, Table ‎5-5 and Table ‎5-6 illustrate 
results for the average, standard deviation and maximum RTT, respectively. 
Security Profile 
Initial Message Size (Byte) FA Value Normalised 
Value 1 10 100 1 K 10 K 100 K 1 M 
UA 80 81 82 84 101 263 2055 -0.04871 6.798309 
UDP 80 80 80 81 98 259 2051 -0.06932 6.854555 
MCS 119 119 119 121 137 295 2109 0.33679 5.746259 
SSL 42 42 42 43 45 71 348 -0.85547 9 
SA 52 52 53 52 55 80 357 -0.75276 8.719699 
SV 122 122 124 124 140 303 2110 0.37639 5.638189 
STS 266 285 288 294 316 481 2229 2.07595 1 
Table  5-4: Factor Analysis and Normalised Values (Average RTT Results) 
Security Profile 
Initial Message Size (Byte) FA 
Value 
Normalised 
Value 1 10 100 1 K 10 K 100 K 1 M 
UA 25 28 28 28 33 59 18 -0.34493 8.955704 
UDP 26 26 27 27 31 57 15 -0.34978 8.969387 
MCS 29 29 29 29 33 56 16 -0.344 8.95308 
SSL 22 22 22 23 24 42 20 -0.36063 9 
SA 23 24 23 23 25 41 24 -0.35538 8.985187 
SV 23 24 27 24 29 57 15 -0.35418 8.981802 
STS 664 957 1048 1246 1272 1201 498 2.47481 1 
Table  5-5: Factor Analysis and Normalised Values (STDEV RTT Results) 
Security 
Profile 
Initial Message Size (Byte) FA Value Normalised 
Value 1 10 100 1 K 10 K 100 K 1 M 
UA 237 237 236 239 253 400 2509 -0.32987 8.838517 
UDP 235 235 235 237 251 393 2398 -0.33284 8.846821 
MCS 295 274 275 277 291 435 2489 -0.32621 8.828285 
SSL 205 205 205 206 205 218 381 -0.38763 9 
SA 215 214 215 215 214 226 460 -0.38478 8.992032 
SV 282 282 282 282 298 516 2464 -0.32544 8.826132 
STS 19218 23250 22973 30351 30366 26838 33229 2.47385 1 
Table  5-6: Factor Analysis and Normalised Values (Max RTT results) 
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5.5.7  Pair-wise Comparisons Matrices for Alternatives 
In this model, there are 14 pair-wise comparison matrices for the seven 
alternatives with respect to all the sub-criteria connected with the alternatives. 
Due to space limitations and to avoid repetition, a few representative matrices are 
shown in this section. However, all the matrices are provided in Appendix B. 
For each sub-criterion within the security criteria, we rely on judgments derived 
from the literature study. The words that have been used in literature to describe 
the strength of alternatives with respect to a specific sub-criterion are used to 
compare these alternatives. The comparisons then are converted to numerical 
values using the nine-point scale for pair-wise comparisons (Table ‎5-2).  
For example, in terms of peer authentication, security mechanisms that use 
asymmetric key cryptography are considered marginally stronger than those that 
use username tokens (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010). Hence, MCS is 3 times more 
than UA in a 9-point scale, as shown in Table ‎5-7. Although all the examined 
security profiles guarantee peer-authentication, digital certificates used in the 
asymmetric‎ key‎ methods‎ (MCS,‎ SSL,‎ SV,‎ etc…)‎ are‎ usually‎ stronger‎ in‎
establishing identity than username/password authentication methods (UA and 
UDP), which can be sometimes compromised.  
 UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 
UDP 1 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 
MCS 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SSL 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SA 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SV 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
STS 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Table  5-7: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to 
Peer Authentication 
The configuration elements (sub-criteria) are also based on judgments. For 
instance, we compared the alternatives with respect to the configuration 
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flexibility; assuming that implementing the transport layer security profile (SSL) 
is the easiest and most straightforward way. Some profiles require configuring 
additional options, such as the username based profiles (UA and UDP) which 
require some configurations to the keystore on the server-side and the trust-store 
on the client-side. Whilst SAML-based profiles require configuring callback 
handler on the client side, STS-based profiles require configuring the security 
token service node, in addition to the service provider and client nodes, which 
make them the most difficult to implement. Table ‎5-8 shows the values of the 
pair-wise judgments with respect to flexibility. 
 UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 2 1/2 2 2 6 
UDP 1 1 2 1/2 2 2 6 
MCS 1/2 1/2 1 1/3 1 1 5 
SSL 2 2 3 1 3 3 7 
SA 1/2 1/2 1 1/3 1 1 5 
SV 1/2 1/2 1 1/3 1 1 5 
STS 1/6 1/6 1/5 1/7 1/5 1/5 1 
Table  5-8: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to 
Flexibility 
On the other hand, the performance of the different security profiles can be 
measured as described in the previous section. Thus, the pair-wise comparisons 
here are done based on actual data rather than judgments, as illustrated in 
Table ‎5-9. 
 UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 0.99 1.18 0.76 0.78 1.21 6.8 
UDP 1.01 1 1.19 0.76 0.79 1.22 6.85 
MCS 0.85 0.84 1 0.64 0.66 1.02 5.75 
SSL 1.32 1.31 1.57 1 1.03 1.6 9 
SA 1.28 1.27 1.52 0.97 1 1.55 8.72 
SV 0.83 0.82 0.98 0.63 0.65 1 5.64 
STS 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.18 1 
Table  5-9: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to 
Average RTT 
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5.5.8  Raised Power Matrices 
All the comparison matrices should be raised to a higher power to improve 
accuracy (Saaty, 2008). Table ‎5-10 shows a matrix derived from the comparison 
matrix of the flexibility by squaring it twice. 
 UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 357.15 357.15 635.35 222.16 635.35 635.35 2522.64 
UDP 357.15 357.15 635.35 222.16 635.35 635.35 2522.64 
MCS 200.48 200.48 356.82 124.67 356.82 356.82 1416.79 
SSL 591.91 591.91 1052.84 368.37 1052.84 1052.84 4182.67 
SA 200.48 200.48 356.82 124.67 356.82 356.82 1416.79 
SV 200.48 200.48 356.82 124.67 356.82 356.82 1416.79 
STS 53.15 53.15 94.6 33.08 94.6 94.6 376.07 
Table  5-10: Raised Power Matrix (Flexibility) 
5.5.9  Normalised Matrix and Eigen Vectors 
To normalise the previous matrices, each element is divided by the sum of its 
column. The Eigen vector is then calculated by dividing the sum of each row of 
the normalised matrix by the number of its elements. A representative normalised 
matrix of the matrix in Table ‎5-8 and its Eigen vector are shown in Table ‎5-11, 
while Table ‎5-12 illustrates the rankings of the alternatives against each sub-
criterion. 
The consistency ratio for this matrix is CI/RI = 1.12% < 10%, so the weights are 
accepted. 
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS Eigen Vector 
UA 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.1821 
UDP 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.1821 
MCS 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.1 0.10 0.10 0.1023 
SSL 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.3019 
SA 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.1023 
SV 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.1023 
STS 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.0271 
Table  5-11: Normalised Matrix and Eigen Vector (Flexibility) 
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Criteria Sub-criteria 
Security Profiles 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
Security 
Peer 
Authentication 
0.0588 0.0588 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 
Message 
Origin 
Authentication 
0.2308 0.2308 0.2308 0.0256 0.0256 0.0256 0.2308 
Message 
Integrity 
0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 
Message 
Confidentiality 
0.0588 0.0588 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 
Non-
repudiation 
0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 
Authorisation 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 0.2903 0.2903 0.2903 
End-to-End 
Security 
0.1915 0.1915 0.1915 0.0213 0.0213 0.1915 0.1915 
Configuration 
Certificates 
Exchange 
0.0435 0.0435 0.3913 0.3913 0.0435 0.3913 0.0435 
Users 
Database 
0.2903 0.2903 0.0323 0.2903 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 
Security 
Service Token 
0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.6000 
Flexibility 0.1821 0.1821 0.1023 0.3019 0.1023 0.1023 0.0271 
Performance 
AVR RTT 0.1554 0.1567 0.1313 0.2057 0.1993 0.1289 0.0229 
STD RTT 0.1633 0.1635 0.1632 0.1641 0.1638 0.1638 0.0182 
MAX RTT 0.1627 0.1628 0.1625 0.1656 0.1655 0.1624 0.0184 
Table  5-12: Ratings for the Alternatives on Each Criterion 
5.6 Scenarios 
In this section we illustrate the usage of our proposed framework by adopting 
three common scenarios (Microsoft Corporation, 2005) used by Microsoft to 
demonstrate the different Web service security considerations and solutions in 
common Web services interactions. Additionally, we augmented these scenarios 
to include performance and configuration requirements besides the security 
requirements provided by the original solution. 
Each scenario starts with a high-level description of the application followed by 
an identification of requirements and preferences for the application. 
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5.6.1  Public Web Service Scenario (S1) 
Description: 
A distributor uses Web services to provide catalogue information to online sellers 
that provide online shopping services. The sellers access the Web service from 
their Web applications to display current items available from the distributor. The 
Web service provider has the following requirements:  
Web services clients require direct access to the Web service. Sellers accessing 
the Web service must be authenticated, and data passed between the service and 
clients contains some information, such as account information, that must be 
protected while in transit. The Web service provider has a database for the sellers 
that are allowed to use this service. A high performance is expected by the clients 
as they should get instant responses when using the service. 
Solution Factors: 
The following factors have to be considered for the distributer we service: 
 Merchant accounts are stored in a custom database or directory service. 
 The message data must be protected during transit. 
 Performance must be considered. 
AHP Application 
According to the previous description, the three criteria are compared against each 
other’s. Within each criterion, the sub-criteria are also pair-compared in terms of 
their importance to compose the pair-wise comparison matrix. In this scenario we 
assumed the performance should have the highest priority since we are dealing 
with an online application. It is strongly more important than configuration. 
Security is marginally less important in this application than the performance. The 
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matrix is then raised to a higher power and normalised to calculate the Eigen 
vector (Priorities), see Table ‎5-13. 
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Security 1 3 1/3 0.2583 
Configuration 1/3 1 1/5 0.1047 
Performance 3 5 1 0.6370 
Consistency Ratio = 3.32 % 
Table  5-13: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Main Criteria with Respect 
to the Goal (S1) 
With respect to security criteria, each sub-criterion that satisfies a requirement is 
considered to be extremely more important than a sub-criterion that does not 
represent a requirement in the application (Table ‎5-14). The security requirements 
that should be fulfilled in this application are: peer authentication, integrity, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation, while the support of message origin 
authentication, authorisation and end-to-end security is not required in this 
particular application. 
 
P
ee
r 
A
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
o
n
 
M
es
sa
g
e 
O
ri
g
in
 
A
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
o
n
 
M
es
sa
g
e 
In
te
g
ri
ty
 
M
es
sa
g
e
 
C
o
n
fi
d
en
ti
al
it
y
 
N
o
n
-r
ep
u
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
A
u
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
 
E
n
d
-t
o
-E
n
d
 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
L
o
ca
l 
w
ei
g
h
t 
Peer Authentication 1 9 1 1 1 9 9 0.2308 
Message Origin Authentication 1/9 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 1 1 0.0256 
Message Integrity 1 9 1 1 1 9 9 0.2308 
Message Confidentiality 1 9 1 1 1 9 9 0.2308 
Non-repudiation 1 9 1 1 1 9 9 0.2308 
Authorisation 1/9 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 1 1 0.0256 
End-to-End Security 1/9 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 1 1 0.0256 
Consistency Ratio = 0 % 
Table  5-14: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Security (S1) 
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Within the configuration criteria, based on the idea that the service provider has a 
database for the names of its clients, the user database management option is 
extremely more important than managing exchanged certificates out-of-band. All 
the Web clients are accessing the service directly, where there is no need to enable 
the management of security service token. Table ‎5-15 shows the comparisons. 
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Certificates 1 1/9 1 1/7 0.0522 
Users DB 9 1 9 3 0.5953 
Security Token Service 1 1/9 1 1/7 0.0522 
Flexibility 7 1/3 7 1 0.3004 
Consistency Ratio = 3.41 % 
Table  5-15: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Configuration (S1) 
For the performance criteria, we presume that the average value of the round trip 
time has stronger importance than the standard deviation value, and very stronger 
importance than the maximum value, as shown in Table ‎5-16. 
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AVR RTT 1 5 7 0.7306 
STDEV RTT 1/5 1 3 0.1884 
MAX RTT 1/7 1/3 1 0.0810 
Consistency Ratio = 5.59 % 
Table  5-16: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Performance (S1) 
The next step is to calculate the global weights vector by multiplying the local 
weight of each sub-criterion by the priority of its criterion, as illustrated in 
Table ‎5-17. 
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Criteria Priorities Subcriteria Local weight 
Global Weight 
Criteria x 
subcriteria 
Security 0.2583 
Peer Authentication 0.2308 0.0596 
Message Origin 
Authentication 
0.0256 0.0066 
Message Integrity 0.2308 0.0596 
Message Confidentiality 0.2308 0.0596 
Non-repudiation 0.2308 0.0596 
Authorisation 0.0256 0.0066 
End-to-End Security 0.0256 0.0066 
Configuration 0.1047 
Certificates Exchange 0.0522 0.0055 
Users Database 0.5953 0.0623 
Security Service Token 0.0522 0.0055 
Flexibility 0.3004 0.0315 
Performance 0.6370 
AVR RTT 0.7306 0.4654 
STD RTT 0.1884 0.1200 
MAX RTT 0.0810 0.0516 
Table  5-17: Local and Global Weights (S1) 
The results are synthesised by multiplying each alternative weights vector by the 
global weights vector. The resulting weights are added for each alternative to 
calculate its final priority, as shown in Table ‎5-18. 
Finally, the results can also be presented in the ideal form by dividing each 
priority by the maximum priority to make this first ranked alternative an ideal one 
with the others getting their proportionate value, as demonstrated in Table ‎5-19. 
The AHP framework suggests the usage of the transport security using SSL to 
secure the service because of the tendency towards a high performance in the 
given scenario. Transport layer security mechanisms are normally faster than 
message layer security profiles and easier to configure. Although this profile is a 
point-to-point security mechanism, it is enough to satisfy the security 
requirements of the proposed application. Microsoft (Microsoft Corporation, 
2005) suggests using Username Token and HTTPs in this scenario, which is an 
equivalent to the Transport Security using SSL provided by the Metro Web 
service Stack (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010). 
  
‎Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making Approach  
 
Bachar Alrouh 102 
Criteria Sub-criteria 
Security Profiles 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
Security 
Peer 
Authentication 
0.0035 0.0035 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 
Message 
Origin 
Authentication 
0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0015 
Message 
Integrity 
0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 
Message 
Confidentiality 
0.0035 0.0035 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 
Non-
repudiation 
0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 
Authorisation 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 
End-to-End 
Security 
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0001 0.0001 0.0013 0.0013 
Configuration 
Certificates 
Exchange 
0.0002 0.0002 0.0021 0.0021 0.0002 0.0021 0.0002 
Users 
Database 
0.0181 0.0181 0.002 0.0181 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Security 
Service Token 
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0033 
Flexibility 0.0057 0.0057 0.0032 0.0095 0.0032 0.0032 0.0009 
Performance 
AVR RTT 0.0723 0.0729 0.0611 0.0957 0.0927 0.06 0.0106 
STD RTT 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 0.0197 0.0197 0.0197 0.0022 
MAX RTT 0.0084 0.0084 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085 0.0084 0.0009 
Total Priority 0.1517 0.1523 0.1378 0.1925 0.1669 0.1372 0.0628 
Ranking 4 3 5 1 2 6 7 
Table  5-18: Synthesizing to Obtain Final Results and Ranking (S1) 
Security Profile Normalised Priorities Idealised Priorities Ranking 
UA 0.1517 0.7959 4 
UDP 0.1523 0.7991 3 
MCS 0.1378 0.7230 5 
SSL 0.1925 1.0000 1 
SA 0.1669 0.8757 2 
SV 0.1372 0.7198 6 
STS 0.0628 0.3295 7 
Table  5-19: Final Results shown as Normalised and Idealised Priorities (S1) 
In addition, our AHP framework provides an order for the other possible 
alternatives. In this scenario, peer-to-peer authentication and configuration, 
Transport layer based security profiles are the top of the ranking. 
‎Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making Approach  
 
Bachar Alrouh 103 
5.6.2  Intranet Web Service Scenario (S2) 
Description: 
A company uses an internal application to access operations provided by a Web 
services. Mutual authentication is required for all Web services interactions. The 
application must support single sign on (SSO) capabilities. Message data are 
sensitive and must be protected against unauthorised access and the message must 
not be tampered with during transit. 
Solution Factors: 
The following factors have to be considered for the distributer Web service: 
 Mutual authentication is required for all Web service interactions. 
 Applications must support single sign on (SSO) capabilities. 
 Message data is sensitive and must be protected against unauthorised 
access. 
 The message must not be tampered with during transit. 
AHP Application 
The pair-wise comparison matrices and results are shown below: 
 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
P
ri
o
ri
ti
es
 
Security 1 5 3 0.6370 
Configuration 1/5 1 1/3 0.1047 
Performance 1/3 3 1 0.2583 
Consistency Ratio = 3.32 % 
Table  5-20: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Main Criteria with Respect 
to the Goal (S2) 
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Peer Authentication 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 0.2308 
Message Origin Authentication 1/3 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.0769 
Message Integrity 1/3 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.0769 
Message Confidentiality 1/3 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.0769 
Non-repudiation 1/1 1 1 1 1 1/1 1/1 0.0769 
Authorisation 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 0.2308 
End-to-End Security 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 0.2308 
Consistency Ratio = 0 % 
Table  5-21: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Security (S2) 
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Certificates 1 9 9 5 0.6693 
Users DB 1/9 1 1 1/5 0.0555 
Security Token Service 1/9 1 1 1/5 0.0555 
Flexibility 1/5 5 5 1 0.2198 
Consistency Ratio = 4.99 % 
Table  5-22: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Configuration (S2) 
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AVR RTT 1 5 7 0.7306 
STDEV RTT 1/5 1 3 0.1884 
MAX RTT 1/7 1/3 1 0.0810 
Consistency Ratio = 5.59 % 
Table  5-23: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Performance (S2) 
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Security 
Profile 
Normalised 
Priorities 
Idealised 
Priorities 
Ranking 
UA 0.1197 0.6411 7 
UDP 0.1199 0.6422 6 
MCS 0.1593 0.8532 2 
SSL 0.1200 0.6427 5 
SA 0.1507 0.8072 3 
SV 0.1867 1.0000 1 
STS 0.1436 0.7691 4 
Table  5-24: Final Results shown as Normalised and Idealised Priorities (S2) 
The AHP framework results indicate that using SAML Sender Vouches with 
Certificates (SV) is the most appropriate alternative for this kind of applications. 
This profile assures the fulfillment of the high security requirement due to the use 
of mutual certificates for integrity and confidentiality, while ensuring a good 
performance. In addition, the SV profile satisfies the requirement of providing 
single sign on capability by using SAML tokens for authorisation. 
5.6.3  Multiple Internet Web Service Scenario (S3) 
Description: 
A travel booking franchise provides a Web application that travel agents can use 
to search for and book travel packages. The Web application uses several Web 
services to perform the operations of searching for and booking packages. The 
travel booking Web application is accessible from the Internet. However, only the 
Web application can access the Web services that the application calls. Each Web 
service has an independent data store.  
The travel booking application has the following features: 
 Travel agents in a travel franchise help customers to book tour packages. 
 Two Web services are used: a travel packages Web service, and an online 
booking Web service. 
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 The travel packages Web service provides travel product catalogue 
information such as tour dates, itineraries, and prices. 
 The online booking Web service allows travel agents to book tour 
packages on behalf of the customers. 
 Identity propagation is needed for the online booking Web service because 
the database needs to keep a record of each travel agent who makes a 
travel request. Customers can go to any travel agent in the franchise to 
book a tour. 
 During peak travel seasons, user activity is high. This means that 
performance must be considered. 
Solution Factors: 
The following factors have to be considered for the distributer Web service: 
 Travel agent user accounts are stored in a database. 
 Mutual authentication is required. 
 SSO support is required. 
 Performance must be considered. 
 Sensitive data must be protected against unauthorised access. 
 Web services are behind a firewall. 
AHP Application 
The pair-wise comparison matrices and results are illustrated in the tables below. 
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Security 1 5 7 0.7306 
Configuration 1/5 1 3 0.1884 
Performance 1/7 1/3 1 0.0810 
Consistency Ratio =  5.59 % 
Table  5-25: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Main Criteria with Respect 
to the Goal (S3) 
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Peer Authentication 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Message Origin Authentication 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Message Integrity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Message Confidentiality 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Non-repudiation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Authorisation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
End-to-End Security 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Consistency Ratio = 0 % 
Table  5-26: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Security (S3) 
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Certificates 1 1 1/9 1/3 0.0630 
Users DB 1 1 1/9 1/3 0.0630 
Security Token Service 9 9 1 7 0.7186 
Flexibility 3 3 1/7 1 0.1554 
Consistency Ratio = 3.41% 
Table  5-27: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Configuration (S3) 
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AVR RTT 1 5 7 0.7306 
STDEV RTT 1/5 1 3 0.1884 
MAX RTT 1/7 1/3 1 0.0810 
Consistency Ratio = 5.59 % 
Table  5-28: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect 
to the Performance (S3) 
Security 
Profile 
Normalised 
Priorities 
Idealised 
Priorities 
Ranking 
UA 0.1206 0.5343 6 
UDP 0.1207 0.5347 5 
MCS 0.1425 0.6312 3 
SSL 0.1125 0.4984 7 
SA 0.1302 0.5766 4 
SV 0.1479 0.6551 2 
STS 0.2257 1.0000 1 
Table  5-29: Final Results shown as Normalised and Idealised Priorities (S3) 
The results recommend using single Security Token Service (STS) to establish a 
chain of trust between the server and the client; especially that service providers 
and clients are in different managed environments, each with its own resources, 
where confidentiality is a major issue. As a confirmation of this recommendation, 
the Sun Microsystems Metro User Guide (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010) and 
Microsoft Patterns and Practices Document (Microsoft Corporation, 2005) 
indicate using an STS-based security profile for this kind of applications. 
5.7 Summary 
Selecting the best possible security profile for a Web service in a given 
application can be a difficult task for Web services developers, as there are many 
different options available to help secure Web services. The selection process is 
further complicated by the fact that different systems and projects can have 
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different requirements and specifications that drive their security decisions. 
Furthermore, securing Web services tends to aggravate the performance of these 
services. Therefore, the developer is expected to select a security profile that 
satisfies not only the security requirements, but also the performance expectations.  
In this chapter, we have provided a novel multi-criteria decision making 
framework based on the analytical hierarchy process in order to help developers 
prioritise their security, performance and configuration requirements in order to 
rank the available alternatives according to their suitability for a specified 
application. The data used in building this model has been derived from a 
literature study as well as actual performance testing.  
While other models (Wu & Chang, 2007; Zuo, Wang & Wu, 2008; Godse, Sonar 
& Mulik, 2008; Casola et al., 2009; Thirumaran et al.; 2011) have focused on the 
service consumer point of view to address the Web services composition problem, 
this chapter has its focus on the service developer viewpoint during the 
development process. We have also provided common security usage scenarios 
for Web services and applied the proposed framework on them to test its validity. 
The framework results match the security recommendations for these scenarios. 
In order to evaluate the applicability of the proposed Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making framework in practical settings, we have adopted three common usage 
scenarios for Web services security, as presented by Microsoft and Sun. 
Comparing the results of the MCDM framework to the suggestions of Microsoft 
and Sun, and reaching similar conclusions illustrate the validity of the model. 
However, there are other cases where a Web service developer may not be able to 
rely solely on documentations of best practice, such as: 
1) New or unusual scenarios, where no or very little documentations of best 
practice are available. 
2) More than one recommended solution can be implemented.  
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3) The recommended solution cannot be implemented due to 
system/configurations limitations. 
In addition, our MCDM includes not only the usual security factors, but also 
configuration and performance considerations. It rates and provides an order for 
all the possible alternatives that can be considered by a Web services developer, 
so he/she can select which profile is best to be implemented. 
The proposed framework can be implemented as a separate Web service that Web 
developers can consult when selecting security profiles for their Web services. 
Alternatively, the MCDM model can be extended to cover other quality 
dimensions and therefore act as an additional sub-layer that sits at the top of the 
Quality of Service (QoS) layer in the Web services protocol stack, as illustrated in 
Figure ‎5-2.  
 
Figure  5-2: The MCDM in the Web Services Stack 
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This position enables the MCDM model to rely on the underlying QoS protocols 
as they represent the criteria/alternatives, and keeps it independent of the upper 
business logic layer and the lower discovery, description, message and transport 
layers. 
In Appendix C, We present the AHP framework as a generic Java class to perform 
the AHP calculations and a Java Main class to run the AHP tool. The framework 
and the tool are the outcomes of the third iteration of the DSR cycle (see 
section ‎3.6.3 ) 
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Chapter 6:  Information Hiding in SOAP 
Messages: A Steganographic Method for 
Web Services  
6.1 Overview 
Digital steganography is the art and science of hiding communications; a 
steganographic system thus embeds secret data in public cover media so as not to 
arouse‎ an‎ eavesdropper’s‎ suspicion.‎ There‎ are‎ still‎ very‎ limited‎ methods‎ of‎
steganography to be used with communication protocols, which represent 
unconventional but promising steganography mediums. In this chapter, we discuss 
and analyse a number of steganographic studies in text, XML as well as SOAP 
messages. Then, we propose a novel steganography method to be used for SOAP 
messages within Web services environments. The method is based on rearranging 
the order of specific XML elements according to a secret message. This method 
has a high imperceptibility; it leaves almost no trail because of using the 
communication protocol as a cover medium, and since it keeps the structure and 
size of the SOAP message intact. The method is empirically validated using a 
feasible scenario so as to indicate its utility and value. 
6.2 Steganography vs. Encryption 
Secure and secret communication methods are needed for transmitting messages 
over the Internet. Cryptography scrambles the message so that it cannot be 
understood. However, it makes the message suspicious enough to attract 
eavesdropper’s‎ attention.‎ Additionally,‎ due‎ to‎ the increase of computers 
capabilities and cipher texts availability, cryptographic techniques could be 
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vulnerable. However, this vulnerability can be reduced significantly using 
steganography, which is a method of covert communication and information 
security. 
Unlike encryption, steganography hides even the existence of secret information 
rather than hiding its meaning only. Thus, steganography is the art of hiding secret 
messages within other innocuous-looking cover files (i.e. images, audio, video, 
and text files) so that it cannot be observed. Consequently, steganography aims to 
hide the very existence of communication by embedding messages within other 
cover objects. As a result, the purpose of steganography is to keep others from 
thinking that a secret message even exists within the stego files.  
Using only encryption for secret communication draws the attention of others. 
Therefore, steganography combined with cryptography raises the security level 
and would be the most secure method to go. 
Steganography can be considered as a solution to exchange secret information and 
news between people around the world over the Internet without any fear of the 
message being detected. 
Related to steganography but distinct from it, watermarking is a data hiding 
technique that protects digital documents, files, or images against removal of 
copyright information. Therefore, the goal of steganography is the secret 
messages while the goal of watermarking is the cover object itself (Venkatraman, 
Abraham & Paprzycki, 2004). Watermarking is the process of embedding a 
specific copyright mark into digital documents in the same way. Nevertheless, in 
order to detect any break of licensing agreement, a serial number is embedded in 
every copy of this digital document. This process is known as fingerprinting. 
Text steganography refers to the process of hiding secret information in text files. 
For security and imperceptibility reasons, it is very important for stego texts not to 
show any detectable artefacts. Thus, readers should not notice or discover the 
modifications made in the stego text files. Generally, the redundant information in 
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text files is very limited in comparison to that in images and audio files. 
Therefore, using text as cover files in steganography represents the most difficult 
way of information hiding (Bender et al., 1996). 
It is well known that the Web represents the world's premier network and 
Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) represents the world's premier data 
representation format (Newcomer, 2002). Though, Web services require a data 
exchange in the form of XML documents, Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
provides exactly this kind of data transport. Therefore, SOAP supports a common 
data transfer protocol for effective communication over the Web (Newcomer, 
2002). Thus, XML is playing an increasingly important role in the exchange of a 
wide variety of data on the Internet. Therefore, XML documents are considered as 
a language of Web pages and digital contents. Moreover, they are used for the 
data exchange between organisations. 
Basically, a SOAP message is an XML document that contains text. Therefore, 
steganography methods used for text files and XML documents can theoretically 
be used for SOAP messages. However practically, most of these methods are 
infeasible. 
In this chapter, we propose a new steganography method to embed secret 
information in SOAP messages. This method changes the order of XML elements 
according to the secret message to be embedded.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section ‎6.3 reviews the related 
work on text and XML steganography. Section ‎6.4 discusses and explains the 
concept of information hiding within SOAP messages. Furthermore, our designed 
and proposed steganography method is illustrated in Section ‎6.5. An example 
scenario is illustrated in section ‎6.6. Finally, the conclusion is presented in 
Section ‎6.7. 
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6.3 Related Work 
There is a relatively small number of text steganography studies in comparison to 
that of image video, and audio based steganography. This might be due to the lack 
of redundancy in text files (Inoue et al., 2001). 
Basically, there are three major methods to hide data in text files. The first 
method, open space method, manipulates white spaces in the text. Therefore, it 
exploits inter-sentence spacing, end-of-line spaces, and inter-word spacing. The 
second method, syntactic method utilises punctuation. However, the third method, 
semantic method, manipulates the words of the text themselves (Bender et al., 
1996). 
Por & Delina (2008) improved the open space method proposed by Bender et al. 
(1996). Accordingly, they proposed a hybrid steganography method for text by 
combining both inter-word spacing and inter-paragraph spacing methods. Thus, 
whitespaces between words and paragraphs in right-justification of text are used 
for data hiding in order to increase the embedding capacity. However, the cover 
text was dynamically generated according to the size of the secret message. 
Shirali-Shahrez (2008) proposed a new steganography method for texts. This 
method is based on the different spelling of some words in English between UK 
and‎US.‎For‎example,‎“centre”‎has‎different‎terms‎in‎UK‎(centre)‎and‎US‎(center).  
This can be used to hide a one bit each time a certain spelling occurs in the text. 
For example, A US spelling of a word means the‎ secret‎ bit‎ is‎ “0”, while a UK 
spelling means the‎secret‎bit‎is‎“1”. 
Subsequently, the model proposed in (Shirali-Shahreza, 2008) defines a text 
steganography method based on substituting the words which have different terms 
in UK and US. For example, (Gas) has different terms in UK (Petrol) and US 
(Gas).  
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Liu, Guo & Zhou (2009) proposed a text steganography method to be used in 
online chat. This method is based on an Internet meme named typoglecymia, 
which holds that‎ changing‎ the‎ order‎ of‎word’s middle letters has a slight to no 
effect on the ability of skilled readers to understand the text (e.g. Guitar and 
Guiatr). Therefore, it used the redundancy found in the interior letters’ order. 
Since this letter randomisation equals to the common error made by chatters due 
to high speed typewriting, it is likely to be used in online chats, where the text 
usually contains mistakes. 
However, there are fewer studies and examples of research regarding information 
hiding in XML files. Whilst the previous studies provide text steganography 
method, these are not necessarily applicable in SOAP messages context due to the 
fact that SOAP messages are exchanged and monitored by computer systems 
rather than humans. Importantly, using misspelled or alternative words in SOAP 
messages would result in the SOAP parsers not being able to handle the SOAP 
messages received because they do not comply with the expected semantic. 
Inoue et al. (2001) proposed five steganography methods to be used with XML 
files. These steganography methods are summarised as follows: 
1) The empty elements are represented according to the secret bit; either a 
start-tag immediately followed by an end-tag (<img></img>), or an 
empty-element tag (<img/>). This technique can embed one bit per empty 
element. 
2) According to the secret bit, we can either add a white space before the 
close bracket (<tag >), or delete (normal with no added spaces) this white 
space (<tag>). This technique can embed one bit per tag. 
3) Two elements may or may not be exchanged according to the secret bit. 
Thus, one bit per an exchange of two elements can be hidden. 
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4) The order of attributes in an element can be exchanged to hide the secret 
data. Thus, one bit per an exchange of the attributes order can be hidden. 
5) Elements that contain each other can be used to hide secret data by 
exchanging inner-tags and outer-tags. In this method, one bit per an 
exchange can be hidden. 
If an element has no content then empty-element tag can be used whether or not it 
is declared using the keyword EMPTY. However, the number of such elements in 
an XML document is limited and then the capacity of method (1) is limited too.  
Additionally, using two formats to represent empty elements in the same 
document will arouse the attention of observers. Moreover, the parser may use 
only one representation of empty elements rather than two, which invalidate this 
method.  
Whilst names of XML elements can't contain spaces, there can be a space before 
the closing character ">" (<tag >). However, this process will increase the size of 
the XML file and the hidden data may be destroyed due to parsing which may 
discard these added spaces (secret data).  
Additionally, tags are case sensitive and therefore the tag <tag> is different from 
the tag <tag >. In other words, the end-tag’s‎name‎has‎to‎exactly‎match‎the‎start-
tag's name. Thus, the method (2) is practically infeasible since it uses a start-tag 
different from the end-tag (one tag may contain a white-space).  
The order in which attributes are included on an element is not considered 
relevant. For example, if an XML parser encounters a specific order of an element 
attributes, it does not necessarily have to give us the attributes in the same order. 
As a result, method (4) above is infeasible in terms of validity and applicability 
even though its capacity is very limited. However, a certain order of information 
can be maintained in an XML document if we put this information into elements, 
rather than attributes. As a result, method (3) above is a valid and possible 
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solution for steganography. Nevertheless, hiding only one secret bit per an 
exchange of two elements represents a very small capacity.  
Finally, an XML document must have a top-level element and all the other 
elements are its children. Furthermore, one and only one root element must be 
included in each XML document even if this element has no content. However, 
each of these children elements may represent a parent element and therefore have 
some sub-elements. Thus, exchanging a parent element with a sub-element 
technically looks valid (method (5) above). However, it seems impractical since 
the semantics will not make sense and we will get a new and different parent 
element by such an exchange. Also, the steganographic capacity of this method is 
very limited. 
Since XML documents are widely used for data exchange over different networks 
and exposed to different threats, XML security become a key concern of 
organisations. Thus, Memon, Khawaja & Shah (2008) considered XML 
steganography as a new method and solution for secure communication. 
Furthermore, they proposed and designed four XML based steganography 
methods for the purpose of securing the cover file (XML document) rather than 
for the purpose of secret communication. The main aspects of these methods are 
as follows: 
1) Random characters are inserted inside all tags and their values. So, after 
the first character of the first tag one random character is inserted, after the 
second character of the first tag two random characters are inserted and so 
on. Thus, it mixes up the actual XML data with random fake characters 
and therefore increases the size of the stego XML file significantly. 
2) XML tags are shuffled (sequentially) in such a way the position of the 1st 
tag and its value are swapped with that of the last tag and its value. The 
same process happens with the second and the second last tags, and so on. 
The large XML file is, the better this technique work. 
‎Chapter 6: Information Hiding in SOAP Messages: A Steganographic Method for Web 
Services  
 
Bachar Alrouh 119 
3) This is similar to the previous method, however the correct order of 
shuffled tags is identified in the attribute value of the root element. Thus, 
the first tag is determined by the first character of attribute value while the 
second character is randomly generated. Also, this method works better 
with large XML files. 
4) The sequence of characters in all tags and values are reversed. Thus, the 
order‎ of‎ tags’‎ characters‎ is‎ reversed‎ by‎ moving‎ the‎ last‎ character‎ to‎
become the first one while the second last one becomes the second 
character and so on. As a result, the XML file will look like an encrypted 
file since the characters are scrambled in an unreadable form. 
Memon, Khawaja & Shah (2008) then suggested combining all these methods 
together in one hybrid method to provide better XML security. In conclusion, all 
these four methods aim to safeguard the stego XML document against actual 
XML content detection rather than against hidden information detection. 
Additionally, their goal is the XML content not the hidden data itself. Therefore, 
the goal of these methods is totally different from our steganography goal which 
is undetectable and covert communication. Nevertheless, the first and fourth 
methods are definitely infeasible for steganography since the stego XML arouses 
the suspicion of everyone (look like encrypted). The second method may hide a 
few bits only, while in the third method, the secret key is included in the stego 
file, which is more than enough to extract the hidden message. 
SOAP parsers have been developed and they only process XML that conforms to 
the SOAP schema and associated structural rules. Zhang, Wang & Sun (2007) 
proposed a steganography method depending on the text characteristics of SOAP 
technology in order to hide information in SOAP messages. Therefore, the 
physical properties of SOAP keywords and namespaces (self-defined) are used as 
cover message.  
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A character string is initialised by converting every letter in these keywords and 
namespaces into lowercases. Coordinating every secret bit with every letter of the 
character string, a specific letter is converted into a capital letter only when the 
secret‎ bit‎ is‎ “1”.‎ However,‎ the‎ amount‎ of‎ SOAP‎ keywords‎ is‎ limited‎ for‎ short‎
SOAP message.  
Furthermore, the stego SOAP looks suspicious since some characters of this 
message are in lowercase shape while others are in uppercase shape. Therefore, 
the overall shape of the stego SOAP may attract attention. Last but not least, this 
method does not comply with the case-sensitivity nature of XML documents. 
6.4 Information Hiding in SOAP Messages 
The SOAP protocol is designed to enable the exchange of structured information 
(i.e. SOAP messages) over a variety of underlying protocols in decentralised and 
distributed environments. This lightweight protocol uses XML technologies to 
define a messaging framework that is independent of any specific programming 
languages or implementation semantics (Newcomer, 2002). 
A SOAP message‎ is‎ an‎ XML‎ document,‎ which‎ consists‎ mainly‎ of‎ “envelope,‎
header, body and fault elements, as shown in (Figure ‎6.1).‎The‎“Envelope” is the 
root element that defines the XML document as a SOAP message. Also, it 
indicates the start and the end of the message. Application-specific information 
(such as security and reliability) is usually defined within the optional “Header” 
element. Additionally, headers may contain commands to SOAP processors either 
to understand these headers or to reject the SOAP message. However, the actual 
data is defined within the required “Body” element. Thus, mandatory information 
that must be delivered to the intended recipient should be included within the 
body part of SOAP message. The optional “Fault” element is used to identify 
error messages. If an error occurs during SOAP processing, a SOAP fault element 
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will be emerge in the body of the message. Then, the sender of the SOAP message 
will get the fault response returned. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header>…</S:Header> 
    <S:Body>… 
 <S:Fault>… </S: Fault > 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Figure  6.1: SOAP Message Construct 
public class BookOrder{ 
    private String isbn; 
    private String author; 
    private String bookName; 
    private int numOfPages; 
    private String publisher; 
    private int year; 
    private double price; 
   public getters and setters 
} 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:BookOrder xmlns:ns2="http://service.bookorder.com/"> 
            <book> 
<isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn> 
<author>Author_1</author> 
<bookName>Book_1</ bookName > 
<numOfPages>372</numOfPages> 
<publisher>Publisher_1</publisher> 
< year >2009</year> 
<price>29.99</price> 
            </book> 
        </ns2:BookOrder> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Figure  6.2: Example Java Class and Its XML Serialised Instance 
When two parties communicate through SOAP messages, the actual data (i.e. 
fields and properties of objects or parameters and return values of methods) in the 
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sender endpoint are converted (serialised) into an XML stream that conforms to 
the SOAP specifications. This serialised XML document is the SOAP message 
that needs to be de-serialised at the receiver endpoint to reconstruct the actual 
data. Figure ‎6.2 illustrates an example Java class Book and its XML serialised 
class instance. 
An endpoint application normally employs a SOAP package to perform the 
serialisation and de-serialisation processes, as Web applications and clients care 
mainly about the actual data transmitted and not the structure of the SOAP 
message. Hence, secret information can be smuggled into SOAP messages, which 
provide a perfect cover if the hidden secret message does not damage the SOAP 
messages or spoil the actual data. 
The main concern of hiding secret information within SOAP messages is how to 
do this without the fear of detection. Basically, end users care about the actual 
data transmitted but they do not care about other issues like SOAP namespace, 
keywords, or the order of elements’‎attributes.‎However,‎the‎transmitted‎message‎
must generate no errors and therefore not to discard the message. 
Hiding secret information in a SOAP message means that the mule that is used to 
convey the secret message is the communication protocol that governs the actual 
data path over a network, instead of using the actual data itself as a cover. This 
idea can overcome many of the limitations that faced the conventional 
steganography techniques. Traditional techniques hide secret messages inside 
digital files, which impose the threat of detecting the secret as these files are 
usually saved. Alternatively, a SOAP message leaves almost no trail as they are 
normally deleted after receiving the message and de-serializing the actual data. In 
addition, a secret piece of information can be divided into multiple smaller 
messages and transmitted over several SOAP messages to overcome the size 
limitation as well. 
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This chapter provides a novel steganography method that manipulates the SOAP 
protocol by rearranging the order of the contents and attributes of specific 
elements in a SOAP message, where every permutation represents a specific 
status according to a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. For 
example, there are 7 sub-elements within the element book in Figure ‎6.2. These 
sub-elements are arranged in a particular order (isbn, author, bookName, 
numOfPages, publisher, year, and price). Whilst this order does not have any 
importance for the endpoint application, if the order of these sub-elements is 
rearranged, the message will still have the same meaning for the endpoint.  
For a set of n sub-elements, there are a maximum of n! (factorial of n) 
permutations  . This means that n! different sequences of order can be presented, 
and consequently, n! different symbols can be used in the character set of the 
stego script. 
6.5 Steganography Framework for SOAP 
Messages 
Considering the previous concept, we have designed and implemented a data 
hiding method that monitors a SOAP message just after its serialisation in the 
sender endpoint and before it is sent, analyses its elements and embeds a secret 
message accordingly. Figure ‎6.3 illustrates the general model of data hiding in 
SOAP messages. 
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Figure  6.3: SOAP Steganography Model 
When the stego SOAP message arrives at the receiver endpoint, the secret 
message is extracted using a stego key that is shared between the sender and 
receiver.  
6.5.1  Embedding Procedures 
In our proposed method, the procedure of hiding a secret message within SOAP 
consists of the following six steps. 
1) Capturing the SOAP message after its serialisation. 
2) Analysing its contents to identify all the elements with contents that can be 
rearranged to determine if the SOAP message is suitable for embedding 
(i.e. has elements with contents that can be rearranged). 
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3) Calculating the number of elements that can be used to hide data (N). 
4) Permuting every set of sub-elements to reflect a status of a symbol from 
the secret message. 
5) If all the symbols of the secret message can be hidden in one SOAP 
message (the number of available sets N is greater than the length of the 
secret message M), then the sub-elements of the set M+1 will be 
rearranged to indicate the end of secret message. 
6) Otherwise, if M>N, only a part of the secret message is sent in this SOAP 
message and the last set of sub-elements is rearranged to indicate that 
more hidden data are to arrive within the next received SOAP message. 
Figure ‎6.4 illustrates the algorithm used for secret message embedding.  
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Figure  6.4: Secret Message Embedding 
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6.5.2  Extracting Procedure 
 
The receiver, once the SOAP message is received, extracts hidden data by 
analysing the contents of each eligible element using the secret key to reveal the 
hidden symbol, as described in the following section and illustrated in the 
Extracting Algorithm (Figure ‎6.5): 
1) Capturing the SOAP message and checking its validity and capability to 
be a stego SOAP message. 
2) Calculating the number of elements that might be used for data hiding (N). 
3) Extracting the hidden symbols by analysing the sub-elements order of each 
element in the stego SOAP message. 
4) Stop the process either if the extracted symbol indicates that the message 
is‎not‎a‎stego‎SOAP‎or‎if‎the‎extracted‎symbol‎means‎“End‎of‎Message”. 
5) If‎ the‎extracted‎symbol‎means‎“To‎Continue”,‎new‎SOAP‎message‎to‎be‎
captured and analysed as in 1. 
6) Otherwise, the next symbol will be extracted and so on until we get the 
entire secret message embedded. 
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Figure  6.5: Secret Message Extracting 
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6.6 Example Scenario 
Our proposed method for SOAP message-based steganography is empirically 
tested and validated. Thus, we demonstrate the data embedding and extracting 
algorithms using an example, yet realistic, Web service scenario (Book Order): In 
this scenario, we assume that the person who wants to send secret data is the 
“Book‎Buyer”‎while‎the‎intended‎recipient‎of‎secret‎message‎is‎the‎“Book‎Seller”.‎
However,‎the‎opposite‎scenario‎is‎true‎since‎the‎“Book‎Seller”‎can‎send‎a‎secret‎
message‎to‎the‎“Book‎Buyer”‎using‎the‎same‎procedure.‎The‎example‎scenario‎is: 
Step 1: The Book Buyer (Service Requester) selects the books to be ordered from 
the Book Seller Website (service Provider). 
Step2:  The Book Order will be formatted as XML document and then an XML-
based SOAP message will be generated in order to be sent to the Service Provider. 
Step 3: An application is used at the sender (Book Buyer) endpoint in order to 
capture each SOAP message before it has been sent (prevents the sending process 
of SOAP). 
Step 4: The‎ “Embedding‎ Procedure”‎ of‎ our‎ SOAP‎ steganography‎ method‎ is‎
applied on each captured SOAP message. 
Step 5: The output‎of‎ the‎“Embedding‎procedure”‎(a‎stego‎SOAP‎message)‎will‎
be sent to the Book Seller. 
Step 6: The Book Seller receives the SOAP message (a stego SOAP) and a similar 
application to that used at the Book Buyer endpoint will be used at the Book 
Seller endpoint to capture each received SOAP message. 
Step 7: The‎ “Extracting‎ Procedure”‎ of‎ our‎ SOAP‎ steganography‎ method‎ is‎
applied on each captured SOAP message in order to extract the secret message 
from the stego SOAP messages. 
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As illustrated in Figure ‎6.6, a book buyer is sending two messages to the book 
seller. The first SOAP message contains an order for four books, while the second 
is an order for three books.‎A‎secret‎message‎“Hello” is smuggled by shuffling 
the sub-elements‎ of‎ each‎ “book” element in these SOAP messages. The first 
message‎ contains‎ only‎ part‎ of‎ the‎ hidden‎ message‎ “Hel” and‎ “to continue” 
symbol (Figure ‎6.7), while the second message contains the rest of the message 
“lo” and‎ the‎ “end of message” symbol (Figure ‎6.8). Because each element has 
five sub-elements, 5! (=120) different cases can be represented. That covers all the 
alphabetical characters (in small and capital caps), numbers and most of the 
printing characters. For the purpose of demonstration, we used a shifted version of 
the ASCII table as a secret key for data hiding, see Appendix D. More complex 
secret keys can be used in real implementations. 
For this experiment, NetBeans IDE 6.9 is used to develop the Web service (book 
seller service) and the client (book buyer application). The Web service is built as 
a Web application and deployed on a Glass Fish 2.2 application server. All the 
SOAP messages are intercepted in the sender endpoint just after being serialised 
into XML messages and before the SOAP messages are sent to the receiver 
endpoint. Similarly, all the coming SOAP messages are intercepted before they 
are de-serialised. The SOAP messages are also monitored and recorded using 
soapUI in the standard HTTP proxy mode. 
 
Figure  6.6: Example Secret Message Hidden in Two SOAP Messages  
Book Order 1 
Book 1:  “H” 
Book 2:  “e” 
Book 3:  “l” 
Book 4:  “T.C.” 
Book Order 2 
Book 5:  “l” 
Book 6:  “o” 
Book 7:  “E.O.M.” 
   SOAP Message 1               SOAP Message 2 
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Book Order (Step 1): 
Order 1: 
1-Book 1: isbn=1-11-111111-1, author=Author_1, name=Book_1, pages=111, publisher=Publisher_1 
2-Book 2: isbn=2-22-222222-2, author=Author_2, name=Book_2, pages=222, publisher=Publisher_2 
3-Book 3: isbn=3-33-333333-3, author=Author_3, name=Book_3, pages=333, publisher=Publisher_3 
4-Book 4: isbn=4-44-444444-4, author=Author_4, name=Book_4, pages =444, publisher=Publisher_4 
Cover SOAP (Stes 2+3): 
 
SOAP Message 1: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope 
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <S:Body> 
  <ns2:bookOrder 
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/"> 
   <book>  
     <isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn> 
     <author>Author_1</author> 
     <name>Book_1</name> 
     <pages>111</pages> 
     <publisher>Publisher_1</publisher> 
   </book> 
   <book>  
     <isbn>2-22-222222-2</isbn> 
     <author>Author_2</author> 
     <name>Book_2</name> 
     <pages>222</pages> 
     <publisher>Publisher_2</publisher> 
   </book> 
   <book>  
     <isbn>3-33-333333-3</isbn> 
     <author>Author_3</author> 
     <name>Book_3</name> 
     <pages>333</pages> 
     <publisher>Publisher_3</publisher> 
   </book> 
   <book>  
     <isbn>4-44-444444-4</isbn> 
     <author>Author_4</author>  
     <name>Book_4</name>            
     <pages>444</pages> 
     <publisher>Publisher_4</publisher> 
   </book>             
  </ns2:bookOrder> 
 </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Stego SOAP (Steps 4+5+6+7): 
 
SOAP Message 1: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope 
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <S:Body> 
  <ns2:bookOrder 
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/"> 
   <book>  
     <author>Author_1</author> 
     <pages>111</pages> 
     <publisher>Publisher_1</publisher> 
     <name>Book_1</name> 
     <isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn> 
   </book> 
   <book>  
     <name>Book_2</name> 
     <publisher>Publisher_2</publisher> 
     <pages>222</pages> 
     <isbn>2-22-222222-2</isbn> 
     <author>Author_2</author> 
   </book> 
   <book>  
     <pages>333</pages> 
     <isbn>3-33-333333-3</isbn> 
     <publisher>Publisher_3</publisher> 
     <name>Book_3</name> 
     <author>Author_3</author> 
   </book> 
   <book>  
     <publisher>Publisher_4</publisher> 
     <isbn>4-44-444444-4</isbn> 
     <author>Author_4</author>  
     <name>Book_4</name>            
     <pages>444</pages> 
   </book>             
  </ns2:bookOrder> 
 </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Secret Message: 
“Hel” 
Stego Key: 
NO EMBEDDING = isbn, author, name, pages, publisher. 
“H”‎Character‎=‎author, pages, publisher, name, isbn 
“e”‎Character‎=‎name,‎publisher,‎pages,‎isbn,‎author 
“l”‎Character‎=‎pages,‎isbn,‎publisher,‎name,‎author 
“To‎Continue”‎=‎publisher,‎isbn,‎author,‎name,‎pages 
 
Figure  6.7: Hiding the First Part of the Secret Message 
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Book Order (Step 1): 
Order 2: 
1-Book 5: isbn=5-55-555555-5, author=Author_5, name=Book_5, pages =555, publisher=Publisher_5 
2-Book 6: isbn=6-66-666666-6, author=Author_6, name=Book_6, pages =666, publisher=Publisher_6 
3-Book 7: isbn=7-77-777777-7, author=Author_7, name=Book_7, pages =777, publisher=Publisher_7 
Cover SOAP (Stes 2+3): 
 
SOAP Message 2: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope 
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Body> 
<ns2:bookOrder 
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/"> 
            <book>  
                <isbn>5-55-555555-5</isbn> 
                <author>Author_5</author> 
                <name>Book_5</name> 
                <pages>555</pages> 
                <publisher>Publisger_5</publisher> 
            </book> 
            <book>  
                <isbn>6-66-666666-6</isbn> 
                <author>Author_6</author> 
                <name>Book_6</name> 
                <pages>666</pages> 
                <publisher>Publisger_6</publisher> 
            </book> 
            <book>  
                <isbn>7-77-777777-7</isbn> 
                <author>Author_7</author> 
                <name>Book_7</name > 
                <pages>777</pages> 
                <publisher>Publisher_7</publisher> 
            </book> 
        </ns2:bookOrder> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Stego SOAP (Steps 4+5+6+7): 
 
SOAP Message 2: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope 
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Body> 
<ns2:bookOrder 
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/"> 
            <book>  
                <pages>555</pages> 
                <isbn>5-55-555555-5</isbn> 
                <publisher>Publisger_5</publisher> 
                <name>Book_5</name> 
                <author>Author_5</author> 
            </book> 
            <book>  
                <pages>666</pages> 
                <author>Author_6</author> 
                <name>Book_6</name> 
                <isbn>6-66-666666-6</isbn> 
                <publisher>Publisger_6</publisher> 
            </book> 
            <book>  
                <publisher>Publisher_7</publisher> 
                <pages>777</pages> 
                <name>Book_7</name > 
                <author>Author_7</author> 
                <isbn>7-77-777777-7</isbn> 
            </book> 
        </ns2:bookOrder> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Secret Message: 
“lo" 
Stego Key: 
NO EMBEDDING = isbn, author, name, pages, publisher. 
“l”‎Character‎=‎pages,‎isbn,‎publisher,‎name,‎author 
“o”‎Character = pages, author, name, isbn, publisher 
“End‎of‎Message”‎=‎publisher,‎pages,‎name,‎author,‎isbn 
Figure  6.8: Hiding the Second Part of the Secret Message 
6.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have provided a communication protocol-based steganography 
method that manipulates the SOAP protocol. This method monitors a SOAP 
message just after its serialisation in the sender endpoint and before it is sent. It 
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analyses the SOAP elements and embeds a secret message accordingly by 
rearranging the order of the contents and attributes of specific elements in a SOAP 
message, where every permutation represents a specific symbol according to a 
secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. As a result, the provided 
method has a high resistance against detection since it uses the communication 
protocol as a cover medium rather than the traditional digital files. Furthermore, 
the stego SOAP message has the same size of the original message. The method is 
tested and validated using a feasible scenario so as to demonstrate its utility and 
applicability. 
Security is an ongoing process and as soon as developers fix one set of problems 
crackers will find yet another way to break these systems. Essentially, the 
applications must be flexible in order to add new security features as needed. 
Furthermore, anyone on the Internet can intercept the data transmitted between 
different sites. Thus, distributed applications require higher security levels than 
internal applications. 
Encryption can be used to preserve data security but the technologies required for 
encryption cause problems with firewalls and they don’t‎work‎ very‎well‎ on‎ the‎
Internet.‎ Encryption‎ has‎ another‎ problem;‎ if‎ both‎ communication‎ parties‎ don’t‎
have‎ the‎ same‎ platform‎ then‎ the‎ receiver‎ can’t‎ decrypt‎ the‎ sender’s‎ message.‎
Thus, even a common encryption scheme usually can only work on a limited 
number of platforms (Mueller, 2001). As a result, our SOAP based steganography 
method could be a reasonable solution for transmitted data security. It can be used 
as a secret communication channel over different kinds of networks regardless of 
the applications used at the distributed endpoints. As a kind of communication 
security, the process of surely knowing the identity of the other communicating 
party (on the other end of a channel) is known as Authentication. Additionally, 
associated HTTP Authentication Framework with HTTP 1.1 provides better 
authentication means between communicating parties. Thus, the HTTP 
Authentication Framework secures only the authentication portion of the 
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communication. Furthermore, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 
(S/MIME) and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) use digital certificates to provide 
security which relies on the use of public key cryptography. Usually, using static 
keys provides the crackers more chance to break the system than using dynamic 
keys (Mueller, 2001). 
As a result, we can use the proposed SOAP steganography method to convey 
information of authentication which necessary to authenticate the communicating 
parties. Additionally, encryption keys can be embedded and transmitted in order 
to get dynamic keys instead of static keys, and therefore add another level of 
system security. 
On the other hand, the proposed method does not specify any prior stego keys as it 
assumes that the initial exchange of the original stego key occurs out-of-band. 
Hence, traditional cryptography-based key management mechanisms can be used 
to facilitate the sharing of the stego key, and the overhead of the key sharing relies 
mainly on the selected key management approach. For example, a simple 
username authentication mechanism can be used to generate a symmetric stego 
key that is used for both embedding and extracting hidden messages within the 
SOAP messages in all future communications between the client and the server. 
For this approach, the client does not possess any key of its own, but instead 
authenticate to the server using a username/password token, which is used to 
generate a single shared stego key at run time. Alternatively, more advanced STS-
based approaches may be used to generate and share a sequence of stego keys, 
where each key is valid for a certain period of time or number of exchanged 
messages. 
Basically, encryption algorithms represent a conventional solution of information 
security but the encrypted data is still there and everyone can observe it over the 
network. Thus, our SOAP steganography algorithm provides a way of secret 
communications over the Internet. It can overcome the limitations and challenges 
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of encryption as well as it can be used with encryption to provide a double layer 
of security. 
In conclusion, the proposed SOAP steganography method can be used for a 
variety of applications such as; authentication, proof of identity, watermarking, 
and message hashing. The framework is the outcome of the fourth iteration of the 
DSR cycle (see section ‎3.6.4 ) 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
7.1 Overview 
Web services technology is the modern way of connecting businesses. Companies 
nowadays expose their business functionalities, via the Web, as services for their 
customers or other companies to use. However, this exposure represents a 
complex dilemma of finding the right balance between security and performance. 
This is because developers have to secure these Web services to limit their 
vulnerability to attacks, while ensuring that an acceptable level of performance is 
provided by these services. In view of that, the aim of the research presented in 
this thesis was to develop a prototypical framework that aids Web services 
architects to select the best suited security approach that satisfies the security and 
performance requirements of a given Web services application. 
In this chapter, we summarise the research conclusions and findings and identify 
the research limitations in order to provide future research directions.  
7.2 Thesis Overview and Findings 
This thesis was organised in seven chapters. The following section summarises 
the previous first six chapters: 
Chapter 1 is the introduction of this thesis, in which the main motivations for 
conducting this research were explored. The discussion highlighted the impact of 
applying security on the performance of Web services and indicated that whilst 
the different Web services security profiles achieve different levels of security, 
they also have different performance measurements. This emphasised the 
importance of selecting a suitable security approach that provides the best balance 
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between security and performance, in accordance with the system requirements 
and limitations. Consequently, the aim of this research was identified as 
developing a framework to help Web services architect to choose the best suited 
security profile that fulfils the security and performance expectations of a given 
Web services application. Thereafter, the steps to achieve this aim were identified 
as the objectives of this thesis and research approach was briefly explained. 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of Web services security and its related 
standards. Several approaches to analyse the performance of Web services 
security were discussed and the trade-off between security and performance was 
identified as a major challenge that faces the development of secure Web services. 
The literature review indicates that this trade-off varies depending on the applied 
security approach. Furthermore, there are many cases that require employing a 
combination of security specifications to achieve the required level and coverage 
of security. Web services development environments normally provide developers 
with predefined sets of security profiles and allow for their parameters to be 
adjusted according to the security preferences of the developed system. The 
chapter pointed towards the importance of evaluating the security coverage of 
these profiles against their performance when selecting a security profile for a 
Web service, which requires a performance testing model as well as a systematic 
framework to rate these security profiles. 
Chapter 3 explained the research method undertaken in this thesis. A theoretical 
grounding of Design Science Research (DSR) is provided in this chapter. 
Thereafter, The DSR paradigm is justified as a suitable approach for this research. 
The research conducted in this thesis is then explained in line with the DSR 
research cycle. Four iterations were identified and presented to accomplish the 
development of the selection model: (1) Library Research, (2) Laboratory 
Experiments, (3) Configuration Requirements and (4) Alternative Solution Based 
on Steganography. 
Chapter 4 compared the performance of several security profiles for Web 
services. The performance evaluation indicated that profiles that use transport 
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level security are always faster than message level security profiles. In addition, 
Message level security protocols have a scalability problem when large messages 
are exchanged, unlike SSL-based profiles. Security profiles that utilise username 
tokens perform better than mutual certificates security, especially when 
exchanging small size messages. Moreover, the performance of SAML-based 
profiles is controlled by their underlying security profile. STS-based security 
profiles perform massively less than non-STS profiles and should only be 
considered when the service and its client are located in different domains. 
Finally, reliability has a huge impact on the performance of Web services as it 
increases the number and size of SOAP messages, due to the addition of reliability 
assertions, as well as the process time. 
Chapter 5 proposed a multi-criteria decision making framework, based on the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach. This framework incorporates not 
only the security requirements, but also the performance considerations as well as 
the configuration constraints of these security profiles. This approach emphasises 
the service developer viewpoint and focuses on analysing the performance of the 
security profiles rather than the individual security features. The framework is 
then empirically validated and evaluated using a scenario-driven approach to 
demonstrate its utility and value. The different scenarios illustrate various 
situations where the decision making framework is used to make informed 
decisions to rank various security profiles in order to select the most suitable one 
for each scenario. 
Chapter 6 provided an alternative approach to secure Web services based on data 
hiding (steganography). This approach utilises a communication protocol-based 
steganography method that manipulates the SOAP protocol by analysing the 
SOAP message and hiding a secret message accordingly. The idea is based on 
rearranging the order of the XML tags of specific elements in a SOAP message. 
Every permutation of these tags represents a specific symbol according to a secret 
key shared between the sender and the receiver. This steganographical approach 
has a high resistance against detection since it uses the communication protocol as 
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a cover medium rather than the traditional digital files and keeps the original size 
of the SOAP message intact. This method is then illustrated using a feasible 
scenario to demonstrate its applicability and effectiveness. 
7.3 Research Contribution 
This thesis contributes to the theory and the demonstration of theory in practice. 
The integration of the diverse but interconnected domains of Web services, 
security, performance analysis, decision making and steganography enriches the 
quality of this research. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
7.3.1  A Performance Evaluation Model 
This model builds upon current research and extends it to provide guidelines for 
Web services developers to aid them when selecting a security approach for their 
applications. The proposed model helps to establish a better understanding of the 
trade-off between security and performance in the field of Web services research 
by measuring the performance of the security profiles and comparing the results to 
classify the various security profiles according to their performance. 
Several studies tried to tackle the problem of mapping security to performance in 
the area of Web services (Shirasuna et al., 2004; Moralis et al., 2007; Novakouski 
et al, 2010), but they generally compared the performance of different 
specifications and standards that are rarely used in a stand-alone manner. Instead, 
security profiles are normally used as they combine standards that are guaranteed 
to work in a harmony. Therefore, the approach we followed to develop this model 
was to evaluate the performance of these security profiles, rather than the 
underlying standards. This approach shields the developers from the complexity 
of these standards and allows them to direct their efforts towards fulfilling the 
security as well as performance requirements of their applications. 
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In addition, our proposed model is more comprehensive than those developed in 
previous research as we tested a larger number of security and reliability profiles 
that represent various security methods using different message sizes. 
7.3.2  A Multi-Criteria Decision Making Framework 
The second contribution have provided a novel multi-criteria decision making 
framework, and accompanying software, based on the analytical hierarchy process 
in order to help developers to rate security profiles according to the security, 
performance and configuration requirements. The approach we followed to 
develop this framework is to focus on the service developer viewpoint during the 
development process. This is different from other related work that studied Web 
services composition (Wu & Chang, 2007; Zuo, Wang & Wu, 2008; Godse, Sonar 
& Mulik, 2008; Casola et al., 2009; Thirumaran et al.; 2011), and therefore 
focused on the service consumer point of view. This framework provides 
developers with a useful tool for the selection of security profiles for Web services 
applications. This particularly useful in new or unusual cases, where no or very 
little documentations of best practice are available. There are cases where several 
profiles can be implemented, or when all the profiles cannot entirely satisfies all 
the requirements, where this tool can help to determine the best option. 
We have also provided three common security usage scenarios for Web services 
and tested them using the proposed framework to demonstrate its validity and 
effectiveness. The framework results match the security recommendations for 
these scenarios. 
7.3.3  A Steganographic Method for Web Services 
In this thesis, we provide an alternative approach to secure Web services based on 
a novel Steganography method. This method was developed to overcome the 
limitations of using cryptographic-based techniques. The first major issue we 
identified with the traditional security and reliability approaches is their impact on 
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the size of SOAP-messages, as illustrated in Appendix A.  In addition although 
encryption can be used to establish data security but the technologies required for 
encryption are not always firewall-friendly, and they are in many cases platform-
dependant (Mueller, 2001).  
Therefore, we provided a communication protocol-based steganography method 
that manipulates the SOAP protocol by monitoring a SOAP message just after its 
serialisation in the sender endpoint and before it is sent, analysing the SOAP 
elements and embedding a secret message accordingly. This is done by 
rearranging the order of specific elements in the SOAP message in a way where 
every permutation represents a specific character according to a secret key shared 
between the sender and the receiver. This method has a high resistance against 
detection because it uses the communication protocol as a cover medium rather 
than the traditional digital files. The proposed data hiding method produces stego 
SOAP messages that have exactly the same size of the original message, which 
makes it undetectable using conventional detecting methods. Furthermore, a secret 
message can be sent over a number of messages, providing that there is a 
continues interaction between the sender and the receiver, which overcomes the 
capacity issue of traditional data hiding techniques that are limited by the size of 
the cover medium. There are several applications that can benefit from this 
method, such as authentication and watermarking. 
In conclusion, this research has suggested a prototypical framework for selecting a 
security profiles for Web services applications. This framework consists of three 
approaches: (1) a performance analysis approach that provides Web services 
developers with a performance guideline, (2) a multi-criteria decision making 
approach that aids developer to make an informed decision when selecting a 
security profile based on different requirements and limitations, and finally (3) a 
steganographic method that can be used as an alternative to cryptographic-based 
security methods. 
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Table ‎7-1 shows how this research successfully accomplished the objectives 
established in section ‎1.3. 
Research Objective Accomplishments 
Objective 1: Design a performance 
testing model to understand 
the cost of applying security 
profiles on the performance 
of Web services. 
The first objective was achieved 
in ‎Chapter 4:   
Several experiments were conducted 
to compare the performance of 
security profiles. The results were 
analysed and presented. 
Objective 2: Develop a decision making 
framework based on the 
results gathered from the 
testing model as well as the 
security requirements and 
system limitations. 
We accomplished these objectives 
in ‎Chapter 5:  
A MCDM framework based on the 
AHP was developed. A generic AHP 
software tool was also developed to 
be used as an instantiation of the 
framework. Three different scenarios 
were used to validate the framework. 
Objective 3: Evaluate the developed 
framework through the use 
of real scenarios so as to 
indicate‎the‎framework’s 
utility and value. 
Objective 4: Explore and evaluate the 
feasibility of using 
steganography as an 
alternative approach to 
secure Web services. 
This objective was met in ‎Chapter 6:  
We have developed an algorithm for 
embedding and extracting hidden 
messages in/from SOAP messages 
using a novel steganographic 
method. This method is based on 
XML-tags shuffling. The method is 
validated through the use of a real 
scenario. 
Table  7-1: Accomplishments of The Research Objectives 
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7.4 Research Limitations and Future Work 
During this course of this study, few issues were identified as limitations that may 
require further addressing in future work. 
The first limitation of this research is the number of security profiles we 
evaluated, although we carefully selected a number of security profiles so they are 
representatives of the different security methods, token types, security layer and 
security coverage. We consider that there are more profiles that can be tested to 
enhance the performance testing model. These profiles can also be tested using 
different configurations, platforms and implementations so as to expand the scope 
of this model. 
The AHP framework can be improved by conducting rigorous pair-wise 
comparisons using a number of experts in the field of Web services security, and 
then integrating the group judgment in one overall framework. It is also 
advantageous to conduct further validations and consider expanding the AHP 
hierarchy by including other criteria and sub-criteria, such as cost and usability. 
This thesis has also presented a data hiding method based on XML shuffling 
technique. However, this method can only be applied to SOAP messages that have 
a complex payload structure (in order to have enough XML tags to shuffle). 
Messages with simple payload structures cannot be used with this method in its 
current form. Exploring other approaches to hide data in Web services may 
present an interesting future research. In addition, this method can be further 
developed and implemented to be used in a variety of applications, such as 
watermarking, establishing identity and reliable messaging. 
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Appendix A 
 I 
Appendix A 
Examples of SOAP Messages Based on a One Character Initial Message 
Profile 
Number of SOAP 
requests 
Request length (Bytes) 
Number of SOAP 
responses 
Response length 
(Bytes) 
Simple (No Security) 1 205 1 217 
UA 1 7693 1 5345 
MCS 1 7285 1 5877 
Reliable Messaging 4 
5674 
(1222+1672+1144+1636) 
4 
5710 
(1222+2143+777+1568) 
 
Example 1: Simple WS (No Security) 
 Request Response 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope 
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:sendEcho 
xmlns:ns2="http://s00r0.server.bash/"> 
            <echoText>A</echoText> 
        </ns2:sendEcho> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope 
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:sendEchoResponse 
xmlns:ns2="http://s00r0.server.bash/"> 
            <return>A</return> 
        </ns2:sendEchoResponse> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
 
  
Appendix A 
 II 
Example 2: Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA) 
 Request Response 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
    xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
    xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" 
    xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
    xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To wsu:Id="_5006" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS01R0WSServi
ce</To> 
        <Action wsu:Id="_5005" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s01r0.server.bash/EchoS01R0WS/sendEchoRequest</Action> 
        <ReplyTo wsu:Id="_5004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> 
            <Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address> 
        </ReplyTo> 
        <MessageID wsu:Id="_5003" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:f780f110-9efd-47ed-aa59-
e5acc61368b5</MessageID> 
        <wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1"> 
            <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:50:35Z</wsu:Created> 
                <wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:55:35Z</wsu:Expires> 
            </wsu:Timestamp> 
            <xenc:EncryptedKey Id="_5002" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/> 
                <ds:KeyInfo 
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo"> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                            EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-
1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">dVE29ysyFW/iD1la3ddePzM6IWo=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
                <xenc:CipherData> 
                    
<xenc:CipherValue>E9460LKVK7uQog7QdWhlOp2Bb/ffPoCIez3J4UhSbriSZ3Ds4xB9/MvJj+sJSIeai7ZtztrML9dEQfU8Ov43bTNX+Jj5vvsJ
NN94TdSD9Oa0wGsbqLvnZIDQgxWNo7XFlrq8r5zzp2aU141pcPEpRbQuYdpTcu0CFDlMtu5B1g0=</xenc:CipherValue> 
                </xenc:CipherData> 
            </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
            <xenc:ReferenceList xmlns="" 
                xmlns:ns16="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns17="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <xenc:DataReference URI="#_5008"/> 
                <xenc:DataReference URI="#_5009"/> 
            </xenc:ReferenceList> 
            <xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5009" 
                Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
    xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
    xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" 
    xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
    xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To wsu:Id="_5005" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To> 
        <Action wsu:Id="_5003" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s01r0.server.bash/EchoS01R0WS/sendEchoResponse</Action> 
        <MessageID wsu:Id="_5002" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:09bc6aba-46eb-422d-871c-
f5a97d63a528</MessageID> 
        <RelatesTo wsu:Id="_5004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:f780f110-9efd-47ed-aa59-e5acc61368b5</RelatesTo> 
        <wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1"> 
            <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:50:37Z</wsu:Created> 
                <wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:55:37Z</wsu:Expires> 
            </wsu:Timestamp> 
            <xenc:ReferenceList xmlns="" 
                xmlns:ns16="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns17="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <xenc:DataReference URI="#_5007"/> 
            </xenc:ReferenceList> 
            <ds:Signature Id="_1" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <ds:SignedInfo> 
                    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                        <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/> 
                    </ds:CanonicalizationMethod> 
                    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5002"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>leCh8+B0DZ9FV73NIZBEGKZmeGw=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5003"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>JyDAngE0Rm2fAfB7WIYDJ5eG8kI=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
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                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/> 
                <ds:KeyInfo 
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo"> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:Reference URI="#_5002" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-
1.1#EncryptedKey"/> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
                <xenc:CipherData> 
                    
<xenc:CipherValue>3di4cQ/jAcVfnkgw2vljdWDwns7AxpVRJq+D/DXeouWcuxLNSDxKsAmQYfE+pXjzAUZRyaq9V0rsKbHrvQRwM1S6b
9dUf2WLnsgZOJ7CboMkg3dtWgqneYS0luOikzgf3BO2b/gZMatnS6/FJpCosHQeB1D046kF1ru2fN2GSejNa1fk26/Qu8LWjnQFk9Vj10qlHuY
gb2/SprJulH5mgEhOx4PLv2+GS6L9xdTIslpfV5RTtjoIrp8/BHb9mhfEKRfMqCppfFCOyDga3GX9fIY7GkeYuDPdOyTRJ0Es201Aw0byUBlz
SQWtdqkkL7q8vRnUc8uhDDB/A7CrU0lNxGwrTyh9YUwNjn1mFHSGohBy0VHRiFAF0y0+uj1aadCWvCgEsvsdseYlqBr+OtTD2sip/y1mYP
Vsre2xe5obXmJzFXzJriQrcZz208MjMOE5Vvz+U0PY/RRUqfXQdtkUxQnGs/T01yh7+E3R3LMCrhk3w+PISuNLCSPG0Sf6lrUA</xenc:Ciph
erValue> 
                </xenc:CipherData> 
            </xenc:EncryptedData> 
            <ds:Signature Id="_1" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <ds:SignedInfo> 
                    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                        <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/> 
                    </ds:CanonicalizationMethod> 
                    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5003"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>AiAgXvnVHF6eatthuPwzG4A/hw8=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5004"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>5Ab1ebo4/FraGgck/A8iDx1J9+I=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5005"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>cpHaSaANqa1Ctogh/9Gv6rbbivs=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5006"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5004"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>pOE9k50Odm1bpagrnYxikFnj8IQ=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5005"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>Nd/8wVmBdLowQKMblBRYK+6xcjA=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5006"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>6QWqKtiSnibxN8alXBJ+aUy1yVA=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_3"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>Dji/v8LpUM1zccDNhJsHd6fVaH8=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                </ds:SignedInfo> 
                <ds:SignatureValue>nUNYjCespsZKXbVKWnE0TdkFVWA=</ds:SignatureValue> 
                <ds:KeyInfo> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                            EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-
1.1#EncryptedKeySHA1">uVSGWduakDJe2qHFnEZ4dUt/ljU=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
            </ds:Signature> 
        </wsse:Security> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body wsu:Id="_5006"> 
        <xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5007" 
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
            xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/> 
            <ds:KeyInfo 
                xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo"> 
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                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>BLoJ2F/86smJfhXz7WZzid7Dx4Y=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5007"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>LX/ljKbElCK0/l0OY6BTLEW1WVk=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_3"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>Kzo9PEsY7D3nnraB42PZO+XbG+U=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#uuid_3aed497d-ff1c-4a37-964e-56f9189d080c"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>XbDgClGFz2z0OMkdeDN4xlMrMEo=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                </ds:SignedInfo> 
                <ds:SignatureValue>4RPUOnA4IDzOyMG/ZwGJ9TAhC+o=</ds:SignatureValue> 
                <ds:KeyInfo> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsu:Id="uuid_c1149094-08fa-49ea-996f-a8ea9ce37b56"> 
                        <wsse:Reference URI="#_5002" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-
1.1#EncryptedKey"/> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
            </ds:Signature> 
        </wsse:Security> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body wsu:Id="_5007"> 
        <xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5008" 
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
            xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/> 
            <ds:KeyInfo 
                xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo"> 
                <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                    <wsse:Reference URI="#_5002" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-
1.1#EncryptedKey"/> 
                </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                    <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                        EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-
1.1#EncryptedKeySHA1">uVSGWduakDJe2qHFnEZ4dUt/ljU=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
                </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
            </ds:KeyInfo> 
            <xenc:CipherData> 
                
<xenc:CipherValue>rnfTD8vqOU7YuMiZKbuvxath4/uStxTsxh/yuGVmvvC+OKzNAKOzHFxBTp/hIgHNl0eAGrJHJ7bD2/xuM6wnLMidQO
UyZ1nEOtATqOWPAl7VVauurHg48JxE2WzEcbVKpLK/XaeyOyUOQFjXvljqHuc8dPfGlZ1GM+wQ0Ggwvpg=</xenc:CipherValue> 
            </xenc:CipherData> 
        </xenc:EncryptedData> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
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            </ds:KeyInfo> 
            <xenc:CipherData> 
                
<xenc:CipherValue>KVFK0+8PB54BvOq1oT2AoC0JV6odWJX+CH0quyzD2lRd08Gf4Qd+0r2f9xdMOjVeWGqPmCP618PwK4X5RNjW68I
N4FOI4S0Rv4/qpc65ygF49fgDRy4hwsYay97QQ6/4n/22a5rFjf9sQW93Tb99dQ==</xenc:CipherValue> 
            </xenc:CipherData> 
        </xenc:EncryptedData> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
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Example 3: Mutual Certificates (MCS) 
 Request Response 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
    xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
    xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" 
    xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
    xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To wsu:Id="_5005" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS02R0WSServi
ce</To> 
        <Action wsu:Id="_5004" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s02r0.server.bash/EchoS02R0WS/sendEchoRequest</Action> 
        <ReplyTo wsu:Id="_5003" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> 
            <Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address> 
        </ReplyTo> 
        <MessageID wsu:Id="_5002" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:28076cd2-4ceb-40d6-ae9c-
6de83f5b03c6</MessageID> 
        <wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1"> 
            <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:53:05Z</wsu:Created> 
                <wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:58:05Z</wsu:Expires> 
            </wsu:Timestamp> 
            <wsse:BinarySecurityToken 
                EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
                ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3" 
                wsu:Id="uuid_a18fed82-16fb-4ba7-addb-bb886f30134f" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512">MIIDDzCCAnigAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECB
MKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEMMAoGA1UEChMDU1VOMQwwCgYDVQQLEwNKV1MxDjAMBgNVBAMTBVNVTkNBMB4XDTA3MDMxM
jEwMjQ0MFoXDTE3MDMwOTEwMjQ0MFowbzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgTClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoTG
EludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDEMMAoGA1UECxMDU1VOMRowGAYDVQQDExF4d3NzZWN1cml0eWNsaWVudDCBnz
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
    xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
    xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" 
    xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
    xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To wsu:Id="_5005" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To> 
        <Action wsu:Id="_5003" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s02r0.server.bash/EchoS02R0WS/sendEchoResponse</Action> 
        <MessageID wsu:Id="_5002" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:b922c13e-e733-4f08-bab2-
a92c34e88b8c</MessageID> 
        <RelatesTo wsu:Id="_5004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:28076cd2-4ceb-40d6-ae9c-6de83f5b03c6</RelatesTo> 
        <wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1"> 
            <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:53:05Z</wsu:Created> 
                <wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:58:05Z</wsu:Expires> 
            </wsu:Timestamp> 
            <xenc:EncryptedKey Id="_5007" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/> 
                <ds:KeyInfo 
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo"> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                            EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-
1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">/mItfvuFdS7A0GCysE71TFRxP2c=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
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ANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAvYxVZKIzVdGMSBkW4bYnV80MV/RgQKV1bf/DoMTX8laMO45P6rlEarxQiOYrgzuYp
+snzz2XM0S6o3JGQtXQuzDwcwPkH55bHFwHgtOMzxG4SQ653a5Dzh04nsmJvxvbncNH/XNaWfHaC0JHBEfNCMwRebYocxYM92pq/G5
OGyECAwEAAaOB2zCB2DAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMCwGCWCGSAGG+EIBDQQfFh1PcGVuU1NMIEdlbmVyYXRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0
ZTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU/mItfvuFdS7A0GCysE71TFRxP2cwfgYDVR0jBHcwdYAUZ7plxs6VyOOOTSFyojDV0/YYjJWhUqRQME4xCzAJB
gNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpTb21lLVN0YXRlMQwwCgYDVQQKEwNTVU4xDDAKBgNVBAsTA0pXUzEOMAwGA1UEAx
MFU1VOQ0GCCQDbHkJaq6KijjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBEnRdcQeMyCYqOHw2jbPOPUlvu07bZe7sI3ly/Qz+4mkrFctqMSupgh
QtLv9dZcqDOUFLCGMse7+l5MG00VawzsoVe242iXzJB111ePzhhppIPOHXXtflj/JD2U4Qz75C/dfdd5AAZbqGSFtZh7pyE8Ot1vOq7R48/bH
uvTsEVUQ==</wsse:BinarySecurityToken> 
            <xenc:EncryptedKey Id="_5007" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/> 
                <ds:KeyInfo 
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo"> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                            EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-
1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">dVE29ysyFW/iD1la3ddePzM6IWo=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
                <xenc:CipherData> 
                    
<xenc:CipherValue>mYictXCXb4po/chiQP+x6+UTZv3ZFuIccHYzOx9J6M1HPSmWYLDEUE8EkKU4W6YTU8Y0uopjlH6Dgsun+wqItDU
mKj0Yg3whFCNWlXvvltS9conN6J3KSZTz85zK1LY8mAmcSTTegplRlsqCtuPUYNWV7/+1br4+JBUSgOfPGy0=</xenc:CipherValue> 
                </xenc:CipherData> 
                <xenc:ReferenceList> 
                    <xenc:DataReference URI="#_5008"/> 
                </xenc:ReferenceList> 
            </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
            <ds:Signature Id="_1" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <ds:SignedInfo> 
                    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                        <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/> 
                    </ds:CanonicalizationMethod> 
                    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/> 
                <xenc:CipherData> 
                    
<xenc:CipherValue>l8HHf0gE3XIqazuL/U2x/bZOC8t0NC5fs04Q/uq5RU9R6AT9iPTEb9i/ab/3LNFwnUFy67m3zfQmbMuKeaE+otneBEEHX
8K6m0vjNfG7Hc2wIRgQO2Ef8MDQOaaMFP1ZKSoK9bLXo9xD+hQ1jXCtCUNL1VaiEJgcxAOtDl/uOfI=</xenc:CipherValue> 
                </xenc:CipherData> 
                <xenc:ReferenceList> 
                    <xenc:DataReference URI="#_5008"/> 
                </xenc:ReferenceList> 
            </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
            <ds:Signature Id="_1" 
                xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
                <ds:SignedInfo> 
                    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                        <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/> 
                    </ds:CanonicalizationMethod> 
                    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5002"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>fZevxFpoUe0O+ib+4cJ5c/5QtAI=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5003"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>5tMtOXddKS5hpu/EssMo5gLSMGY=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5004"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
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                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5002"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>c2r5I0nidByse48vZ1s5K7gVX4E=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5003"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>bfaj3tu9jIeOXTrb3JWtYD+ZKaI=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5004"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>BAhm4BLMooiBr1NI9rwLm+1OYY4=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5005"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>X2+HYlWW9NOqjhw54V+HbcSKkDM=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5006"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>+YMQSKO6KUAZZiZRNK2Aw/X5IyU=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5005"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>Nd/8wVmBdLowQKMblBRYK+6xcjA=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_5006"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>K56DINu9+dyLCrPwOAmcTiV1fZU=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_3"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>X9xUde9yklabvg1xhmtQscPwbkw=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                </ds:SignedInfo> 
                
<ds:SignatureValue>bpomFxcblaE+EMDNt6RRaXAmYkZTKTK94tmzlvq0WnXni5iBcMXpBP5elLM+b87a8NWQ8IHdlIEaz3/r0wOOmz3fh
wiSiEOIaoN9BR8iGziUeZ3jzjbfIBdeq7pQr9MK8j9MELgto4MSotim/csImXLrE3Y+O1cX7OomIfb3sNU=</ds:SignatureValue> 
                <ds:KeyInfo> 
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                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>UOc+OFH9SsG+7m2KsX0TO4y4unQ=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                    <ds:Reference URI="#_3"> 
                        <ds:Transforms> 
                            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
                                <exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/> 
                            </ds:Transform> 
                        </ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
                        <ds:DigestValue>X9xUde9yklabvg1xhmtQscPwbkw=</ds:DigestValue> 
                    </ds:Reference> 
                </ds:SignedInfo> 
                
<ds:SignatureValue>YjI9Ee0jJOZkepquOFmUigXb4Ms1VlDEj7bqzvMvIsSk42FAFkHQrteiqkLcZqym/NEsuZGbuneTf8384KEl76Ik67EXT9
R4yLwS6v5CD5TUmYmvGTjrM0sy3+JN8khG3QoXgqST7vKLycfPYRzlA7PkdsNb7MG5QN+KYBdvypY=</ds:SignatureValue> 
                <ds:KeyInfo> 
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:Reference 
                            URI="#uuid_a18fed82-16fb-4ba7-addb-bb886f30134f" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-
wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3"/> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
            </ds:Signature> 
        </wsse:Security> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body wsu:Id="_5006"> 
        <xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5008" 
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
            xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/> 
            <xenc:CipherData> 
                
                    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                        <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                            EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-
1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">dVE29ysyFW/iD1la3ddePzM6IWo=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
                    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                </ds:KeyInfo> 
            </ds:Signature> 
        </wsse:Security> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body wsu:Id="_5006"> 
        <xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5008" 
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
            xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/200512"> 
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/> 
            <xenc:CipherData> 
                
<xenc:CipherValue>Dq6GxW9E98czYA6sGGGnCDSUal5+t5moWseIth61pp1wkKbGNdFOTMvHoLTE82btl/+01KHhkEUV8G8bhvbyklXt6
+8rPQkNChbrCP2cQENN+uEo8TTN2lxcs2fetBU1W8ddR+BZrjhzo1jA1y4h5OGJ25M0592I0tzuF0DLXuA=</xenc:CipherValue> 
            </xenc:CipherData> 
        </xenc:EncryptedData> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
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<xenc:CipherValue>KX4UCZjxjepkkAHbJDsCt2UbXvLNXODxLUD8AU1axYGV/hoPjo1fFjuDu94m6XvcoyqwKfXVZKMMmiklMddg+hm
R+wK1T3tUY+TtuP/tmd/bNFQkSmoN+RfU0LfAx8DaNnqvuz9QJt1Ujm3mEQqbjg==</xenc:CipherValue> 
            </xenc:CipherData> 
        </xenc:EncryptedData> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
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Example 4: Reliable Messaging 
 Request Response 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To> 
        <Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/CreateSequence</Action> 
        <ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> 
            <Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address> 
        </ReplyTo> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:5e9caaa4-c296-4972-b9c1-8910e573978f</MessageID> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:CreateSequence 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:AcksTo> 
                <ns3:Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</ns3:Address> 
            </ns2:AcksTo> 
            <ns2:Offer> 
                <ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier> 
            </ns2:Offer> 
        </ns2:CreateSequence> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To> 
        <Action 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/CreateSequenceResponse</
Action> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:3416b50a-2bbc-49ed-90e5-
f221b11ada10</MessageID> 
        <RelatesTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:5e9caaa4-c296-4972-b9c1-
8910e573978f</RelatesTo> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:CreateSequenceResponse 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:Accept> 
                <ns2:AcksTo> 
                    
<ns3:Address>http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSService</ns3:Ad
dress> 
                </ns2:AcksTo> 
            </ns2:Accept> 
        </ns2:CreateSequenceResponse> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Appendix A 
 XII 
2 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To> 
        <Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s00r1.server.bash/EchoS00R1WS/sendEchoRequest</Action> 
        <ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> 
            <Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address> 
        </ReplyTo> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:a4129c51-bfa1-4e96-9933-5b8b39ae4afe</MessageID> 
        <ns2:Sequence 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:MessageNumber>1</ns2:MessageNumber> 
        </ns2:Sequence> 
        <ns2:AckRequested 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
        </ns2:AckRequested> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:sendEcho xmlns:ns2="http://s00r1.server.bash/"> 
            <echoText>A</echoText> 
        </ns2:sendEcho> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To> 
        <Action 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s00r1.server.bash/EchoS00R1WS/sendEchoResponse</Action> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:b973c467-e39f-4061-8d8c-
07312d279191</MessageID> 
        <RelatesTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:a4129c51-bfa1-4e96-9933-
5b8b39ae4afe</RelatesTo> 
        <ns2:Sequence 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:MessageNumber>1</ns2:MessageNumber> 
        </ns2:Sequence> 
        <ns2:AckRequested 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier> 
        </ns2:AckRequested> 
        <ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="1"/> 
        </ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body> 
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        <ns2:sendEchoResponse xmlns:ns2="http://s00r1.server.bash/"> 
            <return>A</return> 
        </ns2:sendEchoResponse> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
3 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <ns2:Sequence 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:MessageNumber>2</ns2:MessageNumber> 
            <ns2:LastMessage/> 
        </ns2:Sequence> 
        <To 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To> 
        <Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/LastMessage</Action> 
        <ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> 
            <Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address> 
        </ReplyTo> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:fa473ac0-a927-4075-96b5-45d84a5aa03e</MessageID> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body/> 
</S:Envelope> 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="2"/> 
        </ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement> 
        <Action 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/LastMessage</Action> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body/> 
</S:Envelope> 
4 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
    <S:Header> 
        <To xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To> 
        <Action 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/TerminateSequence</Actio
n> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:0d92d0cb-43a7-4fd9-95f8-
fdc13ecbd40b</MessageID> 
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            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="1"/> 
        </ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement> 
        <To 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To> 
        <Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/TerminateSequence</Action> 
        <ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"> 
            <Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address> 
        </ReplyTo> 
        <MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:eb4cd190-e4cc-46da-a17f-31a72a2131cc</MessageID> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:TerminateSequence 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
        </ns2:TerminateSequence> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
        <RelatesTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:eb4cd190-e4cc-46da-a17f-
31a72a2131cc</RelatesTo> 
        <ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier> 
            <ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="2"/> 
        </ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement> 
    </S:Header> 
    <S:Body> 
        <ns2:TerminateSequence 
            xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm" 
            xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" 
            xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd" 
            xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" 
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm"> 
            <ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier> 
        </ns2:TerminateSequence> 
    </S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Appendix B  
 XV 
Appendix B 
AHP Matrices 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Peer Authentication 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
UDP 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
MCS 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SSL 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SA 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SV 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
STS 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.0588 0.0588 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Message Origin Authentication 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 9 9 9 1 
UDP 1 1 1 9 9 9 1 
MCS 1 1 1 9 9 9 1 
SSL 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 1 1 0.11 
SA 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 1 1 0.11 
SV 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 1 1 0.11 
STS 1 1 1 9 9 9 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.2308 0.2308 0.2308 0.0256 0.0256 0.0256 0.2308 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Message Integrity 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MCS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SSL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
STS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Message Confidentiality 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
UDP 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
MCS 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SSL 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SA 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
SV 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
STS 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.0588 0.0588 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Nonrepudiation 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MCS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SSL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
STS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Authorization 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 1 0.11 0.11 0.11 
UDP 1 1 1 1 0.11 0.11 0.11 
MCS 1 1 1 1 0.11 0.11 0.11 
SSL 1 1 1 1 0.11 0.11 0.11 
SA 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 
SV 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 
STS 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 0.2903 0.2903 0.2903 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to End-to-End Security 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 9 9 1 1 
UDP 1 1 1 9 9 1 1 
MCS 1 1 1 9 9 1 1 
SSL 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 1 0.11 0.11 
SA 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 1 0.11 0.11 
SV 1 1 1 9 9 1 1 
STS 1 1 1 9 9 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1915 0.1915 0.1915 0.0213 0.0213 0.1915 0.1915 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Certificates 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 
UDP 1 1 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 
MCS 9 9 1 1 9 1 9 
SSL 9 9 1 1 9 1 9 
SA 1 1 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 
SV 9 9 1 1 9 1 9 
STS 1 1 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.0323 0.0323 0.2903 0.2903 0.0323 0.2903 0.0323 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Users DB 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 9 1 9 9 9 
UDP 1 1 9 1 9 9 9 
MCS 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 1 1 
SSL 1 1 9 1 9 9 9 
SA 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 1 1 
SV 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 1 1 
STS 0.11 0.11 1 0.11 1 1 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.2903 0.2903 0.0323 0.2903 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Security Service Token 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.11 
UDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.11 
MCS 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.11 
SSL 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.11 
SA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.11 
SV 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.11 
STS 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667 0.6 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Flexibility 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 2 0.5 2 2 6 
UDP 1 1 2 0.5 2 2 6 
MCS 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 5 
SSL 2 2 3 1 3 3 7 
SA 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 5 
SV 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 5 
STS 0.17 0.17 0.2 0.14 0.2 0.2 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1821 0.1821 0.1023 0.3019 0.1023 0.1023 0.0271 
 
Consistency Ratio= 1.12% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to AVR RTT 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 0.99 1.18 0.76 0.78 1.21 6.8 
UDP 1.01 1 1.19 0.76 0.79 1.22 6.85 
MCS 0.85 0.84 1 0.64 0.66 1.02 5.75 
SSL 1.32 1.31 1.57 1 1.03 1.6 9 
SA 1.28 1.27 1.52 0.97 1 1.55 8.72 
SV 0.83 0.82 0.98 0.63 0.65 1 5.64 
STS 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.18 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1554 0.1567 0.1313 0.2057 0.1993 0.1289 0.0229 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to STD RTT 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 1 1 1 8.96 
UDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 8.97 
MCS 1 1 1 0.99 1 1 8.95 
SSL 1 1 1.01 1 1 1 9 
SA 1 1 1 1 1 1 8.99 
SV 1 1 1 1 1 1 8.98 
STS 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1633 0.1635 0.1632 0.1641 0.1638 0.1638 0.0182 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
    
  Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to MAX RTT 
Matrix  
  UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
UA 1 1 1 0.98 0.98 1 8.84 
UDP 1 1 1 0.98 0.98 1 8.85 
MCS 1 1 1 0.98 0.98 1 8.83 
SSL 1.02 1.02 1.02 1 1 1.02 9 
SA 1.02 1.02 1.02 1 1 1.02 8.99 
SV 1 1 1 0.98 0.98 1 8.83 
STS 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 
        
 
Eigen Vector  
 
UA UDP MCS SSL SA SV STS 
 
0.1627 0.1628 0.1625 0.1656 0.1655 0.1624 0.0184 
 
Consistency Ratio= 0.00% 
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Appendix C 
A Generic AHP Tool 
A Generic Java Class to Perform the AHP Calculations 
  1 public class AHP 
  2 { 
  3     //The number of Criteria, Sub-Criteria and Alternatives 
  4  
  5     public double numOfCriteria; 
  6     public int[] numOfSubCriteria; 
  7     public int numOfAlternatives; 
  8     //Pair-wise Comparison Matrices 
  9     public double[][] criteriaMatrix; 
 10     public double[][][] subCriteriaMatrix; 
 11     public double[][][][] alternativesMatrix; 
 12     //Squared Matrices 
 13     public double[][] criteriaSquaredMatrix; 
 14     public double[][][] subCriteriaSquaredMatrix; 
 15     public double[][][][] alternativesSquaredMatrix; 
 16     //Normalized Matrices 
 17     public double[][] criteriaNormalizedMatrix; 
 18     public double[][][] subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix; 
 19     public double[][][][] alternativesNormalizedMatrix; 
 20     //Eigen Vectors 
 21     public double[] criteriaEigenVector; 
 22     public double[][] subCriteriaEigenVector; 
 23     public double[][][] alternativesEigenVector; 
 24     //Weighted Sum Vectors 
 25     public double[] criteriaWeightedSum; 
 26     public double[][] subCriteriaWeightedSum; 
 27     public double[][][] alternativesWeightedSum; 
 28     //Global Weights Matrices         
 29     public double[][] globalWeight; 
 30     //scoresVector Array 
 31     public double[][][] scoresVector; 
 32     public double[] results; 
 33     //Consistancy Ratios 
 34     public double criteriaConsistancyRatio; 
 35     public double[] subCriteriaConsistancyRatio; 
 36     public double[][] alternativesConsistancyRatio; 
 37     //Saaty Random Consistancy Indices 
 38     private static final double[] randomConsistancyIndices = new double[] 
 39     { 
 40         0,0,0,0.58,0.89,1.11,1.25,1.35,1.40,1.45,1.49 
 41     }; 
 42  
 43     public AHP(int numOfCriteria, int[] numOfSubCriteria, int numOfAlternatives) 
 44     { 
 45         if (numOfCriteria == numOfSubCriteria.length) 
 46         { 
 47             //Initialize The numbers 
 48             this.numOfCriteria = numOfCriteria; 
 49             this.numOfSubCriteria = numOfSubCriteria; 
 50             this.numOfAlternatives = numOfAlternatives; 
 51             ///Initialize the Matrices 
 52             criteriaMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][numOfCriteria]; 
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 53             criteriaSquaredMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][numOfCriteria]; 
 54             criteriaNormalizedMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][numOfCriteria]; 
 55             subCriteriaMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][][]; 
 56             subCriteriaSquaredMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][][]; 
 57             subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][][]; 
 58             for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaMatrix.length; i++) 
 59             { 
 60                 subCriteriaMatrix[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]][numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 61                 subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]][numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 62                 subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]][numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 63             } 
 64             alternativesMatrix = new double[criteriaMatrix.length][][][]; 
 65             alternativesSquaredMatrix = new double[criteriaSquaredMatrix.length][][][]; 
 66             alternativesNormalizedMatrix = new double[criteriaNormalizedMatrix.length][][][]; 
 67             for (int i = 0; i < alternativesMatrix.length; i++) 
 68             { 
 69                 alternativesMatrix[i] = new 
double[subCriteriaMatrix[i].length][numOfAlternatives][numOfAlternatives]; 
 70                 alternativesSquaredMatrix[i] = new 
double[subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i].length][numOfAlternatives][numOfAlternatives]; 
 71                 alternativesNormalizedMatrix[i] = new 
double[subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i].length][numOfAlternatives][numOfAlternatives]; 
 72             } 
 73  
 74             //Initialise Vectors 
 75             criteriaEigenVector = new double[criteriaMatrix.length]; 
 76             criteriaWeightedSum = new double[criteriaSquaredMatrix.length]; 
 77             subCriteriaEigenVector = new double[criteriaEigenVector.length][]; 
 78             subCriteriaWeightedSum = new double[criteriaWeightedSum.length][]; 
 79             for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++) 
 80             { 
 81                 subCriteriaEigenVector[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 82                 subCriteriaWeightedSum[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 83             } 
 84             alternativesEigenVector = new double[criteriaEigenVector.length][][]; 
 85             alternativesWeightedSum = new double[criteriaWeightedSum.length][][]; 
 86             scoresVector = new double[criteriaEigenVector.length][][]; 
 87             for (int i = 0; i < alternativesEigenVector.length; i++) 
 88             { 
 89                 alternativesEigenVector[i] = new 
double[subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length][numOfAlternatives]; 
 90                 alternativesWeightedSum[i] = new 
double[subCriteriaWeightedSum[i].length][numOfAlternatives]; 
 91                 scoresVector[i] = new double[subCriteriaWeightedSum[i].length][numOfAlternatives]; 
 92             } 
 93  
 94             // 
 95             results = new double[numOfAlternatives]; 
 96             //Initialize Consistancy Ratios 
 97             criteriaConsistancyRatio = 0; 
 98             subCriteriaConsistancyRatio = new double[criteriaMatrix.length]; 
 99             alternativesConsistancyRatio = new double[criteriaMatrix.length][]; 
100             for (int i = 0; i < alternativesMatrix.length; i++) 
101             { 
102                 alternativesConsistancyRatio[i] = new double[subCriteriaMatrix[i].length]; 
103             } 
104             // 
105             globalWeight = new double[numOfCriteria][]; 
106             for (int i = 0; i < globalWeight.length; i++) 
107             { 
108                 globalWeight[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
109             } 
110         } else 
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111         { 
112             System.out.println("numOfCriteria <> numOfSubCriteria.length"); 
113             System.exit(0); 
114         } 
115  
116     } 
117  
118     public void squareMatrices() 
119     { 
120         //Calculate the Squared Matrices 
121         criteriaSquaredMatrix = squareMatrix(squareMatrix(criteriaMatrix)); 
122         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaMatrix.length; i++) 
123         { 
124             subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i] = squareMatrix(squareMatrix(subCriteriaMatrix[i])); 
125         } 
126         for (int i = 0; i < alternativesMatrix.length; i++) 
127         { 
128             for (int j = 0; j < alternativesMatrix[i].length; j++) 
129             { 
130                 alternativesSquaredMatrix[i][j] = squareMatrix(squareMatrix(alternativesMatrix[i][j])); 
131             } 
132         } 
133     } 
134  
135     private double[][] squareMatrix(double[][] array) 
136     { 
137         double[][] squaredMatrix = new double[array.length][array.length]; 
138         for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++) 
139         { 
140             for (int j = 0; j < array.length; j++) 
141             { 
142                 for (int k = 0; k < array.length; k++) 
143                 { 
144                     squaredMatrix[i][j] += array[i][k] * array[k][j]; 
145                 } 
146             } 
147         } 
148         return squaredMatrix; 
149     } 
150  
151     public void normalizeMatrices() 
152     { 
153         //Calculate the Normalized Matrices 
154         criteriaNormalizedMatrix = normalizeMatrix(criteriaSquaredMatrix); 
155         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaSquaredMatrix.length; i++) 
156         { 
157             subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i] = normalizeMatrix(subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i]); 
158         } 
159         for (int i = 0; i < alternativesSquaredMatrix.length; i++) 
160         { 
161             for (int j = 0; j < alternativesSquaredMatrix[i].length; j++) 
162             { 
163                 alternativesNormalizedMatrix[i][j] = normalizeMatrix(alternativesSquaredMatrix[i][j]); 
164             } 
165         } 
166     } 
167  
168     private double[][] normalizeMatrix(double[][] array) 
169     { 
170         double[][] normalizedMatrix = new double[array.length][array.length]; 
171         double[] columnSum = new double[array.length]; 
172         for (int j = 0; j < array.length; j++) 
173         { 
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174             for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++) 
175             { 
176                 normalizedMatrix[i][j] = array[i][j]; 
177                 columnSum[j] += normalizedMatrix[i][j]; 
178             } 
179         } 
180  
181         for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++) 
182         { 
183             for (int j = 0; j < array.length; j++) 
184             { 
185                 normalizedMatrix[i][j] = normalizedMatrix[i][j] / columnSum[j]; 
186             } 
187         } 
188         return normalizedMatrix; 
189     } 
190  
191     public void calculateEigenVectors() 
192     { 
193         //Calculate Eigen Vectors 
194         criteriaEigenVector = calculateEigenVector(criteriaNormalizedMatrix); 
195         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++) 
196         { 
197             subCriteriaEigenVector[i] = calculateEigenVector(subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i]); 
198         } 
199         for (int i = 0; i < alternativesEigenVector.length; i++) 
200         { 
201             for (int j = 0; j < alternativesEigenVector[i].length; j++) 
202             { 
203                 alternativesEigenVector[i][j] = calculateEigenVector(alternativesNormalizedMatrix[i][j]); 
204             } 
205         } 
206     } 
207  
208     private double[] calculateEigenVector(double[][] array) 
209     { 
210         double[] eVector = new double[array.length]; 
211         for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++) 
212         { 
213             for (int j = 0; j < array[i].length; j++) 
214             { 
215                 eVector[i] += array[i][j]; 
216             } 
217             eVector[i] = eVector[i] / array.length; 
218         } 
219         return eVector; 
220     } 
221  
222     public void calculateWeightedSums() 
223     { 
224         //Calculate Weighted Sums 
225         criteriaWeightedSum = calculateWeightedSum(criteriaMatrix, criteriaEigenVector); 
226         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaWeightedSum.length; i++) 
227         { 
228             subCriteriaWeightedSum[i] = calculateWeightedSum(subCriteriaMatrix[i], 
subCriteriaEigenVector[i]); 
229         } 
230         for (int i = 0; i < alternativesWeightedSum.length; i++) 
231         { 
232             for (int j = 0; j < alternativesWeightedSum[i].length; j++) 
233             { 
234                 alternativesWeightedSum[i][j] = calculateWeightedSum(alternativesMatrix[i][j], 
alternativesEigenVector[i][j]); 
Appendix C 
 
 XXIV 
235             } 
236         } 
237     } 
238  
239     private double[] calculateWeightedSum(double[][] matrix, double[] eigenVector) 
240     { 
241         double[] weightedSum = new double[eigenVector.length]; 
242         for (int i = 0; i < matrix.length; i++) 
243         { 
244             for (int j = 0; j < matrix[i].length; j++) 
245             { 
246                 weightedSum[i] += matrix[i][j] * eigenVector[j]; 
247             } 
248         } 
249         return weightedSum; 
250     } 
251  
252     public void calculateConsistencyRatios() 
253     { 
254         criteriaConsistancyRatio = calculateConsistancyRatio(criteriaWeightedSum, criteriaEigenVector); 
255         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaWeightedSum.length; i++) 
256         { 
257             subCriteriaConsistancyRatio[i] = calculateConsistancyRatio(subCriteriaWeightedSum[i], 
subCriteriaEigenVector[i]); 
258         } 
259         for (int i = 0; i < alternativesWeightedSum.length; i++) 
260         { 
261             for (int j = 0; j < alternativesWeightedSum[i].length; j++) 
262             { 
263                 alternativesConsistancyRatio[i][j] = calculateConsistancyRatio(alternativesWeightedSum[i][j], 
alternativesEigenVector[i][j]); 
264             } 
265         } 
266     } 
267  
268     private double calculateConsistancyRatio(double[] weightedSum, double[] eigenVector) 
269     { 
270         double eigenValue = 0; 
271         for (int i = 0; i < weightedSum.length; i++) 
272         { 
273             eigenValue += weightedSum[i] / eigenVector[i]; 
274         } 
275         eigenValue = eigenValue / weightedSum.length; 
276         double ci = (eigenValue - (eigenVector.length)) / (eigenVector.length - 1); 
277         double ri = randomConsistancyIndices[eigenVector.length]; 
278         double consistancyRatio = ci / ri; 
279         return consistancyRatio; 
280     } 
281  
282     public void calculateGlobalWeight() 
283     { 
284         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++) 
285         { 
286             globalWeight[i] = new double[subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length]; 
287             for (int j = 0; j < subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length; j++) 
288             { 
289                 globalWeight[i][j] = criteriaEigenVector[i] * subCriteriaEigenVector[i][j]; 
290             } 
291         } 
292     } 
293  
294     public void calculateScores() 
295     { 
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296         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++) 
297         { 
298             for (int j = 0; j < subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length; j++) 
299             { 
300                 for (int k = 0; k < alternativesEigenVector[i][j].length; k++) 
301                 { 
302                     scoresVector[i][j][k] = globalWeight[i][j] * alternativesEigenVector[i][j][k]; 
303                 } 
304             } 
305         } 
306     } 
307  
308     public void calculateResultsVector() 
309     { 
310         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++) 
311         { 
312             for (int j = 0; j < subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length; j++) 
313             { 
314                 for (int k = 0; k < alternativesEigenVector[i][j].length; k++) 
315                 { 
316                     results[k] += scoresVector[i][j][k]; 
317                 } 
318             } 
319         } 
320     } 
321 } 
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Java Main Class to Run the AHP Tool 
  1 public class MainClass { 
  2  
  3     /** 
  4      * AHP Step 1: Create and Initialize Hierarchy 
  5      */ 
  6     private int numOfAlternatives = 7; 
  7     private int numOfCriteria = 3; 
  8     private int[] numOfSubCriteria = new int[]{ 
  9         7, 4, 3 
 10     }; 
 11     private final double[][] measuresArray = new double[][]{ 
 12         { 
 13             6.798309352, 6.85455513, 5.746259492, 9, 8.719698985, 5.638189001, 1 
 14         }, 
 15         { 
 16             8.955703524, 8.969387467, 8.953079593, 9, 8.985187484, 8.981801766, 1 
 17         }, 
 18         { 
 19             8.838517131, 8.846820526, 8.828284664, 9, 8.992032095, 8.826131932, 1 
 20         } 
 21     }; 
 22     private String[] criteria; 
 23     private String[] criteriaNames; 
 24     private String[][] subCriteria; 
 25     private String[][] subCriteriaNames; 
 26     private String[][][] alternatives; 
 27     private String[] alternativesNames; 
 28  
 29     public MainClass() { 
 30         //Initialise String Matrices 
 31         criteria = new String[numOfCriteria]; 
 32         criteriaNames = new String[numOfCriteria]; 
 33  
 34         subCriteria = new String[criteria.length][]; 
 35         subCriteriaNames = new String[criteriaNames.length][]; 
 36         for (int i = 0; i < subCriteria.length; i++) { 
 37             subCriteria[i] = new String[numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 38             subCriteriaNames[i] = new String[numOfSubCriteria[i]]; 
 39         } 
 40         alternatives = new String[criteria.length][][]; 
 41         alternativesNames = new String[numOfAlternatives]; 
 42         for (int i = 0; i < alternatives.length; i++) { 
 43             alternatives[i] = new String[subCriteria[i].length][numOfAlternatives]; 
 44         } 
 45  
 46         //Initialize double Matrices 
 47         AHP ahp = new AHP(numOfCriteria, numOfSubCriteria, numOfAlternatives); 
 48  
 49         //Enter the names for all criteria and sub-criteria 
 50         fillNamesArrays(); 
 51  
 52  
 53         /** 
 54          * AHP Step 2: Pair-Wise Comparisons 
 55          */ 
 56         //Enter the pair-wise compariosn values for the judgement-based criteria and sub-criteria 
 57         fillStringArrays(); 
 58  
 59         //Calcualte the weights for the measurement-based sub-criteria 
 60         for (int i = 0; i < measuresArray.length; i++) { 
 61             weightsCalculator(ahp.alternativesMatrix[alternatives.length - 1][i], i); 
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 62         } 
 63  
 64         /** 
 65          * AHP Step 3: Eigen Vector 
 66          */ 
 67         //Square all the matrices 
 68         ahp.squareMatrices(); 
 69         //Normalize all the matrices 
 70         ahp.normalizeMatrices(); 
 71         //calculate the eigen vector for each matrix 
 72         ahp.calculateEigenVectors(); 
 73         // calculate the wighted sums  
 74         ahp.calculateWeightedSums(); 
 75  
 76         /** 
 77          * AHP Step 4: Consistency Ratio 
 78          */ 
 79         ahp.calculateConsistencyRatios(); 
 80  
 81         /** 
 82          * AHP Step 5: Ratings 
 83          */ 
 84         ahp.calculateGlobalWeight(); 
 85         ahp.calculateScores(); 
 86         ahp.calculateResultsVector(); 
 87  
 88         //Display All the Matrices 
 89         /*Code to display all the matrices and calculations*/ 
 90     } 
 91  
 92     private void weightsCalculator(double[][] doubleArray, int index) { 
 93         for (int i = 0; i < doubleArray.length; i++) { 
 94             for (int j = 0; j < doubleArray[i].length; j++) { 
 95                 doubleArray[i][j] = measuresArray[index][i] / measuresArray[index][j]; 
 96             } 
 97         } 
 98     } 
 99  
100     private void fillStringArrays() { 
101         /**Code to enter the pair-wise comparisons*/ 
102     } 
103  
104     private void fillNamesArrays() { 
105         /**Code to enter names for the criteria and sub-criteria*/ 
106     } 
107  
108     public static void main(String[] args) { 
109         // TODO code application logic here 
110         MainClass m = new MainClass(); 
111     } 
112 }  
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Appendix D 
An Example of a Stego Key 
Sequence Binary Oct Dec Hex Glyph 
isbn-author-name-pages-publisher- 000 0000 0 0 0 NO EMBEDDING 
isbn-author-name-publisher-pages- 010 0000 40 32 20 Space 
isbn-author-pages-name-publisher- 010 0001 41 33 21 ! 
isbn-author-pages-publisher-name- 010 0010 42 34 22   
isbn-author-publisher-name-pages- 010 0011 43 35 23 # 
isbn-author-publisher-pages-name- 010 0100 44 36 24 $ 
isbn-name-author-pages-publisher- 010 0101 45 37 25 % 
isbn-name-author-publisher-pages- 010 0110 46 38 26 & 
isbn-name-pages-author-publisher- 010 0111 47 39 27 ' 
isbn-name-pages-publisher-author- 010 1000 50 40 28 ( 
isbn-name-publisher-author-pages- 010 1001 51 41 29 ) 
isbn-name-publisher-pages-author- 010 1010 52 42 2A * 
isbn-pages-author-name-publisher- 010 1011 53 43 2B + 
isbn-pages-author-publisher-name- 010 1100 54 44 2C , 
isbn-pages-name-author-publisher- 010 1101 55 45 2D - 
isbn-pages-name-publisher-author- 010 1110 56 46 2E . 
isbn-pages-publisher-author-name- 010 1111 57 47 2F / 
isbn-pages-publisher-name-author- 011 0000 60 48 30 0 
isbn-publisher-author-name-pages- 011 0001 61 49 31 1 
isbn-publisher-author-pages-name- 011 0010 62 50 32 2 
isbn-publisher-name-author-pages- 011 0011 63 51 33 3 
isbn-publisher-name-pages-author- 011 0100 64 52 34 4 
isbn-publisher-pages-author-name- 011 0101 65 53 35 5 
isbn-publisher-pages-name-author- 011 0110 66 54 36 6 
author-isbn-name-pages-publisher- 011 0111 67 55 37 7 
author-isbn-name-publisher-pages- 011 1000 70 56 38 8 
author-isbn-pages-name-publisher- 011 1001 71 57 39 9 
author-isbn-pages-publisher-name- 011 1010 72 58 3A : 
author-isbn-publisher-name-pages- 011 1011 73 59 3B ; 
author-isbn-publisher-pages-name- 011 1100 74 60 3C <  
author-name-isbn-pages-publisher- 011 1101 75 61 3D = 
author-name-isbn-publisher-pages- 011 1110 76 62 3E >  
author-name-pages-isbn-publisher- 011 1111 77 63 3F ? 
author-name-pages-publisher-isbn- 100 0000 100 64 40 @ 
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author-name-publisher-isbn-pages- 100 0001 101 65 41 A 
author-name-publisher-pages-isbn- 100 0010 102 66 42 B 
author-pages-isbn-name-publisher- 100 0011 103 67 43 C 
author-pages-isbn-publisher-name- 100 0100 104 68 44 D 
author-pages-name-isbn-publisher- 100 0101 105 69 45 E 
author-pages-name-publisher-isbn- 100 0110 106 70 46 F 
author-pages-publisher-isbn-name- 100 0111 107 71 47 G 
author-pages-publisher-name-isbn- 100 1000 110 72 48 H 
author-publisher-isbn-name-pages- 100 1001 111 73 49 I 
author-publisher-isbn-pages-name- 100 1010 112 74 4A J 
author-publisher-name-isbn-pages- 100 1011 113 75 4B K 
author-publisher-name-pages-isbn- 100 1100 114 76 4C L 
author-publisher-pages-isbn-name- 100 1101 115 77 4D M 
author-publisher-pages-name-isbn- 100 1110 116 78 4E N 
name-isbn-author-pages-publisher- 100 1111 117 79 4F O 
name-isbn-author-publisher-pages- 101 0000 120 80 50 P 
name-isbn-pages-author-publisher- 101 0001 121 81 51 Q 
name-isbn-pages-publisher-author- 101 0010 122 82 52 R 
name-isbn-publisher-author-pages- 101 0011 123 83 53 S 
name-isbn-publisher-pages-author- 101 0100 124 84 54 T 
name-author-isbn-pages-publisher- 101 0101 125 85 55 U 
name-author-isbn-publisher-pages- 101 0110 126 86 56 V 
name-author-pages-isbn-publisher- 101 0111 127 87 57 W 
name-author-pages-publisher-isbn- 101 1000 130 88 58 X 
name-author-publisher-isbn-pages- 101 1001 131 89 59 Y 
name-author-publisher-pages-isbn- 101 1010 132 90 5A Z 
name-pages-isbn-author-publisher- 101 1011 133 91 5B [ 
name-pages-isbn-publisher-author- 101 1100 134 92 5C \ 
name-pages-author-isbn-publisher- 101 1101 135 93 5D ] 
name-pages-author-publisher-isbn- 101 1110 136 94 5E ^ 
name-pages-publisher-isbn-author- 101 1111 137 95 5F _ 
name-pages-publisher-author-isbn- 110 0000 140 96 60 ` 
name-publisher-isbn-author-pages- 110 0001 141 97 61 a 
name-publisher-isbn-pages-author- 110 0010 142 98 62 b 
name-publisher-author-isbn-pages- 110 0011 143 99 63 c 
name-publisher-author-pages-isbn- 110 0100 144 100 64 d 
name-publisher-pages-isbn-author- 110 0101 145 101 65 e 
name-publisher-pages-author-isbn- 110 0110 146 102 66 f 
pages-isbn-author-name-publisher- 110 0111 147 103 67 g 
pages-isbn-author-publisher-name- 110 1000 150 104 68 h 
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pages-isbn-name-author-publisher- 110 1001 151 105 69 i 
pages-isbn-name-publisher-author- 110 1010 152 106 6A j 
pages-isbn-publisher-author-name- 110 1011 153 107 6B k 
pages-isbn-publisher-name-author- 110 1100 154 108 6C l 
pages-author-isbn-name-publisher- 110 1101 155 109 6D m 
pages-author-isbn-publisher-name- 110 1110 156 110 6E n 
pages-author-name-isbn-publisher- 110 1111 157 111 6F o 
pages-author-name-publisher-isbn- 111 0000 160 112 70 p 
pages-author-publisher-isbn-name- 111 0001 161 113 71 q 
pages-author-publisher-name-isbn- 111 0010 162 114 72 r 
pages-name-isbn-author-publisher- 111 0011 163 115 73 s 
pages-name-isbn-publisher-author- 111 0100 164 116 74 t 
pages-name-author-isbn-publisher- 111 0101 165 117 75 u 
pages-name-author-publisher-isbn- 111 0110 166 118 76 v 
pages-name-publisher-isbn-author- 111 0111 167 119 77 w 
pages-name-publisher-author-isbn- 111 1000 170 120 78 x 
pages-publisher-isbn-author-name- 111 1001 171 121 79 y 
pages-publisher-isbn-name-author- 111 1010 172 122 7A z 
pages-publisher-author-isbn-name- 111 1011 173 123 7B { 
pages-publisher-author-name-isbn- 111 1100 174 124 7C | 
pages-publisher-name-isbn-author- 111 1101 175 125 7D } 
pages-publisher-name-author-isbn- 111 1110 176 126 7E ~ 
publisher-isbn-author-name-pages- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 1: To Continue 
publisher-isbn-author-pages-name- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 2 
publisher-isbn-name-author-pages- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 3 
publisher-isbn-name-pages-author- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 4 
publisher-isbn-pages-author-name- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 5 
publisher-isbn-pages-name-author- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 6 
publisher-author-isbn-name-pages- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 7 
publisher-author-isbn-pages-name- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 8 
publisher-author-name-isbn-pages- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 9 
publisher-author-name-pages-isbn- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 10 
publisher-author-pages-isbn-name- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 11 
publisher-author-pages-name-isbn- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 12 
publisher-name-isbn-author-pages- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 13 
publisher-name-isbn-pages-author- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 14 
publisher-name-author-isbn-pages- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 15 
publisher-name-author-pages-isbn- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 16 
publisher-name-pages-isbn-author- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 17 
publisher-name-pages-author-isbn- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 18 
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publisher-pages-isbn-author-name- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 19 
publisher-pages-isbn-name-author- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 20 
publisher-pages-author-isbn-name- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 21 
publisher-pages-author-name-isbn- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 22 
publisher-pages-name-isbn-author- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 23 
publisher-pages-name-author-isbn- N/A N/A N/A N/A Control 24: End of Message 
 
 
 
